News & Additions - The War Profiteers

2012/01/25 - Iraqi Town Says Justice Failed Victims of US Raid

Sat, 28 Jan 2012 00:38:41 +0100

By Barbara Surk & Faris Mohammed
Associated Press
January 25, 2012

Haditha, Iraq - In this town where 24 unarmed civilians died in a U.S. raid seven years ago, residents expressed disbelief and sadness that the Marine sergeant who told his troops to "shoot first, ask questions later" reached a deal with prosecutors to avoid jail time.

They were outraged both at the American military justice system and at the refusal of Iraq's Shiite-led government to condemn the killings and at least try to bring those responsible to face trial in this country.

"We are deeply disappointed by this unfair deal," said Khalid Salman Rasif, an Anbar provincial council member from Haditha. "The U.S. soldier will receive a punishment that is suitable for a traffic violation."

Haditha, a town of about 85,000 people along the Euphrates River valley some 140 miles northwest of Baghdad, is overwhelmingly made up of Sunni Muslims. Sunnis lost influence in this country with the fall of Saddam Hussein and feel increasingly squeezed out of their already limited political role.

"We blame Iraqi officials because they did not take any actions to make the criminals stand trial," said Naji Fahmi, a 45-year-old government employee who was shot in the stomach during what became known as the Haditha massacre.

Iraq's Deputy Justice Minister Busho Ibrahim said on the phone that "we have nothing to do with this issue."

Ali al-Moussawi, a spokesman for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, said "such issue needs to be studied carefully before giving any statement."

Sunni officials and Haditha residents alike said no further study was required.

"This deal is another crime committed against the victims and their families," said Youssef Ayid, who lost four brothers in the Haditha raid. "We are sad to see the criminals escape justice," Ayid said.

The raid took place on Nov. 19, 2005, at a time when Sunni insurgents and al-Qaida militants roamed Haditha's streets, terrorizing the population and battling U.S. forces.

Three months earlier in the same town, six Marines were massacred and their bodies mutilated when insurgents overran their observation post. Two days later, 14 Marines and an interpreter were killed when their vehicle hit a land mine.

The allegations against the Marines were first brought forward in March 2006 when Time magazine reported that it obtained a video of the attack's aftermath, taken by a Haditha journalism student inside the houses and local morgue.

The footage showed a blood-smeared bedroom floor. Bits of what appeared to be human flesh and bullet holes could be clearly seen on the walls. Other scenes showed bodies of women and children in plastic bags on the floor of what appeared to be a morgue.

A week before the images were broadcast, the U.S. military in Iraq said it was investigating potential misconduct by the troops. A military statement issued just days after the Haditha raid had described the incident as an ambush on a joint U.S.-Iraqi patrol in the town that left 15 civilians, eight insurgents and a U.S. Marine dead in the bombing and a subsequent firefight.

The town's residents claimed at the time that the only shooting done after the bombing was by U.S. forces.

The subsequent revelations further tainted America's reputation among Iraqis when it was already at a low point after the release of photos of prisoner abuse by U.S. soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison.

U.S. military prosecutors worked for more than six years to bring Marine Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich to trial on manslaughter charges that could have sent him away to prison for life.

But only weeks after the start of the long-awaited trial at Camp Pendelton, they offered Wuterich a deal that stopped the proceedings and meant no jail time for the squad leader who ordered his men to "shoot first, ask questions later," resulting in one of the Iraq War's worst attacks on civilians by U.S. troops.

The 31-year-old Marine, who was originally accused of unpremeditated murder, pleaded guilty Monday to negligent dereliction of duty for leading the squad that killed 24 unarmed Iraqi civilians during raids after a roadside bomb exploded, killing a fellow Marine and wounding two others.

Wuterich, who was indicted in 19 of the 24 deaths, walked away with no jail time Tuesday after defending his squad's storming of the homes of Haditha as a necessary act "to keep the rest of my Marines alive."

Legal experts said the case was fraught with errors made by investigators and the prosecution that let it drag on for years. The prosecution was also hampered by squad mates who acknowledged they had lied to investigators initially and later testified in exchange for having their cases dropped, bringing into question their credibility.

It was a stunning outcome for the last defendant in the case once compared with the My Lai massacre in Vietnam. The seven other Marines initially charged were exonerated or had their cases dropped.

Local Sunni leaders in Anbar province blasted the plea deal and demanded that Baghdad authorities pressure their U.S. backers not to let American soldiers get away with murder.

Hamid al-Mutlaq, a Sunni lawmaker from Anbar, echoed these remarks.

"They were supposed to protect the Iraqi people, not kill them," he said.

Muhammad Muhsin, a 26-year-old owner of a grocery store in Haditha, said the plea deal was shameful and a disgrace.

"This is a scandal and a shame for American justice," Muhsin said. "The Iraqi government bears responsibility for letting those criminals get away with their heinous crime. We demand the Iraqi government act quickly to ensure the rights of the victims and to make sure that the murderers get what they deserve."

Most Iraqi officials The Associated Press contacted on Tuesday for comment did not respond or declined to comment.

The muted reaction of the officials in the Shiite-dominated government highlights the sectarian resentments that have deepened since the last U.S. forces withdrew late last year. Some fear a return to the type of sectarian warfare that ravaged Iraq during the height of the war.

Surk reported from Baghdad. Associated Press writers Sameer N. Yacoub in Baghdad and Hadi Mizban in Haditha contributed to this report.

External link: http://tinyurl.com/777ol2g

2010/10/14 - European Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 523/2009/TS

Sun, 26 Dec 2010 20:36:22 +0100

Letter & Report by the European Ombudsman

"[...] 20. As a result of the inspection of the document in question, the Ombudsman was able to check whether the Council’s statement of reasoning was sufficient in light of the contents of the document. The document in question contains a draft reply to a letter dated 3 October 2006 from the European Parliament concerning the Council’s contacts with the US administration and, as an annex, an analysis regarding the applicable legal framework. The document deals with several highly sensitive issues concerning the fight against terrorism, and it sets out positions of both parties to the discussions. It contains a detailed analysis of the various issues which were discussed. On this basis, the Ombudsman concludes that, in this case, the statement of reasons set out by the Council for applying the exception based on the protection of public interest as regards international relations was sufficient. The Ombudsman considers that the brevity of the statement of reasons is acceptable in light of the fact that mentioning additional information, in particular making reference to the contents of the document concerned beyond what is stated above, would negate the purpose of the exception.

"21. With regard to the refusal of partial access to the document, the Council expressly stated, first, that this possibility had been considered, and, second, that the reason for rejecting that possibility was that that the content of the document forms an inseparable whole. In light of the contents of the document, the Ombudsman considers that the reason given by the Council for rejecting partial access is adequate.

"22. In light of the foregoing, the Ombudsman considers that, despite the relative brevity of the Council’s statement of reasons for the decision refusing access, the statement of reasons was adequate in view of the contents of the document and of the fact, confirmed by the Ombudsman's inspection, that the contents of the document form an inseparable whole. The Council therefore duly complied with the obligation to provide an appropriate statement of reasons for those decisions.

"23. On the basis of the above, the Ombudsman concludes that there was no maladministration by the Council. [...]"

2010/02/24 - An Examination of the Blackwater Contract and the Need for Oversight

Sun, 26 Dec 2010 16:09:42 +0100

Report by the Committee on Armed Services of the U.S. Senate

"[...] Prepared Statement By Senator Carl Levin

"President Obama has said that a primary objective of our effort in Afghanistan is to strengthen Afghanistan’s government and security forces so that they can take the lead in securing their nation. The President has ordered the deployment of approximately 30,000 additional U.S. troops to help achieve our goals in Afghanistan.

"While most attention has understandably been focused on those 30,000 troops, attention also needs to be paid to the thousands of contractor personnel who are operating in Afghanistan. From training Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to guarding our forward operating bases, contractor personnel are performing missioncritical tasks. According to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), in the last quarter of fiscal year 2009 alone, the number of Department of Defense (DOD) contractor personnel increased by 30,000, bringing the total number in Afghanistan to more than 100,000.

"While we distinguish between American servicemembers and contractor personnel, Afghan civilians often do not. As John Nagl and Richard Fontaine of the Center for New American Security put it: ‘local populations draw little or no distinction between American troops and the contractors employed by them; an act committed by one can have the same effect on local or national opinion as an act carried out by the other.’

"In the fight against the Taliban, the perception of Afghans is crucial. As General Stanley McChrystal said in August of last year ‘the Afghan people will decide who wins this fight, and we ... are in a struggle for their support.’ If we are going to win that struggle, we need to know that our contractor personnel are adequately screened, supervised, and held accountable - because in the end the Afghan people will hold us responsible for their actions.

"Most contractor personnel act responsibly and within the rules to help us execute the mission, often at great risk to their own safety. Today’s hearing, however, will explore contract activities which fell far short of our requirements.

"In the fall of 2008, a company called Paravant entered into a subcontract with Raytheon Technical Services Company to perform weapons training for the Afghan National Army (ANA). The statement of work governing Paravant’s performance was developed by the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A) and contracted out by the U.S. Army’s Program Executive Office Simulation Training and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) to Raytheon.

"Paravant was created in 2008 by Erik Prince Investments (the company which is now named Xe). I’m going to use the names ‘‘Blackwater’’ and ‘‘Paravant’’ interchangeably. I do that for clarity as there is no meaningful distinction between the two. At the time Paravant was awarded its one and only subcontract, it had no employees.

"In Afghanistan, the company operated under Blackwater’s license and shared a bank account with Blackwater. Former Paravant Vice President Brian McCracken reported to Blackwater personnel. According to Mr. McCracken, Raytheon paid Blackwater for services rendered by Paravant and Paravant relied on Blackwater for its billing. Paravant and Blackwater were ‘one and the same,’ according to Mr. McCracken, and he added, Paravant was only created to avoid the ‘baggage’ associated with the Blackwater name.

"It has been widely reported that on May 5, 2009, Justin Cannon and Christopher Drotleff, two men working for Paravant in Afghanistan, fired their weapons, killing two Afghan civilians and injuring a third. In reviewing the Army’s investigation of the incident, then-CSTC-A Commanding General Richard Formica said that it appeared that the contractor personnel involved had ‘violated alcohol consumption policies, were not authorized to possess weapons, violated use of force rules, and violated movement control policies’. According to the Department of Justice prosecutors, the May 5, 2009 shooting ‘caused diplomatic difficulties for U.S. State Department representatives in Afghanistan’ and impacted ‘the national security interests of the United States.’ According to one media report, the shooting ‘turned an entire neighborhood against the U.S. presence’ and quoted a local elder as saying, ‘if they keep killing civilians, I’m sure some Afghans will decide to become insurgents.’

"On January 6, 2010, Mr. Cannon and Mr. Drotleff were indicted on firearm and homicide charges for their involvement in the May 5th shooting. Responsibility for litigating those charges is with the Department of Justice. Today’s hearing will focus on Blackwater-Paravant’s conduct and operations in Afghanistan. As acknowledged by a Blackwater senior executive after the May 5th shooting, an environment was created at Paravant which had ‘no regard for policies, rules, or adherence to regulations in country’.

"Our investigation dug into the events that occurred before the May 5th shooting. We will hear how that environment developed and also discuss failures in U.S. Government oversight that allowed it to persist. In particular, we will hear about Blackwater personnel’s reckless use of weapons, its disregard for the rules governing the acquisition of weapons in Afghanistan, and failures in the company’s vetting process that resulted in those weapons being placed in the hands of people who never should have possessed them. [...]"

2010/12/17 - Ex-Blackwater International Sold

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 02:16:15 +0100

From Agence France Presse
December 17, 2010

New York - Private US security firm Xe, formerly known as Blackwater International, has been bought by a group of investors, they announced on Friday.

New York-based USTC Holdings said it will acquire Xe and its core operating subsidiaries, but did not disclose the price or terms of the agreement in a statement.

USTC Holdings is an investor consortium led by private equity firms Forte Capital Advisors and Manhattan Partners.

Xe's current owner Eric Prince, will sell his entire stake in the company and "will not be involved in the management or operation of the company," USTC Holdings said.

"The company going forward will be managed by a board appointed by the equity owners which will include independent, unaffiliated directors."

The New York Times reported Friday the sale came after the State Department threatened to stop awarding contracts to the company as long as it was owned by Prince, a former Navy SEAL.

The company, once the best known security contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan, has come under pressure since Blackwater guards were accused of killing 17 civilians in Baghdad in 2007.

Prince put the company up for sale in June and moved his family to Abu Dhabi.

The Times said people involved in the negotiations said the sale was worth 200 million dollars, but Prince will receive payments into the future depending on the company's financial performance.

A lead investor is Jason De Yonker of Forte Capital Advisors, who helped Prince develop a business plan after he founded the company in 1997, and negotiated its first training contracts.

Copyright © 2010 AFP.

External link: http://tinyurl.com/35h5plr

2010/12/16 - Blackwater Seeks Dismissal of Iraq Shooting Suit

Sat, 25 Dec 2010 02:13:43 +0100

By Tom Breen
Associated Press
December 16, 2010

Raleigh, N.C. - The security firm formerly known as Blackwater told a federal judge Thursday that the U.S. government - and not the company - should be held accountable for a 2007 shooting by its contractors that killed 17 Iraqis.

The Moyock, N.C.-based company and several of its contractors are seeking the dismissal of a lawsuit that was filed on behalf of three people killed in the shooting - Ali Kinani, Abrahem Abed Al Mafraje and Mahde Sahab Naser Shamake. It accuses the parties of wrongful death and negligence, and seeks punitive damages.

Lawyers for the company, now known as Xe Services, argued in court that Blackwater contractors were essentially acting as employees of the U.S. government because they were providing security to State Department personnel.

Unlike duties performed by other contractors, the sensitive nature of providing security in a war zone required the kind of oversight the government normally reserves for its own employees, attorney Andrew Pincus argued.

"This isn't food service, where we can sort of leave it to the chefs," he said.

Lawyers for both the plaintiffs and the government disputed that, and said the practical effect of transferring the focus of the lawsuit to the federal government would be its dismissal. The federal government is exempt from such lawsuits.

Judge Terrence W. Boyle didn't immediately rule on the motions in the case, but said the most important issue seems to be whether the government is ultimately responsible for the actions of its contractors.

"If the government can cut the cord and let that drift off into space, that's one world," he said. "But it's a different world if the government has to be held accountable."

In separate motions, lawyers for Blackwater and the contractors argued they can't be sued by foreigners for something that happened in a foreign country governed by foreign law. They also argue that Iraqi law prohibits such lawsuits.

The contractors contend insurgents ambushed them in a traffic circle before they opened fire, but prosecutors say the men unleashed an unprovoked attack on civilians using machine guns and grenades.

The five contractors were initially charged with manslaughter for their role in the 2007 Nisoor Square shooting, which strained relations between Baghdad and Washington. A year ago, a federal judge dismissed those charges, citing missteps by the government.

A sixth contractor, Jeremy Ridgeway, pleaded guilty in the criminal case. He filed a separate defense in the civil lawsuit, arguing that the federal court in North Carolina has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Blackwater changed its name to Xe Services in March, saying its brand had been tarnished by its work in Iraq. The company settled a separate series of federal lawsuits earlier this year connected to the Nisoor Square shooting and others in Iraq.

The company is now looking for new ownership.

Associated Press Writer Mike Baker contributed to this report.

External link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/16/AR2010121606064.html
________________________________________________________________________________________

Blackwater Founder in Deal to Sell Company

By Andrew Ross Sorkin & Ben Protess
New York Times
December 16, 2010

Erik D. Prince, the founder of the private security firm formerly known as Blackwater Worldwide, has reached a deal to sell his embattled firm to a small group of investors based in Los Angeles who have close ties to Mr. Prince, according to people briefed on the deal.

Blackwater, now called Xe Services, was once the United States’ go-to contractor in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has been under intense pressure since 2007, when Blackwater guards were accused of killing 17 civilians in Nisour Square in Baghdad. The company, its executives and personnel have faced civil lawsuits, criminal charges and Congressional investigations surrounding accusations of murder and bribery. In April, federal prosecutors announced weapons charges against five former senior Blackwater executives, including its former president.

The sale, which is expected to be announced on Friday, came after the State Department threatened to stop awarding contracts to the company as long as Mr. Prince owned the firm, people involved in the discussions said. These people requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about the confidential talks. The sale is intended to help shake the stigma associated with its ownership under Mr. Prince.

Yet questions remain about Mr. Prince’s continuing relationship with the company. While he is expected to step down from any management or operational role, he will have a financial interest in the company’s future, according to people briefed on the negotiations. As part of the deal, he will be paid an “earn out,” or a payment that depends on the company’s financial performance over the next several years, these people said.

One of the lead investors in the deal is Jason DeYonker of Forté Capital Advisors, who has a long relationship with Mr. Prince and Blackwater. He helped advise Mr. Prince in his development of Blackwater’s business plan when the company was founded and helped negotiate the company’s first training contracts with United States government agencies and the company’s expansion of its training center in Moyock, N.C. In addition, he managed the Prince family’s money from 1998 to 2002. The other lead investor is Manhattan Growth Partners, a private equity firm in New York.

Exact terms of the deal could not be learned, but people involved in the talks said the transaction was worth about $200 million. Bank of America led the financing of the transaction, these people said.

Mr. Prince, a former Navy Seal who created Blackwater in 1997, put his company up for sale in June and moved his family to Abu Dhabi, court records show. Mr. Prince, who built Blackwater using an inheritance from his family’s Michigan auto parts fortune, stepped aside as Xe’s chief executive in 2009 but has remained chairman until now. Mr. Prince sold the company’s aviation division, Presidential Airways, to the AAR Corporation in March.

The auction for Xe Services has dragged on for months as speculation has swirled about the company’s future and the auction process. Some bidders speculated that Mr. Prince had always favored selling the company to the investor group led by Mr. DeYonker.

The new buyers are hoping to recast the company as a military training organization instead of a private security service. The company’s training center in Moyock has trained more than 50,000 United States government personnel and allied forces. The buyers hope to receive new contracts to train forces in Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen, among other locations, especially as the United States withdraws troops and needs to train local forces.

After the sale, the company will continue to be subject to an agreement it reached with the State Department in August. Under the settlement, the company paid $42 million in fines over hundreds of violations of United States export control regulations, permitting it to continue to compete for government contracts.

Wendy Wysong, a partner at the law firm Clifford Chance, was appointed as a special compliance officer for Xe Services as a result of the settlement.

James Risen contributed reporting.

Copyright 2010 The New York Times Company

External link: http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/blackwater-founder-in-deal-to-sell-company/

2010/12/08 - Officials Pressed Germans on Kidnapping by C.I.A.

Sun, 19 Dec 2010 01:12:13 +0100

By Michael Slackman
New York Times
December 8, 2010

Berlin - American officials exerted sustained pressure on Germany not to enforce arrest warrants against Central Intelligence Agency officers involved in the 2003 kidnapping of a German citizen mistakenly believed to be a terrorist, diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks show.

John M. Koenig, the American deputy chief of mission in Berlin, issued a pointed warning in February 2007 urging that Germany "weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with the U.S." in the case of Khaled el-Masri, a German of Lebanese descent. Mr. Masri said he was held in a secret United States prison in Afghanistan and tortured before his captors acknowledged their mistake and let him go.

The United States’ concern over the Masri case was detailed in cables sent from the United States Embassies in Germany, Spain and Macedonia in 2006 and 2007.

The cables indicated what was long suspected by German opposition leaders who led a parliamentary inquiry into the case: intense political pressure from Washington was the reason that Germany never pressed for the arrest and extradition of 13 operatives believed to be from the C.I.A. who were ultimately charged in indictments issued in Spain and in Munich.

"I am not surprised by this," said Hans-Christian Ströbele, a member of the Green bloc in Parliament who then sat on the legislative investigative committee. "It was confirmed once again that the U.S. government kept the German government" from seeking the arrest of the agents.

In one cable, written before Mr. Koenig’s warning to Germany’s deputy national security adviser, the embassy in Berlin reported that diplomatic officials had "continued to stress with German counterparts the potential negative implications for our bilateral relationship, and in particular for our counter-terrorism cooperation, if further steps are taken to seek the arrest or extradition of U.S. citizens/officials."

In 2006 and 2007, the Masri case was one of the most difficult issues between Washington and Berlin, exposing to public scrutiny secret tactics used in the Bush administration’s antiterrorism efforts that were sharply criticized both in the United States and in Europe. At the time, political pressure was mounting in Germany to investigate and expose the practice of extraordinary rendition, which involved capturing suspects and sending them to third-party countries for questioning in secret prisons.

Mr. Masri was seized on Dec. 31, 2003, as he entered Macedonia while on vacation; border security guards confused him with an operative of Al Qaeda with a similar name. He says he was turned over to the C.I.A., which flew him to Afghanistan, where he says he was tortured, sodomized and injected with drugs. After five months, he was dropped on a roadside in Albania. No charges were brought against him.

The case drew widespread attention in Europe. The cables show that the United States was especially concerned about cooperation between Spanish and German prosecutors. The Spanish courts became involved because they concluded that the plane that transported Mr. Masri had traveled through Spanish territory.

"This coordination among independent investigators will complicate our efforts to manage this case at a discreet government-to-government level," read a cable sent from the embassy in Madrid in January 2007.

The cables’ release has created a stir in Germany mostly because the documents contain American diplomats’ caustic comments about German officials and because they show that the embassy had informants in one of the governing parties. The Masri case, however, has already been so thoroughly discussed in public, and the degree of Washington’s pressure on Berlin is so well known, that it has not gained much attention.

The one cable that has caught the attention of some in the German press was written on Feb. 6, 2007, by Mr. Koenig, the second-highest-ranking diplomat in the embassy, under the title "CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS."

Rolf Nikel, Germany’s deputy national security adviser, told Mr. Koenig that the two governments had differences over Washington’s antiterrorism methods, including German opposition to the prison at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and to rendition. Mr. Nikel said, according to the cable, "the Chancellery is well aware of the bilateral political implications of the case, but added that this case ‘will not be easy,’ because of the intense pressure from the parliament and the German media."

Mr. Koenig said that while Washington "recognized the independence of the German judiciary," he added that "to issue international arrest warrants or extradition requests would require the concurrence of the German Federal Government."

His point was that the case could be stopped.

The prosecutor’s office in Munich issued warrants for the arrest of the C.I.A. operatives, but Germany’s government did not press for arrests or extraditions.

"We already dealt with this, including in the Bundestag, about why the German federal government did not take further action to carry out the arrest warrant," said Mr. Ströbele. "How one deals with the fact that he was taken into custody and tortured - whether more will be revealed on that - what was done in order to keep it a secret: that is what interests me."

Diana Aurisch contributed reporting.

External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/09/world/europe/09wikileaks-elmasri.html

2006/02/06 - Subject: Macedonia: Prime Minister On Elections, NATO Accession, ICTY and Kosovo Final Status

Sun, 19 Dec 2010 00:28:39 +0100

Confidential Report by the U.S. Embassy in Skopje, Macedonia

VZCZCXRO7436
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #0118/01 0371811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061811Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4207
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUESEN/SKOPJE BETA
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000118

SIPDIS
NOFORN

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: PRIME MINISTER ON ELECTIONS, NATO
ACCESSION, ICTY AND KOSOVO FINAL STATUS

REF: SKOPJE 104

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY

1. (C/NF) PM Buckovski told the Ambassador February 1 that parliamentary elections likely will be held in late June/early July, and that he expects the opposition to use rough campaign and electoral tactics in trying to replace his government. On Macedonia's NATO accession prospects, he agreed the government must do more to coordinate anti-corruption efforts and to ensure aggressive prosecution of corruption cases. The GOM will ask the ICTY to delay the return of four potential war crimes cases until at least the end of 2006. Buckovski believes Kosovo final status should be determined "the sooner the better" in order to safeguard regional stability; he is convinced final status ultimately will end in independence. The GOM will keep its head down and guard up regarding allegations that Macedonia has assisted the USG in the "el-Masri" case that has captured local media attention. With the 2006 parliamentary elections in mind and campaigning about to begin in the next several months, Buckovski wants to portray himself as a pragmatic leader, and to ensure that none of his policy stances differs significantly from ours. End Summary.

PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN EARLY SUMMER, CONCERNS ABOUT OPPOSITION TACTICS

2. (C) During a dinner with Ambassador, DCM, DATT, and P/E Chief on February 1, PM Buckovski said parliamentary elections likely would be held in late June or early July to allow the next government to organize itself during the summer. The draft electoral code would enter parliamentary debate by the first week of March, with passage expected by mid-March. Buckovski, who was accompanied by his foreign policy and national security advisers, said he was hopeful the parliament would have passed important judicial reform laws (on the police and on the courts) before the election date.

3. (C) Buckovski said he was concerned that opposition center-right party VMRO-DPMNE would play a "destructive" role during the electoral campaign and elections. He cited recent demonstrations by unemployed tobacco workers from Kumanovo and Prilep, and ongoing street blockades by an NGO protesting government plans to privatize the state electrical power company, as typical examples of VMRO-DPMNE destabilization tactics. (Comment: We agree there was a partisan political dimension to the protests, in addition to the underlying socio-economic complaints by workers and citizens. End Comment.)

4. (C) Noting VMRO-DPMNE objections to government plans to staff local election boards with civil servants, Buckovski said that previous elections had been marred by the appointment of political party members to those boards, which made the board members susceptible to manipulation and fraud. The government proposal would, he claimed, be more reassuring to voters, especially in primarily ethnic Albanian areas where fraud had typically been most prevalent. Ethnic Albanians would put more stock in the integrity of civil service professionals than they would in party representatives.

DPA'S RETURN TO PARLIAMENT

5. (C) Buckovski thanked Ambassador for her constructive role in persuading the ethnic Albanian opposition party DPA to return to the Parliament after a 9-month hiatus to protest irregularities during local elections last March and April (reftel). He said that he would welcome receiving DPA's suggestions for amendments to the draft electoral code, and would discuss those amendments the following day (February 2) with a DPA representative. During the conversation, Buckovski spoke by phone with DPA Vice President Menduh Thaci, and with Speaker of Parliament Jordanovski, to arrange for DPA's return to Parliament the week of February 6.

NATO ACCESSION

6. (C) Ambassador briefed Buckovski on the upcoming visit by a high-level US delegation to review Macedonia's progress toward meeting its MAP goals. She said it would be important for Macedonia to demonstrate that it was a net contributor to security. The country had to convince some skeptical NATO members that bringing Macedonia into the Alliance would not be tantamount to "importing instability." Also, the GOM would have do more to combat corruption, including better coordination of existing anti-corruption efforts and more aggressive efforts to prosecute high-level corruption cases.

7. (C) Buckovski agreed that more needed to be done to fight corruption. He accepted the need for stronger coordination, and said Foreign Policy Adviser Mersel Biljali was in charge of "finding a methodology" for tackling the problem. Buckovski noted his personal ties to both the Public Prosecutor ("a friend") and the Minister of Justice (a former law student of his) and even offered personally to head the effort to improve coordination among the various judicial agencies to enhance anti-corruption efforts.

ICTY RETURN OF CASES -- REQUEST FOR DELAY

8. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's request for an update on the status of the return of four unindicted cases from the ICTY to Macedonian jurisdiction, Buckovski said that Chief Public Prosecutor Prcevski would meet with ICTY investigators in late February to ask orally for a delay in the return. Buckovski did not want a paper trail or any documentation of the request for a delay, since that could later be used by the opposition to attack the government for being soft on the ethnic Albanians (all four cases involved eAlbanians alleged to have committed war crimes during the 2001 internal armed conflict.)

9. (C) Comment: Buckovski's information was at odds with FM Mitreva's report to the EU Special Representative this week that Prcevski would travel to The Hague on February 2 to request the delayed return of cases. This discrepancy reflects the general lack of coordination on this matter between the Prime Minister, Mitreva, and the President -- the only three GOM officials with the authority to make decisions regarding the return of cases. Buckovski reportedly told the press on February 2 that he expected the return of cases "to coincide with completion of the judicial reforms," and that the cases likely would be returned "by the end of 2006." End Comment.

KOSOVO FINAL STATUS

10. (C) On Kosovo final status, Buckovski said he could see no other possible outcome but independence. He said he agreed with the US position, that Kosovo final status should be determined "the sooner, the better" to reduce the potential for future instability in the region. As a positive example to Kosovo and the region of Macedonia's multi-ethnic experience, he said, the GOM planned to host in Ohrid in August the 5th anniversary commemoration of the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended the 2001 internal armed conflict in Macedonia. Buckovski said he hoped for high-level representation at the event from those countries and organizations that had signed the original agreement, in particular the U.S. and EU.

EL-MASRI: STAY THE COURSE

11. (C/NOFORN) Concerning the case of a German citizen of Lebanese descent who has claimed that Macedonian authorities detained him in January 2004 and handed him over to the CIA for a rendition flight to Afghanistan, Buckovski noted that the GOM would stay the course and would continue to support the Minister of Interior, who has declined to discuss the matter with the local press. Buckovski was relieved to hear from the Ambassador that we would not shift course, either, and would continue to decline to discuss in public specific cases. The Prime Minister suggested that the Ambassador coordinate on the issue with the German Embassy in Skopje, suggesting that the Germans were putting pressure on the Macedonians to be more forthcoming. The Ambassador demurred.

TRILATERAL MEETING ALONG A-3 LINES

12. (SBU) Buckovski mentioned that he was organizing a "trilateral meeting" in Tirana with his Albanian and Croatian counterparts (mirroring the Adriatic Partnership), and hoped the U.S. Ambassador in Tirana would be able to participate. He gave no specifics regarding the objective of the meeting, other than to mention that it would strengthen regional cooperation.

COMMENT

13. (C) Buckovski characterized the dinner as a chance to further strengthen the close cooperation between the Embassy and his office. He pledged "open and frank" communication
between his office and the Embassy, and suggested Macedonia continues to view the U.S. as its single most important "strategic partner." Buckovski clearly was eager to get feedback on sensitive issues, and to portray himself as a pragmatic leader who can listen to arguments at odds with his own views, and who is ready to compromise when needed. With parliamentary elections likely in summer 2006 and the campaign season about to begin, Buckovski also feels it is necessary to show that he has international community support, especially from the US, and that his policy stances do not conflict with ours on any high-profile matters.
MILOVANOVIC

2010/12/10 - Court Rejects El-Masri Suit Against German Gov’t

Fri, 17 Dec 2010 00:38:48 +0100

From the Associated Press
December 10, 2010

Berlin - A German court rejected a lawsuit filed by Khaled el-Masri seeking to force Berlin into prosecuting suspected CIA agents who he alleges illegally detained him nearly eight years ago as part of the U.S. rendition program.

The Cologne Administrative Court, in a ruling on Dec. 7, supported Berlin's decision not to seek the Americans' extradition after Washington told the Germans in 2007 it would reject any attempts to prosecute its agents, citing national security concerns. The ruling was published on Friday.

The court ruled that "the German government's decision not to seek the extradition of the agents, despite the arrest warrant issued by a German court, was legal."

El-Masri's lawyer said he and his client were considering whether to appeal the ruling. They have one month to do so.

El-Masri, 44, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, says he was illegally detained by CIA agents while entering Macedonia on New Year's Eve 2003 and then transferred to a CIA-run prison in Afghanistan, where he says he was beaten, sodomized and injected with drugs.

Five months later, el-Masri says, he was dumped on a hilltop in Albania.

U.S. officials have never publicly commented on the case, but diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks website show that diplomats in Germany and Macedonia were at pains to keep the case out of the news and the court.

In a cable from the U.S. Embassy in Skopje, Macedonia, dated Feb. 6, 2006, then-Prime Minister Vlado Buckovski is cited as promising the U.S. ambassador he would continue to refuse local press requests to discuss the el-Masri case.

Buckovski goes on to ask if the ambassador could speak to his German counterpart, "suggesting that the Germans were putting pressure on the Macedonians to be more forthcoming," according to the cable, which says the ambassador refused.

Another cable originating from the U.S. Embassy in Berlin in 2007 cites the deputy chief of mission, John M. Koenig, as telling the German deputy national security adviser that issuing warrants for the agents "would have a negative impact on our bilateral relationship."

El-Masri's lawyer, Manfred Gnjidic, said the leaked documents "clearly show" the "massive efforts" on the part of the U.S. government to keep el-Masri's case out of the courts. He expressed hope they would help him win justice for his client.

"We all know what happened, the question has been how can we prove it?" Gnjidic said.

El-Masri is serving an unrelated two-year prison sentence for attacking the mayor of his home town in 2009.

Copyright © 2010 The Associated Press.

External link: http://tinyurl.com/2uo3l47

2010/12/15 - Italian Court Increases Sentences for 23 CIA Agents

Fri, 17 Dec 2010 00:11:05 +0100

By Ella Ide
Agence France Presse
December 15, 2010

Rome - An Italian court upped the sentences for 23 CIA agents convicted in absentia of abducting an Egyptian imam in one of the biggest cases against the US "extraordinary rendition" programme.

The 23 CIA agents, originally sentenced in November 2009 to five to eight years in prison, had their sentences increased to seven to nine years on appeal in what one of the defence lawyers described as a "shocking blow" for the US.

They were also ordered to pay 1.5 million euros (two million dollars) in damages to the imam and his wife for the 2003 abduction.

Washington has refused to extradite the agents, who all remain at liberty but now risk arrest if they travel to Europe.

Osama Mustafa Hassan, a radical Islamist opposition figure better known as Abu Omar, was snatched from a street in Milan in 2003 in an operation coordinated by the CIA and the Italian military intelligence agency SISMI.

Abu Omar, who enjoyed political asylum in Italy, was then allegedly taken to the Aviano US air base in northeastern Italy, then flown to a US base in Germany, and on to Cairo, where he says he was tortured.

Among the defendants sentenced on Wednesday was Bob Seldon Lady, former head of the CIA station in Milan, whose sentence was increased to nine years from eight. The other 22 agents had their sentences upped from five to seven years.

Guido Meroni, a defence lawyer for six of the 23 agents, said he believed the sentences had been increased because the court had rejected the mitigating circumstances that had led to the original judgement.

"The judges had originally ruled they had just been following orders, but it seems the court of appeals didn't agree," he told AFP.

"I am surprised. I didn't think the sentences would be increased. Of course we will take it to the supreme court," he added.

The court also acquitted the then head of Italian military intelligence, Nicolo Pollari, and his assistant Marco Mancini, because producing evidence against them would have violated state secrecy rules.

In an earlier hearing on Wednesday, the court ordered a re-trial for three other CIA officers, including the then CIA chief for Italy Jeffrey Castelli, because of irregularities in the appeal procedures.

In the first trial they had benefited from diplomatic immunity and had been acquitted.

Their lawyer, Alessia Sorgato, said the court had taken a hard line against the other agents.

"It's a shocking blow for the Americans," she said.

Amnesty International welcomed the judgement, but said that Italy's role in the affair should also be examined.

"The Italian government and its officials should not be able to use 'state secrecy' as a shield to cover up human rights abuse," said Amnesty's counter-terrorism specialist Julia Hall.

"The government must engage in a full and fair accountability process even if its official are embarrassed or even vulnerable to criminal charges for their actions," she added.

"Kidnapping is a crime, not a 'state secret'."

The "extraordinary rendition" programme was launched in 2003 by then US president George W. Bush and saw scores of suspects returned to their home countries, some of which were known to use torture.

Abu Omar's US captors failed to take many standard precautions, notably speaking openly on cell phones, leaving investigators to suspect they had cleared their intentions with Italian intelligence.

Copyright © 2010 AFP.

External link: http://tinyurl.com/2w3ujy4

2006/02/15 - Subject: Secstate Legal Adviser on War on Terrorism

Tue, 14 Dec 2010 00:10:08 +0100

Confidential Report by the U.S. Embassy in Brussels, Belgium

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 000524

SIPDIS

DOD FOR HAYNES
NSC FOR WIEGMANN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PHUM EUN USEU BRUSSELS
SUBJECT: SECSTATE LEGAL ADVISER ON WAR ON TERROR

Classified By: USEU POLOFF TODD HUIZINGA, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Secstate Legal Adviser John Bellinger met with a comprehensive array of EU interlocutors in Brussels on February 7-8 to discuss U.S. views on the legal framework for the war on terrorism. He stressed that U.S. decisions on how to deal with an unprecedented global terrorist threat had been made after serious consideration of all legal and political options, and that European officials must publicly underline U.S.-EU solidarity in the fight against terror. On Guantanamo detainees and Al Qaeda, Bellinger argued that the U.S. was and is acting in the context of a new form of international armed conflict, and that therefore, while the Geneva Conventions do not fit this new situation well, the rules of war provide a more appropriate framework than domestic criminal law. He discussed European concerns about the treatment of detainees. Bellinger also argued that rendition is a vital tool against terror. Finally, he urged the EU not to support a Cuban resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission on Guantanamo. The EU response to the visit was for the most part extremely positive, with the Legal Adviser of the Austrian EU presidency underlining that "the fight against terror is our (shared) struggle." Europeans, however, remain concerned about protection issues.
END SUMMARY.

-----------------------------
COMPREHENSIVE SET OF MEETINGS
-----------------------------

2. (SBU) On February 7-8, Secretary of State Legal Adviser John Bellinger met with a wide range of EU and member-state officials, including Robert Cooper, Director-General for Common Foreign and Security Policy at the EU Council Secretariat; Jean-Claude Piris, the Director-General of the Legal Services of the EU Council Secretariat; Michel Petite, Director-General of the Legal Services of the European Commission; Jim Cloos, EU Council Secretariat Director for Transatlantic Relations, Human Rights and UN; and Gijs de Vries, EU Coordinator for the Fight Against Terrorism. The visit was capped by a two-and-a-half-hour discussion with the EU Legal Services Working Group (COJUR), comprising the MFA Legal Advisers of the 25 EU member states, plus Commission and Council Legal Services and Romanian and Bulgarian observers.

--------------------------------------------
BASIC CONTEXT: UNPRECEDENTED GLOBAL CONFLICT
--------------------------------------------

3. (SBU) Bellinger stressed that the situation in which the U.S. and its allies find themselves is unprecedented -- faced with thousands of Al Qaeda and associated terrorists around the globe whose goal is to inflict mass casualties on innocent civilians by any means possible. The legal frameworks that are readily available, the Geneva Conventions or domestic criminal law, do not fit this unprecedented situation well. In this context, the USG has thought long and hard about how best to prosecute the conflict thrust upon it in a way that is politically and legally legitimate, and the answer to the question of what the rules should be that govern the war on terror is not an easy one.

------------------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH AL QAEDA
------------------------------------------

4. (SBU) It is clear, Bellinger said, that the military response against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, an action covered by UNSC Resolution 1373, is properly categorized as an international armed conflict. The U.S. believes that the continuing struggle against Al Qaeda remains a legal state of international armed conflict. Al Qaeda has attacked, and continues to attack, our ships, embassies, people, and territory. Its leaders have explicitly declared war on us. Therefore, the proper legal framework cannot be that of domestic criminal law. Al Qaeda is not the same as domestic European terrorist groups like the IRA or RAF because it is global and operates outside the U.S. and across borders. It is in effect a new manifestation on the battlefield, that of "armies of terrorists." Conceptually, this is a military conflict, not a police action to round up criminals. Most detainees have been picked up by our armed forces on foreign battlefields. Practically, these cases would be virtually impossible for domestic courts to handle, since there are rarely witnesses, statements, or forensic or documentary evidence that would meet domestic standards. Accordingly, the most appropriate framework would be the rules of international armed conflict.

5. (SBU) It is important to note, Bellinger emphasized, the distinction between the President's political statement that we are part of a "war on terror" and the legal status of the international armed conflict with Al Qaeda. When the President speaks of the War on Terror after 9/11, he is taking the position that we must all declare our opposition to terrorism of any kind. The U.S. also believes, however, that it has been and continues to be in a legal state of armed conflict specifically with Al Qaeda.

----------------------------------------
DETAINEES COVERED BY GENEVA CONVENTIONS?
----------------------------------------

6. (SBU) Bellinger stressed that the current rules of international armed conflict do not fit this unprecedented situation very well. After 9/11, the U.S. carefully considered whether and to what extent the Geneva Conventions would apply. Article 2 of the Third Geneva Convention declares that these conventions apply only between High Contracting Parties. While Afghanistan was a High Contracting Party, Al Qaeda is certainly not. In addition, Article 4 dictates that a POW must be a soldier in a national army, wear a uniform with marked insignia, carry arms openly, and follow the laws and customs of war. Because the Taliban did not meet any of these conditions, they are not covered as POWs under the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, Al Qaeda members could not be considered "protected persons" under the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Fourth Convention defines "protected persons" as civilians caught up in a conflict. Al Qaeda was not caught up in, but rather initiated, the conflict. Bellinger noted that privileges are given to POWs under the Geneva Conventions for following the laws of war, which are intended to protect civilians from harm. Al Qaeda and the Taliban completely disregard the rules of war and intentionally target civilians.

7. (SBU) If not covered as POWs or protected persons, what, then, is the status of Al Qaeda and Taliban combatants? Bellinger asserted that there is a clear gap between these terms, and that the gap is intentional. Article 5 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, he notes, specifies that "spies and saboteurs" are not granted rights and privileges under the Geneva Conventions. This designation, "spies and saboteurs," is the designation in the Geneva Conventions that most closely describes Al Qaeda terrorists. Thus, though they are combatants, they are best defined as unlawful combatants who do not have a right to any protections under the Geneva Conventions. Bellinger also explained that the term “unlawful combatant” is not a new term but rather has been used for many years in treatises and military manuals to describe those who engage in combat, but in an unlawful manner.

8. (SBU) Bellinger added that the U.S. response to Al Qaeda attacks does not make members of Al Qaeda legitimate combatants under the Geneva Conventions. Al Qaeda does not follow the laws of war, and the fact that the U.S. is fighting back in no way renders unlawful combatants legitimate under the very laws they do not respect.

------------------------------------
STANDARDS FOR TREATMENT OF DETAINEES
------------------------------------

9. (SBU) If the protections of the Geneva Conventions do not apply, Bellinger said, there is the question of what rules the U.S. is applying to detainees. Accordingly, to clarify U.S. policy towards detainees President Bush issued a public directive on February 7, 2002, titled "Humane Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees." This directive orders that all detainees under the control of the Armed Forces be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, consistent with the Geneva Conventions. In addition, the U.S. remains bound by, and committed to, the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This includes Article 4, which prohibits torture, and Article 3, which prohibits transfers of persons to countries where there is substantial likelihood that they will be tortured. Article 3 is applied on a case-by-case basis. A country's poor record on human rights will raise a red flag, but not necessarily entail a prohibition against transferring a detainee to that country. Instead, in each individual case the U.S. seeks assurances that the person involved will not be tortured, and a transfer is only allowed if those assurances are deemed credible. Regarding Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture, which prohibits cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, the U.S. Senate expressed reservations during ratification in 1995 because there was no definition of "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" in the Convention. The Senate's reservation dictated that the U.S. would tie this provision to the prohibitions of cruel and unusual treatment in the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Because these constitutional amendments apply only to U.S. citizens in territories under U.S. jurisdiction, the Department of Justice interpreted the Senate reservation to mean that Article 16 applies only inside the United States. Nonetheless, as Secretary Rice said in December, as a matter of policy the U.S will treat detainees in a manner consistent with these standards.

10. (SBU) Bellinger described recent U.S. legislation further codifying the standards applied towards detainees. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, he explained, allows the Armed Forces to use interrogation techniques listed in the U.S. Army Field Manual. In addition, the McCain Amendment codifies the prohibition of cruel, unusual and inhuman treatment, as interpreted by the Senate in its reservation concerning Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture, of any detainee regardless of nationality or of where he is being held. Also, the Graham-Levin Amendment allows detainees to appeal the results of military commissions or Combatant Status Review Tribunals (see para 12) to federal courts, while limiting detainees' ability to file frivolous habeas corpus suits in U.S. courts. Bellinger also explained the President's signing statement, issued with his signature of the McCain Amendment. Bellinger said the statement is in keeping with customary presidential practice and does not indicate any intention to ignore the law. Rather, the statement explains how the President intends to interpret the law consistent with the powers conferred upon him by the Constitution. Bellinger pointed further to the public statement released by the White House at the same time, which demonstrates the President's commitment to upholding the McCain Amendment.

--------------------------------
REGULAR REVIEW OF DETAINEE CASES
--------------------------------

11. (SBU) Bellinger then raised some of the more troubling questions. For example, according to the rules of international armed conflict, a nation may hold detainees until the end of the conflict, when they no longer pose a threat. How long, however, will the war against Al Qaeda last? Can detainees be held indefinitely? What if some are innocent? The U.S. recognizes that these are troubling questions, but does not believe such questions could justify a decision not to detain people who represent a danger to American citizens. To deal with this problem at Guantanamo, the U.S. has created an annual Administrative Review Board process to determine, for each individual detainee, whether that detainee should still be considered as in a state of war with the U.S. This process has resulted in the release of 180 detainees and the transfer to other countries of 76, leaving approximately 500 detainees left in Guantanamo. Of those released, at least a dozen people are known to have gone back to fighting against the United States.

12. (SBU) The question has also been raised as to the possible innocence of Guantanamo detainees. As the Geneva Conventions dictate, if there is any doubt about whether or not an individual is a POW, there must be an Article 5 tribunal. Since Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters clearly did not meet the conditions necessary to be granted POW status, the President decided that Article 5 tribunals were not necessary. In 2004, however, Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) were mandated by the Supreme Court. The CSRT process goes beyond the brief tribunals required by Article 5, providing each individual detainee with a full review. These CSRTs have resulted in the determination that there was not enough information upon which to hold a further 38 detainees.

----------
RENDITIONS
----------

13. (SBU) Bellinger pointed out that renditions have been used for decades to detain terrorists and criminals who cannot be extradited or otherwise detained or brought to justice. He stressed that the United States does not conduct "extraordinary" renditions for the purpose of torturing suspects or transferring them to countries in which they will be tortured. There are many circumstances in which a rendition might be the best option. In all cases, renditions are conducted in a manner consistent with international obligations and the sovereignty of other states. The U.S. would expect that states cooperating in rendition activities would also do so in a manner consistent with their domestic law.

14. (SBU) Bellinger sought to dispel allegations that hundreds of people had been kidnapped from European streets. He pointed out that there is no evidence for such allegations, and that the United States respects the sovereignty of European governments. On renditions, CIA flights, and other intelligence operations, the U.S. will not confirm or deny specific allegations, in order not to compromise the confidentiality of intelligence operations as such. Bellinger noted that denying five out of six such allegations would in effect confirm the sixth. The U.S. trusts that European governments will continue to follow the same policy.

----------------------------------------
GUANTANAMO AT UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION
----------------------------------------

15. (C) Some EU interlocutors expressed concern that some EU member states would support a Cuban resolution against U.S. actions in Guantanamo at the upcoming UN Human Rights Commission, that might be modeled after a European Parliament resolution on the subject. Bellinger warned that European support for a Guanatanamo resolution would be a serious setback to U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism, and give the unacceptable impression that the EU was aligned with Cuba against the U.S. EU Council Director-General for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Robert Cooper, said some EU member states might feel obliged to support the resolution because they had agreed last year not to in return for U.S. commitment to allow the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Novak, to visit Guantanamo; now, the U.S. had gone back on that agreement. Bellinger explained that the U.S. had invited Novak to visit, but that Novak had chosen publicly to reject the U.S. offer (to visit under normal conditions, but not to able to interview individual detainees, as only the ICRC may do that). Cooper said the EU, having cooperated with the U.S. in resisting Chinese attempts to impose conditions on visits of Special Rapporteurs, was having difficulty justifying the U.S. attempts to impose conditions on Novak's Guantanamo visit. Both sides agreed that the U.S. and EU needed to consult further in order to avoid a train wreck at the Human Rights Commission on this.

------------------------------------
EUROPEAN REACTIONS POSITIVE FOR U.S.
------------------------------------

16. (C) COMMENT: By and large, Bellinger's European interlocutors responded very positively to his visit. Their questions were many and varied, and all of the meetings were marked by vigorous but constructive discussion. It is clear that many Europeans continue to believe that Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions can be applied to enemy combatants, and still afford the United States the flexibility it seeks. It is also apparent that lingering concerns (fed by negative public perceptions) remain about the treatment of detainees, and protection against wrongful detentions. Some governments remain focused on renditions, and the possibility that there will be negative revelations that impact on them directly.

17. That said, the visit was very helpful in beginning to dispel European misunderstandings and misgivings about our pursuit of the war on terror. Continued engagement on these issues is critical in the coming months to persuade EU governments to stand more firmly and publicly in the face of their public's concerns and suspicion regarding Guantanamo, renditions, and the legality of U.S. actions against Al Qaeda. The Austrian Chair of the COJUR meeting, Ferdinand Trauttmansdorf, concluded the meeting with the following message: "We leave this discussion with the notion that America is carefully considering these difficult questions in good faith." He said also that the fight against terror was a burden shared by the EU, and that the U.S. has as much of a right to ask questions of the EU, as the EU does of the U.S. On the upcoming Human Rights Commission, urgent consultations with the EU will be necessary to avert the possibility of EU support for a Cuban Guantanamo resolution.

18. (U) This message has been cleared by Legal Adviser John Bellinger.

Gray

2009/05/19 - Subject: Scenesetter: President Mubarak’s Visit to Washington

Mon, 13 Dec 2010 01:22:00 +0100

Secret Report by the U.S. Embassy in Cairo, Egypt

O 191258Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2465

Tuesday, 19 May 2009, 12:58
S E C R E T CAIRO 000874
NEA FOR FO; NSC FOR KUMAR AND SHAPIRO
EO 12958 DECL: 05/17/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, KDEM, ECON, EG, IS, IR, IZ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: PRESIDENT MUBARAK’S VISIT TO
WASHINGTON
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Introduction: President Mubarak last visited Washington in April 2004, breaking a twenty year tradition of annual visits to the White House. Egyptians view President Mubarak’s upcoming meeting with the President as a new beginning to the U.S.-Egyptian relationship that will restore a sense of mutual respect that they believe diminished in recent years. President Mubarak has been encouraged by his initial interactions with the President, the Secretary, and Special Envoy Mitchell, and understands that the Administration wants to restore the sense of warmth that has traditionally characterized the U.S.-Egyptian partnership. The Egyptians want the visit to demonstrate that Egypt remains America’s "indispensible Arab ally," and that bilateral tensions have abated. President Mubarak is the proud leader of a proud nation. He draws heavily from his own long experience in regional politics and governance as he assesses new proposals and recommendations for change.

MUBARAK’S PROFILE
-----------------
2. (S/NF) Mubarak is 81 years old and in reasonably good health; his most notable problem is a hearing deficit in his left ear. He responds well to respect for Egypt and for his position, but is not swayed by personal flattery. Mubarak peppers his observations with anecdotes that demonstrate both his long experience and his sense of humor. The recent death of his grandson Mohammad has affected him deeply and undoubtedly will dampen his spirits for the visit which he very much wants to make. During his 28 year tenure, he survived at least three assassination attempts, maintained peace with Israel, weathered two wars in Iraq and post-2003 regional instability, intermittent economic downturns, and a manageable but chronic internal terrorist threat. He is a tried and true realist, innately cautious and conservative, and has little time for idealistic goals. Mubarak viewed President Bush (43) as naive, controlled by subordinates, and totally unprepared for dealing with post-Saddam Iraq, especially the rise of Iran’s regional influence.

3. (S/NF) On several occasions Mubarak has lamented the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the downfall of Saddam. He routinely notes that Egypt did not like Saddam and does not mourn him, but at least he held the country together and countered Iran. Mubarak continues to state that in his view Iraq needs a "tough, strong military officer who is fair" as leader. This telling observation, we believe, describes Mubarak’s own view of himself as someone who is tough but fair, who ensures the basic needs of his people.

4. (S/NF) No issue demonstrates Mubarak’s worldview more than his reaction to demands that he open Egypt to genuine political competition and loosen the pervasive control of the security services. Certainly the public "name and shame" approach in recent years strengthened his determination not to accommodate our views. However, even though he will be more willing to consider ideas and steps he might take pursuant to a less public dialogue, his basic understanding of his country and the region predisposes him toward extreme caution. We have heard him lament the results of earlier U.S. efforts to encourage reform in the Islamic world. He can harken back to the Shah of Iran: the U.S. encouraged him to accept reforms, only to watch the country fall into the hands of revolutionary religious extremists. Wherever he has seen these U.S. efforts, he can point to the chaos and loss of stability that ensued. In addition to Iraq, he also reminds us that he warned against Palestinian elections in 2006 that brought Hamas (Iran) to his doorstep. Now, we understand he fears that Pakistan is on the brink of falling into the hands of the Taliban, and he puts some of the blame on U.S. insistence on steps that ultimately weakened Musharraf. While he knows that Bashir in Sudan has made multiple major mistakes, he cannot work to support his removal from power.

5. (S/NF) Mubarak has no single confidante or advisor who can truly speak for him, and he has prevented any of his main advisors from operating outside their strictly circumscribed spheres of power. Defense Minister Tantawi keeps the Armed Forces appearing reasonably sharp and the officers satisfied with their perks and privileges, and Mubarak does not appear concerned that these forces are not well prepared to face 21st century external threats. EGIS Chief Omar Soliman and Interior Minister al-Adly keep the domestic beasts at bay, and Mubarak is not one to lose sleep over their tactics. Gamal Mubarak and a handful of economic ministers have input on economic and trade matters, but Mubarak will likely resist further economic reform if he views it as potentially harmful to public order and stability. Dr. Zakaria Azmi and a few other senior NDP leaders manage the parliament and public politics.

6. (S/NF) Mubarak is a classic Egyptian secularist who hates religious extremism and interference in politics. The Muslim Brothers represent the worst, as they challenge not only Mubarak’s power, but his view of Egyptian interests. As with regional issues, Mubarak, seeks to avoid conflict and spare his people from the violence he predicts would emerge from unleashed personal and civil liberties. In Mubarak’s mind, it is far better to let a few individuals suffer than risk chaos for society as a whole. He has been supportive of improvements in human rights in areas that do not affect public security or stability. Mrs. Mubarak has been given a great deal of room to maneuver to advance women’s and children’s rights and to confront some traditional practices that have been championed by the Islamists, such as FGM, child labor, and restrictive personal status laws.

SUCCESSION
----------

7. (S/NF) The next presidential elections are scheduled for 2011, and if Mubarak is still alive it is likely he will run again, and, inevitably, win. When asked about succession, he states that the process will follow the Egyptian constitution. Despite incessant whispered discussions, no one in Egypt has any certainty about who will eventually succeed Mubarak nor under what circumstances. The most likely contender is presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose profile is ever-increasing at the ruling party); some suggest that intelligence chief Omar Soliman might seek the office, or dark horse Arab League Secretary-General Amre Moussa might run. Mubarak’s ideal of a strong but fair leader would seem to discount Gamal Mubarak to some degree, given Gamal’s lack of military experience, and may explain Mubarak’s hands off approach to the succession question. Indeed, he seems to be trusting to God and the ubiquitous military and civilian security services to ensure an orderly transition.

MUBARAK’S EGYPT: 1982 -- 2009
-----------------------------

8. (C) Egypt continues to be a major regional economic, political, and cultural power. However, economic problems have frustrated many Egyptians. Egypt’s per capita GDP was on par with South Korea’s 30 years ago; today it is comparable to Indonesia’s. There were bread riots in 2008 for the first time since 1977. Political reforms have stalled and the GOE has resorted to heavy-handed tactics against individuals and groups, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, whose influence continues to grow.

9. (SBU) Economic reform momentum has slowed and high GDP growth rates of recent years have failed to lift Egypt’s lower classes out of poverty. High inflation, coupled with the impact of the global recession, has resulted in an increase in extreme poverty, job losses, a growing budget deficit and projected 2009 GDP growth of 3.5% - half last year’s rate.

10. (S/NF) Mubarak himself refuses to discuss economic assistance to Egypt, but other interlocutors may raise it. On May 7, Egypt formally and publicly accepted FY 2009 and FY 2010 assistance levels, ending a stalemate over the FY 2009 program, linked to levels, a perceived lack of consultation, and political conditionality. Based on our assessment of Egypt’s most pressing assistance needs, and broad public consensus in Egypt that the educational system is seriously deficient, we would like to focus on education. We believe the Egyptians would welcome a new presidential level initiative in this area, which would also be in U.S. national interests given the critical role education will play in Egypt’s political and economic development.

MUBARAK’S REGIONAL OUTLOOK
--------------------------

11. (S/NF) Israeli-Arab conflict: Mubarak has successfully shepherded Sadat’s peace with Israel into the 21st century, and benefitted greatly from the stability Camp David has given the Levant: there has not been a major land war in more than 35 years. Peace with Israel has cemented Egypt’s moderate role in Middle East peace efforts and provided a political basis for continued U.S. military and economic assistance ($1.3 billion and $250 million, respectively). However, broader elements of peace with Israel, e.g. economic and cultural exchange, remain essentially undeveloped.

12. (S/NF) Camp David also presented Mubarak with the perpetual challenge of balancing Egypt’s international image as a moderate with its domestic image as pan-Arab leader. Mubarak has managed this strategic dichotomy most effectively in times of regional stability. However, the Gulf wars, and especially post-Saddam regional crises, have taxed this equation. For example, during the 2006 Lebanon war, the Bush Administration asked Egypt to side against Hizballah; at the same time Egyptian protestors demanded the peace treaty with Israel be vacated. The Egyptians were frozen, and relegated to waiting for the situation to stabilize. More recently, with Iran bringing the battlefield closer with Hamas’ actions in Gaza and discovery of the Hizballah cell in Egypt, the Egyptians appear more willing to confront the Iranian surrogates and to work closely with Israel.

13. (S/NF) Mubarak has been effective as an intermediary during various phases of the Israeli-Arab conflict. In the Arafat era, Egypt worked between the Palestinian Authority and Israel. At the outset of the Abbas era, Egypt’s role was unclear as the Israelis and Palestinians communicated directly, and Mubarak for a time was left with no deliverable either to the West or his public. He firmly believes, incorrectly, that the Bush Administration "forced" the Palestinian legislative elections of 2006 (which Hamas won). Hamas’ June 2007 takeover of Gaza allowed the Egyptians back into the game as a go-between, and Mubarak’s team has made clear they will not cede the "Palestinian file" to another Arab state. In general, the Egyptian-Israeli strategic relationship is on solid ground, as they face a shared threat from Hamas.

14. (S/NF) The ongoing intra-Arab dispute, which pits Egypt and Saudi Arabia against Syria and Qatar and is primarily driven by Iran’s regional influence, is the current test for Mubarak. For the moment the Egyptian-Saudi moderate camp is holding. Mubarak has maneuvered with reasonable effectiveness, brandishing Egyptian clout through a hastily prepared but effective summit in Sharm el Sheikh in February, but Iran’s Arab surrogates (especially Qatar) continue to unsettle the Egyptians. Mubarak will rail against President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, contending that it opened the door to Iranian influence in the region. That said, the Egyptians recently told Special Envoy Ross they expect our outreach to Iran to fail, and that "we should prepare for confrontation through isolation." Mubarak and his advisors are now convinced that Tehran is working to weaken Egypt through creation of Hizballah cells, support of the Muslim Brotherhood, and destabilization of Gaza. Egypt has warned that it will retaliate if these actions continue.

15. (S/NF) Egypt views the stability and unity of Sudan as essential to its national security because of concern over its access to Nile waters and the potential for increased Sudanese refugee flows. The GOE is using development assistance in South Sudan to encourage unity. Here too, the Egyptians are jealous and sensitive to the Qatari foray into resolving Darfur, a crisis squarely in Egypt’s backyard. Mubarak may ask about the potential for cooperation with the U.S. on Sudan and will probably want to hear how the Administration will approach the issue. If he agrees, Mubarak can use his stature and credibility with Bashir to make progress on Darfur and human rights issues.

16. (S/NF) MUBARAK REGIONAL TALKING POINTS
-----------------------------------------
Israeli-Arab peace: He will ask for continued U.S. leadership and highlight Egypt’s role as moderate interlocutor. He will stress the primacy of the Palestinian track over efforts with Syria. He will press for concrete action on settlements and resist Arab gestures to Israel until the Arabs can see whether or not Netanyahu is credible.

Iran: He will rail against Iranian regional influence and express pessimism about U.S. outreach to Tehran. He will make clear that there should be no linkage between Israeli-Arab peace and Iran but will agree with the President’s assessment that such linkage as does exist argues for progress on the Israeli-Palestinian track to undermine Hamas and Hizballah.

Sudan: He will highlight Egypt’s role as provider of humanitarian and military assistance, and stress the need to maintain stability.

Intra-Arab strife: He may criticize Qatar, and perhaps Syria, as Iranian surrogates. He may ask about our plan to engage Damascus and suggest we coordinate our efforts.

Iraq: He may be circumspect, but harbors continuing doubts about Maliki and his Iranian ties. He will say Egypt is open to bilateral improvement but is awaiting Iraqi actions.

SCOBEY

2010/02/11 - Subject: Scenesetter for Secretary Clinton’s Feb 15-16 Visit to Saudi-Arabia

Sat, 11 Dec 2010 10:55:54 +0100

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 RIYADH 000178

NOFORN
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FOR SECRETARY CLINTON FROM AMBASSADOR SMITH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2020
TAGS: OVIP PREL PGOV PTER SA YM IR ECON
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY CLINTON'S FEB 15-16
VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JAMES SMITH
REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D)

INTRODUCTION
------------

1. (C) Madam Secretary, Mission Saudi Arabia warmly welcomes your visit to the Kingdom, a country which, by virtue of its energy resources, financial power, counterterrorism efforts, and leadership of the Muslim world, plays a critical role in many global and regional issues of importance to us.  Your visit comes at a time of emerging opportunities for engagement to advance the goals that you and the President have laid out in your speeches in the region.

2.  (C) Our alliance with Saudi Arabia, while complicated and subject to occasional disjunctions, has proven durable. Taking stock of where we stand, we see a mixed picture. The good news is that the Saudi leadership still sees the United States as its most important strategic partner and guarantor of its stability.  We also share many global and regional objectives, including the need for global financial and energy stability, a common view of threats posed by terrorism and extremism, the dangers posed by Iran and destabilization in Pakistan, and the linkage that progress toward Middle East peace has to virtually all other regional issues.  Finally, Saudi Arabia has become one of our most important allies in the fight against Al-Qaida and terror financing.

3.  (C) The bad news is that we differ on tactics in some key objectives, and we are often frustrated by Saudi unresponsiveness and a dearth of interlocutors among an aging collective leadership. The status of women, religious freedom, and human rights are ongoing concerns.  On the Saudi side, King Abdullah believes we are not always reliable, consistent, or willing to heed his advice on important issues such as Iraq. Saud Al-Faisal and others have openly been
critical of U.S. policies they describe as having shifted the regional balance of power in favor of arch-rival Iran. Differences of opinion on some of these issues can be exacerbated by our differing cultures and value systems, which can introduce a degree of skepticism and hesitancy in the relationship.

4. (C) Despite the problems, a negative assessment of the bilateral relationship would miss a critical point relevant to U.S. goals in the region:  Saudi Arabia is a country in transition, and the changes underway present opportunities for engagement that can advance U.S. interests and national security. Saudi Arabia faces transitions on multiple levels, from the geopolitical, where its trade and energy relations are shifting from west to east, to economic, where greater integration in the world economy is steadily exposing Saudis to international best practices.  Domestically, greater access to internet and cell phones is unleashing new forms of social activism, something demonstrated by an outpouring of Saudi spontaneous voluntary assistance in the aftermath of the Jeddah floods.

EDUCATION & DIVERSIFICATION TO COMBAT EXTREMISM
--------------------------------------------- --

5. (C) Having faced down what amounted to an insurgency by Al-Qaida from 2003 to 2006, Saudi Arabia's leadership acknowledged the pressing need for systemic reforms to combat extremist ideology and provide for a rapidly expanding population (the annual growth rate is about 2 percent).  King Abdullah's strategy is two-pronged:  he has attacked the roots of the extremism that fed Al-Qaida through education and judicial reforms to weaken the influence of the most reactionary elements of Saudi Arabia's religious establishment.  He is also promoting economic diversification.  The King is keenly aware of the urgent need to make Saudi education more relevant to today's workplace and increase the role of women in the economy, goals which remain controversial in this deeply conservative, inward-looking desert Kingdom.  Guided by a vision that dovetails with some key elements of the President's Cairo speech, King Abdullah has begun to implement an ambitious plan to transform Saudi Arabia's economy away from excessive reliance on hydrocarbons and towards a knowledge-based economy that can provide sustainable development for the long-term.  Achieving these goals will require nothing short of a revolution in the education system and significant changes in most aspects of Saudi society, especially the status of women.

6. (U) Seen from the outside, the pace of political reform seems glacial (a notable exception is that changes introduced after the WTO negotiations have been very fast for any country; regulatory agencies are also standing up quickly). Yet for certain elements of Saudi society, the changes are coming too fast.  Whatever the pace, however, the reality is that serious reforms are gradually but irrevocably changing Saudi society.  Recently implemented reform measures include re-shuffling the Ministry of Education's leadership last February (bringing in the King's pro-reform son-in-law as the new minister); a top-to-bottom restructuring of the country's courts to introduce, among other things, review of judicial decisions and more professional training for Shari'a judges; the creation of a new investment promotion agency to overhaul the once-convoluted process of starting a business here; the creation of a regulatory body for capital markets; the construction of the King Abdullah University for Science and Technology (the country's new flagship and controversially-coed institution for advanced scientific research); and a substantial budgetary investment in educating the workforce for future jobs. The Saudi government is also encouraging the development of non-hydrocarbon sectors in which the Kingdom has a comparative advantage, including mining, solar energy, and religious tourism.  The Kingdom's 2010 budget reflects these priorities -- about 25 percent is devoted to education alone -- and amounts to a significant economic stimulus package.

U.S. PARTNERSHIPS TO SUPPORT
REFORM & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
-----------------------------

7. (SBU) Saudi officials have been candid in stressing the importance they place on strong ties with the United States to help them meet reform challenges, both through increased engagement at the government level, including educational exchanges and more FDI, particularly in energy, high tech, and manufacturing.  The past year has seen several large investments by prominent U.S. firms in advanced technology areas, and we are working to raise the profile of our trade and investment relations, including through a major Saudi exposition in Chicago at the end of April.  The Mission has also steadily expanded USG engagement in education, public health, science & technology, entrepreneurship, and civil society.  There are now more than 22,000 Saudi students studying in the US, exceeding pre-9/11 levels.  Public health engagement has included breast cancer awareness and CDC cooperation to set up an advanced epidemic screening network that protected this year’s 3 million Hajj pilgrims.  Our Science & Technology umbrella agreement is already expanding cooperation, including new projects with NASA. Our MEPI programs include a first-time ever exchange visit by a group of Saudi judges, leadership development for women, prevention of violence against women and children, and youth exchange and study. One female participant in our Social Entrepreneurship Forum was a finalist in the 2009 Global Student Entrepreneur Awards. She and seven other Saudi entrepreneurs will attend the President's April summit. Mission elements have also provided training to help the SAG implement a new law to combat trafficking in persons. Intensive engagement with the SAG on IPR is another success story.  You will want to congratulate Saudi officials for the significant progress Saudi Arabia has made over the last several years in improving IPR protection, which resulted in the Special 301 Committee deciding to remove Saudi Arabia from the Watch List.

SAUDI STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS
----------------------------

8. (C) TURNING EAST:  Saudi Arabia is trying to come to terms with the shift in global energy and trade ties towards Asia, which has both political and economic consequences. Bilateral trade with China has more than tripled, and China will soon be Saudi Arabia,s largest importer.  Saudi Arabia has also committed significant investments in China, including the $8 billion Fujian refinery.  Increased trade has also brought increased friction, including anti-dumping complaints from both sides.  Saudi Arabia is thinking through how best to take a leaf from the Chinese playbook and use these expanded trade ties to achieve important political goals.  In this regard, Saudi Arabia has told the Chinese that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.

9. (S/NF) COUNTERING IRAN: We expect that Saudi Arabia will continue to develop its ties with China, in part to counterbalance relations with the West.  While the King's preference is to cooperate with the U.S., he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region, which includes rebuilding Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, supporting the Yemeni government, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran that do not directly depend on U.S. help. The King told General Jones that if Iran succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, everyone in the region would do the same, including Saudi Arabia.

10. (S/NF) The King is convinced that current U.S. engagement efforts with Tehran will not succeed; he is likely to feel grimly vindicated in his view by Ahmadinejad's February 11 boast that having successfully enriched uranium to a level of 20 percent, Iran "is now a nuclear nation."  The King told General Jones that Iranian internal turmoil presented an opportunity to weaken the regime -- which he encouraged -- but he also urged that this be done covertly and stressed that public statements in support of the reformers were counterproductive.  The King assesses that sanctions could help weaken the government, but only if they are strong and sustained.  The King will want you to elaborate on the President's statement that the time for sanctions has come. He will also want to hear our plans for bolstering Gulf defenses vis a vis Iran.  (The King has invited General Petraeus to his desert camp for discussion on this topic on
Tuesday.)

11. (C) CLIMATE CHANGE:  Your visit offers an important opportunity to head off a serious clash over climate change. Saudi officials are very concerned that a climate change treaty would significantly reduce their income just as they face significant costs to diversify their economy.  We want to get beyond the obstructionism that Saudi negotiators have often shown during the negotiations and persuade senior leaders to work with us in a partnership to meet their strategic concerns, including by cooperating on developing solar and biomass energy.  The King is particularly sensitive to avoid Saudi Arabia being singled out as the bad actor, particularly on environmental issues.  Your conveying the importance the President places on working as partners with Saudi Arabia on the Copenhagen process will be very important in making this dialogue more constructive.  Secretary Chu intends to explore specific areas of collaboration during his February 21-23 visit.

SAUDI REGIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
--------------------------------

12. (S) PREVENTING A COLLAPSE OF YEMEN:  Saudi participation in international diplomatic efforts to stabilize Yemen reflect Saudi fears that instability on its southern border is a clear and present danger.  The King will tell you that Yemen's strategic location makes an Al-Qaida presence there more threatening than in Afghanistan; he will stress the need to support Yemeni unity, despite his mistrust of Ali Abdullah Saleh.  With respect to Saudi involvement in the war against the Houthis, the King will stress that the SAG's motivation was self-defense.  As Al-Qaida infiltrators from Yemen multiplied, the SAG concluded that the Houthi rebellion had distracted Saleh's government to the detriment of Saudi security.  The military intervention was triggered by a Houthi incursion into Saudi territory, but it presented a long-sought excuse to fortify the porous Saudi-Yemeni border. On February 7, Prince Khalid also informed Ambassador Smith the fighting is wrapping up, and that a ceasefire arrangement could be in place by mid-February.

13. (C) GESTURES AFTER ALL?:  The King appreciates the President's commitment to Middle East peace but is skeptical the U.S. can bring sufficient and sustained pressure to bear on Israel, especially regarding settlements.  The King told General Jones that progress on Middle East peace was only possible if President Obama was willing to pressure Israel, and Saudi officials have rebuffed U.S. requests for confidence-building gestures to help restart negotiations. Despite their adamant rhetoric, however, several members of a private Jeddah-based think tank run by a retired Saudi general have very quietly been participating in Track Two discussions, apparently with SAG knowledge, and even put forward a proposal on Gaza.  In a more dramatic public encounter that has provoked commotion in the region, former Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Prince Turki Al-Faisal shook hands with Israeli Deputy FM Ayalon to settle a dispute over joint seating at a Munich conference. Both sides have since insisted the gesture did not signal changes in policy, with a "senior Saudi diplomat" issuing a statement emphatically denying that the incident constituted any form of recognition for Israel.

14. (S/NF) AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN:  King Abdullah firmly believes that Asif Zardari is the primary obstacle to the government's ability to move unequivocally to end terrorist safe havens there ("when the head is rotten, it affects the whole body").  The King told General Jones that U.S. development assistance would rebuild trust with the Army, which he asserted was staying out of politics in deference to U.S. wishes, rather than doing what it "should."  On Afghanistan, the King has expressed support for the new U.S. strategy, saying that spending on roads, schools, hospitals and mosques would dissipate popular mistrust and help rebuild the country.  The King has not yet acknowledged the Saudi role in Taliban mediation in conversations with USG officials; GIP Director Prince Muqrin has explained to several recent USG visitors that the SAG prefers to keep such discussions in intelligence channels until any agreement is reached.  Perhaps reflecting this, the Saudi media downplayed President Karzai's recent visit and the Afghan Ambassador reported that the meeting with the King lasted only ten minutes.

A NOTE ABOUT THE KING
---------------------

15. (C) The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques will offer you a traditional Saudi welcome at the desert "encampment" outside Riyadh, where he likes to spend his winter vacations.  You will find in 86-year old King Abdullah a wry and forthright interlocutor.  Having struggled with a speech impediment throughout his life, he tends to express himself tersely.  Reflecting his Bedouin roots, he judges his counterparts on the basis of character, honesty, and trust. He expects commitments to be respected and sees actions, not words, as the true test of commitment; and he expects good-faith consultations, not surprises.  Once the King has lost trust in a counterpart, as has been the case with Nouri Al-Maliki or Asif Zardari, his personal antipathy can become a serious obstacle to bilateral relations.  On the other hand, as with President Obama, the King's esteem will help navigate differences and at times change policies.  The King is undoubtedly looking forward to his discussions with you, and Mission Saudi Arabia enthusiastically looks forward to supporting your visit.

MISSION STAFFING
----------------

16.  (U) The U.S. Mission in Saudi Arabia includes Embassy Riyadh, and Consulate Generals Dhahran and Jeddah.  The entire Mission, representing ten agencies, consists of 605 staff (212 U.S. Direct Hire (USDH) and 393 Locally Engaged

(LE) staff).
SMITH

2010/10/20 - Efforts to Prosecute Blackwater Are Collapsing

Fri, 10 Dec 2010 00:33:01 +0100

By James Risen
New York Times
October 20, 2010

Washington - Nearly four years after the federal government began a string of investigations and criminal prosecutions against Blackwater Worldwide personnel accused of murder and other violent crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, the cases are beginning to fall apart, burdened by a legal obstacle of the government’s own making.

In the most recent and closely watched case, the Justice Department on Monday said that it would not seek murder charges against Andrew J. Moonen, a Blackwater armorer accused of killing a guard assigned to an Iraqi vice president on Dec. 24, 2006. Justice officials said that they were abandoning the case after an investigation that began in early 2007, and included trips to Baghdad by federal prosecutors and F.B.I. agents to interview Iraqi witnesses.

The government’s decision to drop the Moonen case follows a series of failures by prosecutors around the country in cases aimed at former personnel of Blackwater, which is now known as Xe Services. In September, a Virginia jury was unable to reach a verdict in the murder trial of two former Blackwater guards accused of killing two Afghan civilians. Late last year, charges were dismissed against five former Blackwater guards who had been indicted on manslaughter and related weapons charges in a September 2007 shooting incident in Nisour Square in Baghdad, in which 17 Iraqi civilians were killed.

Interviews with lawyers involved in the cases, outside legal experts and a review of some records show that federal prosecutors have failed to overcome a series of legal hurdles, including the difficulties of obtaining evidence in war zones, of gaining proper jurisdiction for prosecutions in American civilian courts, and of overcoming immunity deals given to defendants by American officials on the scene.

"The battlefield," said Charles Rose, a professor at Stetson University College of Law in Florida, "is not a place that lends itself to the preservation of evidence."

The difficulty of these cases also illustrates the tricky legal questions raised by the government’s increasing use of private contractors in war zones.

Such problems clearly plagued the Moonen case. In the immediate aftermath of the Christmas Eve shooting, Mr. Moonen was interviewed, not by the F.B.I., but by an official with the Regional Security Office of the United States Embassy in Baghdad, the State Department unit that supervised Blackwater security guards in Iraq.

Mr. Moonen’s lawyer, Stewart Riley, said that his client gave the embassy officials a statement only after he was issued a so-called Garrity warning - a threat that he might lose his job if he did not talk, but that he would be granted immunity from prosecution for anything he said.

The legal warning and protection given to Mr. Moonen were similar to warnings that embassy officials later gave to Blackwater guards involved in the Nisour Square case. In each case, the agreements presented an obstacle to prosecution in the United States. In effect, the Blackwater personnel were given a form of immunity from prosecution by the people they were working for and helping to protect.

"Once you immunize statements, it is really hard to prosecute," said Andrew Leipold, a law professor at the University of Illinois. "In the field, the people providing the immunity may value finding out what happened more than they do any possibility of prosecution. But that just makes any future prosecution really very hard."

Justice Department officials declined to comment Wednesday about specific Blackwater cases. But the department has appealed the dismissal of the Nisour Square case, and a new trial has been scheduled for next March in the Virginia murder case after a mistrial was declared. And Justice officials noted that the government had had a number of successful prosecutions against contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, including several for sexual assaults and other violent crimes. More than 120 companies have been charged by the Justice Department for contract fraud and related crimes in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait, officials said.

Still, a Justice official who spoke on the condition of anonymity acknowledged that the government had faced tough obstacles. "There are substantial difficulties in prosecuting cases committed in war zones," the official said. "There’s problems with the availability of witnesses, availability of evidence, and the quality of the evidence. You also have claims of self-defense, which are generally difficult, although not insurmountable."

And self-defense is a more compelling argument in war zones, where many people are routinely armed.

One problem in the Moonen case, for example, was that while Mr. Moonen admitted in his statement to the embassy official that he did shoot the Iraqi guard, he asserted that he had done so in self-defense. The guards in the Virginia case also said that they shot in self-defense when they believed they were facing an attack from insurgents. In the Nisour Square case, the five Blackwater guards who were charged also claimed that they shot only after they believed they were under attack.

Jurisdictional problems also plague the Blackwater cases. Since the Blackwater guards were working under a contract with the State Department, they did not fall under the laws that govern contractors working for the Defense Department overseas. Contractors for the Defense Department are subject to criminal prosecution under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, but it has never been clear whether the law can be applied to contractors for the State Department, like Blackwater. Those contractors generally have greater protections because of the possibility that they might be engaged in fighting.

Until last year, foreign contractors also had immunity from prosecution under Iraqi law, so the Blackwater guards were operating in a legal vacuum, noted Eric Jensen, a law professor at Fordham University. "I would be concerned as a prosecutor that even if you got past the immunization, and the problems with witnesses and evidence, that you may not even have a law that supports the prosecution of a Department of State contractor," Mr. Jensen said. "Congress has tried to address this, but it’s still a live question."

Mr. Riley cited these reasons in a letter he wrote in April 2009 to Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. about the case and also noted that he believed the government had considered indicting Mr. Moonen to placate the Iraqi government. In a letter sent to Mr. Riley on Monday, notifying him that they were dropping the case, prosecutors also indicated that they would have difficulty proving their case beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in overcoming Mr. Moonen’s claims that he shot in self-defense.

Meanwhile, the government said that the United States ambassador to Iraq, James F. Jeffrey, had to notify the Iraqi government of the decision, and also provided government officials a letter to be given to the family of the shooting victim, Raheem Saadoun. This year, Mr. Saadoun’s family dropped a civil lawsuit against Mr. Moonen and Blackwater after receiving a financial settlement.

External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/21/world/21contractors.html

2009/08/23 - Subject: Qadhafi Personally Welcomes Lockerbie Bomber

Thu, 9 Dec 2010 23:56:08 +0100

Confidential Report by the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Libya

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000686

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DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD, AND EUR/WE

EO 12958 DECL: 8/23/2019
TAGS PREL, PGOV, ASEC, CASC, KMDR, KPAO, UK, LY
SUBJECT: QADHAFI PERSONALLY WELCOMES LOCKERBIE BOMBER

REF: Tripoli 685

TRIPOLI 00000686 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) Summary: Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi personally met and welcomed convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi in the latter’s home in Sebha August 21. In press statements, Qadhafi thanked the Scottish government for its "courage and independence" despite "unnecessary and unacceptable pressure," and criticized the reaction of the "other side" as "double standard politics," "encroachment," and "arrogance and contempt." Qadhafi’s public, personal involvement will make it extremely difficult for more pragmatic Libyan officials to try to manage the fallout from the mishandling of Megrahi’s return. Separately, the UK Ambassador categorically denied Saif al-Islam’s claims that the UK agreed to Megrahi’s return in exchange for business deals, and said the UK was reconsidering its representation at the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi’s coup September 1. End Summary.

MEGRAHI WELCOMED WITH A WARM EMBRACE

2. (SBU) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi met convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al-Megrahi on August 21, in Megrahi’s hometown of Sebha. [Note: Qadhafi had traveled to Sebha on August 19 to review some economic projects, and apparently stayed there until the August 21 meeting. End note.] The widely televised meeting, preceded by a warm embrace between Qadhafi and Megrahi, also included several poems expressing congratulations to Qadhafi on the 40th anniversary of the "Great al-Fatah Revolution," on the start of Ramadan, and for "the return home of brother, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi." Qadhafi delivered remarks to local and international press after his tete-a-tete with Megrahi, which he addressed to "friends" and "those who objected to these friends." Qadhafi thanked the Scottish Government, including the PM and FM, for their "courage," stating that they "have proven to be independent in spite of all unnecessary and unacceptable pressure they faced." He went on to thank his "friend Brown," the British Prime Minister, his government, Queen Elizabeth, and Prince Andrew, who "against all odds encouraged this brave decision." Qadhafi noted that the UK efforts would positively affect "exchange" between the two countries.

3. (SBU) Addressing "the other side," Qadhafi derided comments that the USG had made concerning the sensitivity of Megrahi’s release to the families of Lockerbie victims, stating "Are we without feelings, and they have feelings? Are we donkeys and they are humans?" Qadhafi referred to the U.S. opposition to Megrahi’s release as "double standard politics," calling it "encroachment" and "arrogance" and "contempt for other nations, their public opinion, and humanity." Qadhafi further stated that the U.S. position was responsible for injustice and terrorism. He said, "Terrorism has its justifications, which is double standard politics."

MEGRAHI’S RELEASE AND UK BUSINESS DEALS

4. (C/NF) On August 20 Qadhafi’s son and potential successor to the throne, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi issued a statement through his quasi-governmental organization, the Qadhafi International and Charity Foundation, praising his own efforts and success in achieving Megrahi’s release from prison. He thanked the Scottish and British governments and stated that the friendship between Libya and both nations would be "forever consolidated." Saif al-Islam went on to address the families of Lockerbie victims, saying that although Megrahi withdrew his appeal, his innocence would one day be proved. During Saif al-Islam’s remarks to his new television station "Al Mutawassit" August 20, which were reprinted August 21 in state-owned newspaper "Oya," he linked Megrahi’s release to UK business contracts, asserting that Megrahi’s case was raised during all negotiations of UK-Libya commercial, oil, and gas deals. Saif al-Islam implied that former UK PM Tony Blair had raised Megrahi with the Libyan leader in connection with lucrative business deals during Blair’s 2007 visit to Libya. [Note: Rumors that Blair made linkages between Megrahi’s release and trade deals have been longstanding among Embassy contacts. End note.] The UK Ambassador in Tripoli categorically denied the claims during a conversation with the Charge August 21. He also stated that the British government was reconsidering its decision to send Prince Andrew to September 1 events in Libya.

PREPARING FOR A GRANDER AFFAIR?

5. (C) While the Qadhafi family and government officials have not had any public interaction with or comment on Megrahi since the September 21 meeting, banners are being unfurled in Tripoli’s Green Square - the site of the upcoming 40th anniversary celebrations - hailing Megrahi’s homecoming and the Libyan leader’s support of his release. Rumors among Embassy contacts suggest that Megrahi will be honored officially by Qadhafi during the 40th anniversary events. The state-run "Al Watan" website claimed that the Libyan People’s Congress would award Megrahi a medal of honor for his "bravery and patience" in turning himself over to the "states of international arrogance" for the sake of his nation.

6. (C) Comment: Qadhafi’s personal, warm welcome of Megrahi and strongly worded statement critical of U.S. opposition to Megrahi’s release are a powerful indication of the importance that Qadhafi attaches to the issue. Qadhafi likely viewed Megrahi’s return as vital to his own domestic politics: a boon to the influential Megrahi tribe and, more importantly, a major victory for the hardliners who have been critical of his engagement with the West. Qadhafi’s very public, personal involvement in this issue will complicate the efforts of pragmatic Libyan officials seeking to manage the fallout from Megrahi’s return, as they now have very little political cover to make the case for a muted response. We continue to monitor the situation. End Comment.

POLASCHIK

2009/12/06 - Subject: Bouteflika to Ward: We Want a Strategic Relationship

Wed, 8 Dec 2010 00:50:06 +0100

Secret Report by the U.S. Embassy in Algiers, Algeria

VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #1077/01 3400757
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 060757Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8190
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO IMMEDIATE 1048
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 1989
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 6814
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1259

S E C R E T ALGIERS 001077

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PBTS KPAL KWBG US IR IZ IS
AF, XA
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA TO WARD: WE WANT A STRATEGIC
RELATIONSHIP

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Jordan;
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

1. (C) U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General William Ward met Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika November 25, during Ward's first visit to Algeria since assuming command of AFRICOM. Ward said AFRICOM's strategy was to assist African nations in providing for their own security needs, not do the job for them. The U.S. recognized Algeria's leadership in the region, and AFRICOM was prepared to assist Algeria and its neighbors combat terrorism. Bouteflika said Algeria wanted to be a strategic partner, not an adversary. Our military relationship already included training and technical cooperation. End-use-monitoring requirements infringed on Algeria's national sovereignty and therefore imposed some limits on military engagement. But the U.S. and Algeria shared a common goal in combating terrorism. Terrorism in the region had taken a dangerous form, and Sahel countries were prepared to address the problem jointly. More needed to be done to ensure the participation and commitment of Mali's political leadership in the regional struggle. Bouteflika told Ward the Malian president needed to understand he could not be friends with both the thieves and their victims at the same time. Trans-Sahara heads of state still planned to convene a security and development summit in Bamako but had yet to set a firm date. Bouteflika also reviewed Egyptian-Algerian tensions in the aftermath of a World Cup qualifying match, Western Sahara, the negative repercussions of Israeli settlement activities, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan. On the soccer issue, he made a point of telling Ward that the king of Morocco -- in contrast to the strain with Egypt -- had sent him a very warm congratulatory message after the game. At the end of the meeting, Bouteflika invited Ward to return to Algeria in the near future. End summary.

Addressing Common Challenges
----------------------------

2. (C) Visiting Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General William Ward met with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika November 25 at the presidential residence. With Bouteflika were Chief of Staff of the Algerian National Popular Army (ANP) Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid-Salah, Ministry of National Defense (MND) Director of External Relations and Cooperation General Nourredine Mekri, ANP Chief of Organization and Logistics Major General Abdelhamid Ghriss and a translator. The Ambassador, General Ward's foreign policy advisor, Dr. Raymond Brown, the DATT and Poloff (notetaker) accompanied General Ward to the meeting, which lasted two hours. Ward emphasized that his visit to Algiers was symbolic of our countries' growing bilateral relationship. Africa Command's mission was to assist African nations address their own security challenges, not to do it for them. The purpose of his visit, Ward said, was to listen to Algeria's perspective on enhancing our cooperation as we seek ways to work together to address common challenges in Africa. Ward recognized that these challenges were complex and required development and political solutions, not just military intervention. Going forward, we sought to cooperate in areas that Algeria determines are priorities. AFRICOM welcomed the regional counterterrorism efforts Algeria has engaged in with neighboring Sahel countries. Algeria is leading the effort; we will work with Algeria and its neighbors to assist in eliminating the terrorist threat in the region.

3. (C) President Bouteflika said that the United States and Algeria shared a common objective and the will to work cooperatively in the fight against terrorism. Bouteflika noted the U.S. and Algeria started to work more closely together during the Clinton administration when both sides came to realize they were fighting the same problem. Bouteflika underscored that after 9/11, Algeria was the first Arab and Muslim country to send a message of solidarity to President Bush. Subsequently, despite the unpopularity of some Bush policies, political and economic relations between our countries improved. Today, relations were excellent, he said, noting that Algeria was the United States' second largest trading partner in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and our largest trading partner in Africa. President Obama's new approach to U.S. foreign policy was "a breath of fresh air" and well regarded by developing world countries. But this meant there were also high expectations for his administration. Bouteflika predicted that our bilateral relationship would continue in a positive direction. He commented that the U.S. and Algeria were moving forward with cooperation, recognizing the value of dialogue across all leadership levels. In this regard, Bouteflika declared he was ready to assist Ward and invited him to visit Algeria again.

Military Cooperation
--------------------

4. (S) Bouteflika attached importance to Algeria's military-military cooperation with the United States but noted that U.S. end-use monitoring requirements contravened Algeria's national sovereignty. Nonetheless, we had made progress on training and technical cooperation. Bouteflika said the capabilities of U.S. and Algerian forces were well understood in the region. Bouteflika argued that frank, direct talks were the key to a successful military dialogue, as well as recognizing that, in some cases, there would be limits on the extent of cooperation. "Tell us what you want, and we will tell you what we can do." Algeria, he continued, wanted to be a strategic partner for the U.S. in the region, not an adversary.

5. (S) General Ward thanked Bouteflika for his candid assessment of our mil-mil relationship. He said the President, secretaries of State and Defense, and US Joint Chiefs of Staff, all recognized the value of the US-Algeria partnership. Bouteflika responded that he would help us to consolidate that partnership. Ward argued that to enhance our partnership, Algeria needed to tell us how we can contribute best to achieve mutual objectives. Despite the bad things sometimes said about AFRICOM, Ward said with a smile, his command had not been created to take over Africa. Without missing a beat, Bouteflika replied with an even bigger smile that he had been unsure about this himself until Ward came. Ward said that, as we continue our military dialogue, we want to do the things Algeria tells us are important. Ward affirmed Algeria had long recognized the challenge of extremism and demonstrated its ability to fight back. AFRICOM would do its part to support Algeria and its neighbors in this effort. Addressing Bouteflika's point on end-use-monitoring requirements, Ward suggested focusing our efforts in areas where cooperation was possible, i.e., training and equipping. He acknowledged that some U.S. laws and regulations may preclude for now Algeria's participation in other forms of engagement.

Civil-Military Relations
------------------------

6. (S) Bouteflika underscored that Algeria's military "absolutely" respected the authority of civilian leadership. "This is not at all like Turkey," he said. Bouteflika asserted that the army was forced to take drastic measures during the violence of the 1990s in order to save the country. This was a difficult period, but constitutional rule had been restored. "The house is now in order," he stressed, "and I can tell you that the army obeys the civilians. There is one constitution and all obey it." Bouteflika acknowledged, however, that the problems of the past still haunted the country. He cited foreign press reports referring to Algeria as a dictatorship and argued that the term was sometimes used carelessly. The Algerian constitution had established the rule of law. In 2004 it was decided that there was no more historical "revolutionary legitimacy". The only legitimacy was the constitution. "Anyone can be a candidate for election, in accordance with the constitution, even a general." He paused, then grinned and said, "but the generals realize the difficulties and none has been a candidate yet."

Counterterrorism
----------------

7. (C) Bouteflika said terrorism in Africa had taken a dangerous form. The situation in Somalia was hopeless, he commented. Meanwhile, the Sahel region presented a complex set of issues. Fortunately, most Sahel countries were determined to cooperate and have the capability to fight the threat if they work together. Mauritania expressed a clear commitment as did Niger, although Bouteflika recognized U.S. concerns with President Tandja. Mali's full cooperation remained elusive, however. Mali's policies have failed to create stability in the north. The result is a lawless environment in which smuggling, along with arms and drug trafficking, enable terrorism. Bouteflika said the region was prepared to tackle this problem, and bilateral and regional efforts were already underway. In this regard, Algeria was closely monitoring U.S. military assistance to Mali and Niger.

8. (S) Ward told Bouteflika that he planned to visit Bamako after Algiers and would encourage Mali's leaders to cooperate in the region's counterterrorism efforts. The U.S. was providing military assistance to Mali, and we hoped it complemented the work Algeria was doing. Ward emphasized that, ultimately, defeating terrorism was the responsibility of the region. Bouteflika expressed his appreciation for U.S. assistance to Mali and said Algeria also provided aid, including some equipment. Bouteflika urged the U.S. to tell Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure that "he cannot be a friend to the thieves and victims at the same time." Many in Mali's security services shared the same concern, Bouteflika asserted. In the past, he said, Algeria has waited for the chance to debrief terrorist suspects held in Mali, only to find out later that Malian officials were conducting negotiations for the terrorist's release back to the terrorist organizations at the same time. "It is difficult to cooperate in these conditions," he said. Despite difficulties, Bouteflika said regional leaders still planned to convene a security and development summit in Bamako. All agreed on the need for the summit, he said, but there was still no set date. Bouteflika said that Algeria would be open to sharing information with the U.S. regarding Algeria's cooperation with its neighbors. General Ward said AFRICOM would do the same for Algeria regarding U.S. initiatives in the region.

XXXXXXXXXXXX

16. (S) The Ward-Bouteflika meeting was significant in a number of respects. The Algerian president spoke repeatedly of his readiness to build a strategic relationship with the US. He transmitted clear readiness for closer coordination and contact on Sahel counter-terrorism issues. The simple fact of the meeting with the president was itself a green light to the military bureaucracy on stepped-up bilateral military cooperation. Not least, the warm and high-level official reception provided a powerful antidote to the persistent negative mythology about Africa Command since the command's rollout. It was also noteworthy that, in the presence of three generals, including the chief of staff, Bouteflika spoke assertively to Ward about civilian control of the military. He described the revolutionary origins of military influence in Algeria, said this so-called revolutionary legitimacy ended in 2004, and the military now obeys the civilians and they all obey the constitution. In the course of his regional political review, Bouteflika delivered Algeria's views on Western Sahara in familiar terms. But in doing so, he also struck an unusually positive note about Morocco and the king's message. Clearly, in the context of the high emotions stirred in Algeria over the controversial World Cup contest with Egypt, Mohammed VI's message of congratulations struck a chord with Bouteflika.
JORDAN

2008/02/22 - Subject: Scene Setter for A/S Welch Visit to Algeria

Wed, 8 Dec 2010 00:13:42 +0100

Secret Report by the U.S. Embassy in Algiers, Algeria

VZCZCXRO5451
PP RUEHCD
DE RUEHAS #0198/01 0531128
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 221128Z FEB 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5295
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2178
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 7030
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3265
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000198

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY --CHANGE OF CLASSIFICATION

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NEA FOR K.HARRINGTON AND M.POPAL

EO 12958 DECL: 02/22/2023
TAGS PREL, PGOV, AG

SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR A/S WELCH VISIT TO ALGERIA
REF: A. ALGIERS 111  B. ALGIERS 110 AND ALGIERS 140  C. 07 ALGIERS 1806  D. 07 ALGIERS 1807 AND 08 ALGIERS 0075  E. ALGIERS 141

Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) We and the Algerians are looking forward to your visit next week. There was a prominent article about your visit, generated with help from our PAO, in best-selling el-Khabar newspaper on February 21. You will be visiting just as the government machine is gearing up to amend the Algerian constitution to enable President Bouteflika to run for a third term in 2009. There is no strong, influential voice criticizing this effort; only small parties and a few notable individuals have spoken against the building momentum (ref A). The only issue that appears unresolved inside the top civilian and military leadership is whether or not there should be a change to the constitution that establishes a vice president as well. This vice president would be the obvious successor to Bouteflika, especially if his health prevents him from serving out a third term that would expire in 2014. We are arranging for you to meet with former Prime Minister Ouyahia, the man most frequently thought to be tapped for vice president.
AN UNHAPPY COUNTRY
------------------

2. (C) There is much discussion among political circles about the constitution, the third term and the succession issue, but precious little discussion about how to address long-standing political alienation and social discontent throughout the country. Housing is woefully short, while unemployment and underemployment are endemic (at least 50 percent among young people). In a relatively new phenomenon, many young people are trying to flee the country, by small boat if necessary. The average age at which Algerians marry is now into the mid 30s - a vivid indicator of how unhappy the twenty-somethings are. Meanwhile, most world food price hikes are being passed to consumers, resulting in strikes by different labor groups almost weekly (see ref B for example. Notably, while you are here we expect school teachers nationwide to strike; on the positive side, school closures may ease traffic during your visit, inshallah.) Almost daily there are isolated demonstrations with the occasional government office in some distant town attacked. Meanwhile, voter turnout for the 2007 legislative and local elections was lower than ever before because Algeria’s young people do not see the political system as having any relevance to addressing their problems. This is not the quaking state of the early 1990s. The government is firmly entrenched. However, much of political and social elite sense that Algeria is drifting (see also ref C).

THE VISION THING
----------------

3. (C) These political, economic and social problems notwithstanding, Algeria is richer than ever. The oil and gas sector is running up record export revenues - USD 70 billion likely in 2007, while imports will only be about USD 45 billion, according to the IMF. As a result, the GoA is piling up record foreign exchange reserves, now around USD 110 billion. The public knows about the riches and the GoA’s inability to relieve problems like housing and unemployment hits at the GoA’s credibility. Bouteflika and his team have only one approach to energize the economy: spend tens of billions of dollars on infrastructure as well as some grandiose projects to generate jobs and also create a Bouteflika legacy. The construction industry is growing but not as fast as in other oil-boom states. Red tape, burdensome regulations and centralization slow project implementation and impede new private investment. The GoA seems incapable of addressing these systemic problems. This inability stems from a lack of vision at the top. Bouteflika and his team have yet to make a choice on whether Algeria will be a market-driven economy where Algerians must integrate into the world economy or an economy whose government still provides the old social contract of the 1960s and 1970s. We have small technical assistance projects to help the GoA reform its financial and education sectors, but bureaucratic ineptitude and a lack of Algerian urgency slow progress. We therefore extract small, new reforms where we can get them. (Treasury DAS McDonald will be here at the same time as you to look at Treasury-funded assistance programming.)

TERRORISM PROBLEM NOT A THREAT TO STABILITY
-------------------------------------------

4. (S/NF) The social discontent enables al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to find a steady supply of recruits but not enough to threaten stability. There are terror-related attacks almost daily now, usually in the mountains east of Algiers. (There are occasional attacks in southern and western Algeria now too.) AQIM and other Islamist extremists usually hit Algerian security forces, but there are regular threats against Western interests, especially French and American. The terrorists’ tactics have not much changed except in one important manner: nine suicide car bomb attacks since April 2007. AQIM can’t threaten the government’s stability but it has hurt the credibility of Bouteflika’s national amnesty program; it likely weakened him in internal debates with the Algerian hard-liners inside the security force leadership. It has hurt the credibility of the Algerian security forces among the Algerian public and the Western community here. In particular, the December 2007 attack that destroyed the UN headquarters here deeply embarrassed the Algerian government.  When the UN said it would conduct its own investigation into the security shortcomings before the attack, the hypersensitive Algerian authorities reacted vehemently and forced the UN to back down. Watching this brittle response, Western companies and embassies now are jittery. Many say that they are watching us for signals on when to send out expatriates. Algiers has seen no incidents since December 11 but there are constant threat reports in sensitive channels.

COUNTER-TERROR COOPERATION VERY GOOD
------------------------------------

5. (S/NF) As the AQIM threat has ratcheted up, we have increased our collaboration with Algerian military intelligence. They are prickly, paranoid group to work with, but with them we have rolled up several networks that sent Algerian jihadis to Iraq. According to information from an al-Qaida in Iraq cell, 64 Algerian fighters reached Iraq between August 2006 and August 2007. Thus, our collective work is not perfect, but the number of Algerians fighting in Iraq likely would have been far higher were we not working closely together. We have also helped the GoA roll up AQIM networks that were planning attacks inside Algeria. Notably, the Algerian authorities do not like to discuss our cooperation against AQIM publicly. Instead, they limit themselves to saying that they cooperate with the U.S. and other nations against international terror networks. We have a new FBI office at the embassy that we hope will establish collaborative programs with the Interior Ministry, but the Algerians are not rushing to cooperate.

MILITARY TO MILITARY: WE MUST BE PATIENT
-----------------------------------------

6. (S/NF) While the Algerians are not rushing to expand our mil-mil relationship. it is slowly growing. For the first time in early 2007 the Algerians themselves proposed some joint activities, and we undertook training exercises here involving the navy and air force. AFRICOM has offered much more, but the Algerians purposely keep a foot on the brake. They want to avoid dependence in their military relations, so they spread out activities among foreign partners. They have limited administrative capacity, and the officers who work on bilateral activities with France or Germany or Russia are the same ones who work with us. They are not good at multi-tasking. Part of the Algerian caution also results from bureaucratic gamesmanship and paranoia. In contrast to programming with some other countries, Algerian military intelligence clears all our bilateral military activities. (They likely seek to enhance their own position within the Algerian power structure by controlling the security relationship with the U.S.) In addition, GoA security personnel are exceptionally careful in their contacts with foreigners due to their CI concerns. Probably because Algerian military intelligence was not ready, the Algerians lost their chance to have a high-level bilateral military committee meeting at the Pentagon in April 2008 that would have drawn up plans for expanded activities into 2009. Their failure to reserve the April dates probably will push that meeting into the autumn or even to the next administration. We warned them clearly but their own system was too sclerotic to respond.

REGIONAL POLICIES: FAR APART FROM US
-------------------------------------

7. (C) Bouteflika is very much his own foreign minister and his thinking about regional politics has evolved little from the 1970s. He loyally attends all the NAM and African Union summits, and he places huge weight on the United Nations, liberation ideology and negotiation over use of force (especially Western armed forces). The Algerians are surprisingly ill informed when events are moving in the region; they also lack a good grounding in underlying trends in areas like the Middle East. Arab satellite TV seems to be a big source of their information. Hence, you will find that the Algerians take nettlesome positions on the regional questions of import to us:

-- Peace Process: They line up behind the Arab League consensus, arguing in private that it is hopeless to try to exclude Syria and Hamas from the efforts to reach a settlement (ref D). They appreciate our pledge to work for a viable Palestinian state and to achieve short-term, concrete improvements for the Palestinians. So far, we have seen little enthusiasm in response to our demarches for more aid to the Palestinian Authority, but they likely would respond to a strong request from the Arab League. The Algerian public, particularly the Islamists, is now less preoccupied with violence in Algeria and vehemently anti-Israeli. The GoA, therefore, is unlikely to make any unilateral gestures to Israel.

-- Lebanon: The Algerians back Arab League efforts and hope for consensus to develop among the Lebanese factions. Their senior MFA official working Middle East issues has repeatedly cautioned us against trying to isolate Syria on Lebanese issues (ref E). Underlining how our efforts complement Arab League efforts will make the most headway with the Algerians.

-- Iraq: President Bouteflika told Senator Nelson last summer that the U.S. should not withdraw too quickly from Iraq lest security deteriorate further. The MFA and Algerian military intelligence have made the same point to us more recently, although publicly the GoA says little. There is an Iraqi embassy in Algiers, but relations with the Iraqi Government are cool. The Algerians have no intention of reopening an embassy in Baghdad. In part, they are still angry about the murder of two of their diplomats in Baghdad in 2005. Despite their repeated inquiries, they have received no information on who was responsible. In addition, public and government distrust of the Iraqi Shia makes the GoA unwilling to take any risks on Iraq policy. Their military intelligence likely would work discretely with Iraqi intelligence to disrupt al-Qaida activities, but we doubt Algerian officers would actually go to Iraq.

-- Iran: Algerian officials remember Iranian support for Algerian Islamists in the early 1990s and are suspicious of Iran’s regional intent. President Bouteflika in private has told the Iranian President to cooperate with the UN on the nuclear issue. The GoA is also adamant that we should continue on the diplomatic track and recognize even small Iranian steps when we see them; they were reluctant to endorse more pressure on Iran during Ambassador Schulte’s visit here in late November. The Algerian leadership has a bit of sympathy for Hizballah and Hamas as liberation fighters, but their heads tell them to be wary. Thus, you will hear understanding from them when we warn them of the dangers of these terror groups, but the Algerians will immediately insist that Israel and the U.S. have to resolve the Palestinian and Lebanese problems. Underlining how Hizballah and Hamas threaten the very progress on the Lebanese and Palestinian issues that the GoA wants will be the most effective arguments.

-- Western Sahara: This is the issue that the GoA cares the most about and you will likely receive an earful. The GoA still lingers over the hope that the Baker Plan will come back despite our telling them repeatedly that it is finished.  The top Algerian leadership stress that they view a Saharan referendum on independence as a matter of national liberation as a matter of principle. They don’t want to destabilize Morocco, and they doubt the Western Sahara is so important to the throne’s hold on power. They do not want to start armed hostilities, although we are less sure they would - or could - stop every possible Polisario provocation. The Algerians likely will try to wait for the end of this American administration hoping that the next one will be less supportive of the Moroccan autonomy proposal. Explaining the exhaustion of broad American patience with the long-standing dispute will be the best way of shaking loose the Algerian fixation on Baker.

AND THE GUANTANAMO PROBLEM
--------------------------

8. (S) For the past two years we have sought GoA approval for the repatriation of some of the two dozen Algerians held at the facility. During the April 2007 visit of S/WCI Williamson we all agreed on principles to govern the return of Algerians, but since then the GoA has refused to agree to accept even a single detainee back despite our repeated attempts. We think that President Bouteflika and military intelligence chief LTG Medienne agree that it would be harmful to Algeria to take any detainees back, and that consensus at the very top makes any movement by lower officials impossible. The GoA has told us we can send detainees back to the countries where we detained them, such as Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is a non-starter. We need you to explain firmly that the Guantanamo detainee issue will not go away and probably will become more important in the next year as we move closer to shutting down the detention center at Guantanamo.
FORD

2010/01/12 - Subject: Algerian FM: TSA Listing "Intolerable, Inappropriate, Inopportune"

Tue, 7 Dec 2010 23:36:43 +0100

Secret Report by the U.S. Embassy in Algiers, Algeria

VZCZCXRO6018
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DE RUEHAS #0039/01 0121750
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O 121750Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8323
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0078
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0448
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 1515
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0476
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0247
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RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0073
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN IMMEDIATE 0008
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH IMMEDIATE 1463
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI IMMEDIATE 0007
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS IMMEDIATE 0082
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE IMMEDIATE 0002
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR IMMEDIATE 0003
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/TSA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 0012
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0577

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000039

SIPDIS
NOFORN

EO 12958 DECL: 01/11/2020
TAGS PREL, PTER, PGOV, PINR, MOPS, AG, US
SUBJECT: ALGERIAN FM: TSA LISTING "INTOLERABLE,
INAPPROPRIATE, INOPPORTUNE"

REF: A. ALGIERS 20 (NOTAL)  B. STATE 001187
ALGIERS 00000039 001.2 OF 004

Classified By: Ambassador David D Pearce; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

1. (S/NF) Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci January 11 summoned the Ambassador and forcefully objected to Algeria’s placement on the TSA enhanced screening list. He termed the decision intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It reflected neither the reality of Algeria’s security situation, its counterterrorism efforts nor our close bilateral cooperation.  Further, the U.S. had not communicated the TSA decision to Algeria prior to releasing it to the press, which was how the GOA had learned of the measure. The GOA now had to contend with not only the collective humiliation felt by domestic opinion but also incomplete and inaccurate information regarding Algeria’s CT efforts circulating in the international press as a result of the story. Medelci reinforced the earlier MFA demarche (ref A) formally requesting removal from the list and a high-level U.S. statement to help correct the record regarding Algerian cooperation on counterterrorism. He pointedly asked the Ambassador to communicate this message to the Secretary and said the GOA would be monitoring the U.S. reaction closely. End Summary.

TSA Decision Ignores Reality of CT Cooperation
--------------------------------------------- -

2. (S/NF) Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador to the MFA January 11 to underscore Algeria’s dissatisfaction with its placement on TSA’s enhanced screening list. Medelci began by noting he had had a productive visit to Washington in early December. He had been favorably impressed with both the quality and level of his meetings and had appreciated their focus on bilateral security and counterterrorism cooperation. The visit had underscored the strategic importance of our countries’ counterterrorism partnership on this sensitive issue. "We are confident in the direction this cooperation is leading," he remarked. "After my visit, I was eager to report my discussions in Washington to President Bouteflika, meetings which demonstrated that our relations have reached a new level."

3. (S/NF) The discussions in Washington, he asserted, reflected the reality of the relationship. Algeria’s own struggle against terrorism and its contribution to defeat terrorists were well understood. It remained determined to continue that cooperation and reinforce the relationship with the U.S. "We are aware of the risks this threat poses. We must remain vigilant and preserve the progress that has been made," Medelci said. The progress that both sides have made on the ground underscores the confidence and openness of the strategic partnership.

4. (S/NF) Therefore, the minister said, the GOA had been extremely disappointed with Algeria’s inclusion in the TSA list, as well as the press coverage the decision had generated. The decision was intolerable, inappropriate, and inopportune. It was a contradiction not only to Algeria’s own progress on security and efforts to fight terrorism, but also to our countries’ counterterrorism cooperation. No attacks against the U.S. had been "signed" by an Algerian. Algeria had made major progress in recent years on its internal security. The domestic security environment had been stabilized, airports were secure, and Algeria was now an international partner in the fight against terrorism. TSA’s announcement had made no mention of any of this.

Measures Viewed as Discriminatory
---------------------------------

5. (S/NF) This was not just a matter of Algeria’s inclusion on the list, Medelci said. The GOA protested the discriminatory nature of the whole list. Thirteen of the 14 countries listed were Muslim. This sent a message that was inconsistent with President Obama’s Cairo speech, and the administration’s stated policy of outreach to Muslim communities. The decision will likely give further impetus to those who already question the sincerity of the administration’s approach.

6. (S/NF) The GOA was also disappointed, Medelci continued, that the decision had not been communicated prior to its release and that the Algerian leadership had to learn of it via the media. The minister said the GOA had initially refrained from making a public statement out of concern for U.S. relations, but now, due to the extensive press play and sense of collective humiliation among the public, it felt it needed to respond.

U.S. Focus on Air Travel Safety
-------------------------------

7. (S/NF) The Ambassador said the intention behind the TSA measures was not to harm or discriminate against any group or country, least of all our friends and partners. The intention was to make air travel as safe as possible for all.  The problem was that, on Christmas day, a terrorist had gotten through the system. President Obama had reacted immediately, ordering reviews of both our watch list system and our air passenger screening measures. He had also made clear that our approach would not be static but would evolve as our evaluation of the risk evolved. Algeria’s concerns would be reported in full; Washington had already heard the message from Ambassador Baali. The Ambassador added that the U.S. understood well Algeria’s difficult history with terrorism and appreciated its leadership in the international fight against extremist violence. The U.S. wanted to continue, and build on, our very important counterterrorism cooperation as well as our new partnerships in other areas, including military relations, law enforcement, and economic and trade cooperation.

Going Forward
-------------

8. (S/NF) Medelci said the GOA shared the desire to continue building our bilateral relationship. He reconfirmed GOA approval for a recent U.S. request to allow overflights of EP-3E surveillance aircraft. He also welcomed the visit of U.S. Attorney General Holder to conclude work on a mutual legal assistance treaty. The minister underscored as well the GOA’s readiness to assist with the upcoming Department of Commerce trade mission to Algeria in February and offered to meet with the head of the U.S. delegation, schedule permitting. At the same time, he asked that the Ambassador convey his message on Algeria’s concerns about the TSA measures to Secretary Clinton. The GOA shared the U.S. desire to continue building the bilateral relationship. But it would also be watching closely to see how the U.S. responds to its stated concerns and looking forward to an "equitable solution".

GOA Statement
-------------

10. (U) Below is Embassy’s informal translation of the statement issued January 11 by the Algerian MFA:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mourad Medelci, summoned Monday the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government’s strong protest over the decision taken by U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals are subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports:
"In the wake of the decision taken by the U.S. authorities to include Algerian nationals on a list of countries whose nationals will be subjected to specific control measures when arriving and departing U.S. airports, Foreign Affairs Minister Mourad Medelci summoned the Ambassador of the United States of America in Algiers to express the Algerian government’s strong protests over the unfortunate, unjustified, and discriminatory measure.

"This comes after several previous efforts that were deployed, once the TSA measures were known, by the central government and by our Ambassador in Washington with the relevant U.S. authorities." END INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF GOA STATEMENT.

COMMENT
-------

11. (S/NF) The past year has seen developments in important new areas of government-to-government cooperation. These include:
-- Approval for visits by senior Department of Defense visitors, including Deputy Assistant Secretary Huddleston and the first by AFRICOM Commander General Ward. These have significantly improved the substance of our mil-mil engagement.
-- Prompt agreement to allow U.S. military overflights for surveillance aircraft against AQIM targets in the Sahel.
-- Repatriation of eight Algerian Guantanamo detainees since 2008 and agreement to cooperate on the return of the remaining Algerian detainees.
-- Bilateral cooperation on judicial matters; a mutual legal assistance treaty and a customs agreement are both ready for signature.
ALGIERS 00000039 004.2 OF 004
-- Cooperation with our new legatt office, including on a cybercrime investigation that will protect American citizens from hackers and identity thieves.
-- Improved police contacts and access for RSO, which plans to launch an anti-terrorism assistance program this year.

12. (S/NF) On the commercial side, the U.S. exported about USD 400 million in oil field equipment and services to Algeria in 2008 and imported USD 19 billion worth of Algerian oil and natural gas. And our commercial interests are rapidly expanding beyond the hydrocarbons sector. Algeria signed two contracts, totaling USD 847 million, in December 2009, to purchase 11 Boeing aircraft. These were presidential decisions, made in the face of heavy French pressure for Airbus. A U.S. firm, Solar Turbines, concluded a USD 320-million contract in October 2009 with Algeria’s state electricity company to supply gas-fired turbines. U.S. companies are also competing for politically sensitive security contracts. Cogent, a U.S. biometrics company, is close to signing a USD 45-million deal to supply the Ministry of Interior with an automated fingerprint identification system but faces heavy competition from France. Harris Radio is bidding on a contract with a potential value of USD 500 million to manufacture and supply radios for Algeria’s defense ministry and signals corps. The Harris and Cogent contracts have significant implications for U.S. commercial and security interests.

13. (S/NF) It is noteworthy that Medelci began and ended this conversation by stressing the importance the Algerian leadership attaches to continuing bilateral cooperation, especially on counterterrorism. But in-between, however, he delivered an unmistakable message that the GOA feels the TSA moves are inconsistent with that relationship and that they will be watching closely to see how we respond to this demarche. Over the past year, we have had a green light to develop important new ties across the board, from military to law enforcement. That light has now turned yellow. PEARCE

2008/10/29 - Subject: Candid Discussion with Prince Andrew on the Kyrgyz Economy and the “Great Game”

Tue, 7 Dec 2010 21:18:50 +0100

Confidential Report by the U.S. Embassy in Bishek, Kyrgyzstan

VZCZCXRO8787
RR RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHEK #1095/01 3031207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291207Z OCT 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1474
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2724
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0265
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1087
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 3111
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2497
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 165

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001095
C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y (ADDRESSEE)
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN (GORKOWSKI)
EO 12958 DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS PREL, ECON, KG
SUBJECT: CANDID DISCUSSION WITH PRINCE ANDREW ON THE KYRGYZ
ECONOMY AND THE "GREAT GAME"
REF: BISHKEK 1059
BISHKEK 00001095 001.4 OF 004
Classified By: Amb. Tatiana Gfoeller, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: On October 28, the Ambassador participated in a two-hour brunch to brief HRH the Duke of York ahead of his meetings with the Kyrgyz Prime Minister and other high-level officials. She was the only non-subject of the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth invited to participate by the British Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic. Other participants included major British investors in Kyrgyzstan and the Canadian operator of XXXXXXXXXXXX. The discussion covered the investment climate for Western firms in the Kyrgyz Republic, the problem of corruption, the revival of the "Great Game," Russian and Chinese influence in the country, and the Prince’s personal views on promoting British economic interests. Astonishingly candid, the discussion at times verged on the rude (from the British side). END SUMMARY.

2. (C) British Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic Paul Brummell invited the Ambassador to participate in briefing His Royal Highness Prince Andrew, the Duke of York, ahead of his October 28 meetings with Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov and other high-level officials. The Prince was in Kyrgyzstan to promote British economic interests. Originally scheduled to last an hour over brunch, the briefing ended up lasting two hours, thanks to the super-engaged Prince’s pointed questions. The Ambassador was the only participant who was not a British subject or linked to the Commonwealth. The absence of her French and German colleagues was notable; they were apparently not invited despite being fellow members of the European Union. Others included major British investors in Kyrgyzstan and the Canadian operator of the Kumtor mine.

"YOU HAVE TO TAKE THE ROUGH WITH THE SMOOTH"
--------------------------------------------

3. (C) The discussion was kicked off by the president of the Canadian-run Kumtor mine, who described at length his company’s travails of trying to negotiate a revised mining concession that provides a greater stake in Kumtor’s parent company to the Kyrgyz government in exchange for a simplified tax regime and an expanded concession. He was followed by the representative of the British owner of Kyrgyzneftigas, who explained his company’s role in Kyrgyz oil exploration and production, as well as doing his share of complaining of being harassed and hounded by Kyrgyz tax authorities. One example he gave was that a Kyrgyz shareholder was now suing the company, saying that his "human rights" were being violated by the terms of his shareholders’ agreement.

4. (C) The Prince reacted with unmitigated patriotic fervor.  To his credit, he diligently tried to understand the Kyrgyz point view. However, when participants explained that some Kyrgyz feel that they were "unfairly" led in the 1990s to sign unfavorable contracts with Westerners, he evinced no sympathy. "A contract is a contract," he insisted. "You have to take the rough with the smooth."

"ALL OF THIS SOUNDS EXACTLY LIKE FRANCE"
----------------------------------------

5. (C) After having half-heartedly danced around the topic for a bit, only mentioning "personal interests" in pointed fashion, the business representatives then plunged into describing what they see as the appallingly high state of corruption in the Kyrgyz economy. While claiming that all of them never participated in it and never gave out bribes, one representative of a middle-sized company stated that "It is sometimes an awful temptation." In an astonishing display of candor in a public hotel where the brunch was taking place, all of the businessmen then chorused that nothing gets done in Kyrgyzstan if President Bakiyev’s son Maxim does not get "his cut." Prince Andrew took up the topic with gusto, saying that he keeps hearing Maxim’s name "over and over again" whenever he discusses doing business in this country. Emboldened, one businessman said that doing business here is "like doing business in the Yukon" in the nineteenth century, i.e. only those willing to participate in local corrupt practices are able to make any money. His colleagues all heartily agreed, with one pointing out that "nothing ever changes here. Before all you heard was Akayev’s son’s name. Now it’s Bakiyev’s son’s name." At this point the Duke of York laughed uproariously, saying that: "All of this sounds exactly like France."

6. (C) The Prince then turned to the Ambassador for an American take on the situation. The Ambassador described American business interests in the country, which range from large investments such as the Hyatt hotel and the Katel telecommunications company to smaller investments in a range of sectors. She stated that part of the problem with business conditions in Kyrgyzstan was the rapid turnover in government positions. Some reacted to their short tenures in a corrupt manner, wanting to "steal while they can" until they were turned out of office. While noting the need for greater transparency in doing business, she recounted that she had hosted the American Chamber of Commerce’s Members Day last week (attended by the Foreign Minister and the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce) which had been widely attended and a resounding success (see reftel). She then described the beneficial impact on the Kyrgyz economy of the Coalition Air Base at Manas Airport.

"YOU HAVE TO CURE YOURSELF OF ANOREXIA"
---------------------------------------

7. (C) With a mock groan, the Duke of York then exclaimed: "My God, what am I supposed to tell these people?!" More seriously, he invited his guests to suggest ways Kyrgyzstan’s economic prospects and attractiveness could be improved. Everyone agreed that in his talks with the Prime Minister and others, he should emphasize the rule of law, and long-term stability.

8. (C) Agreeing with the Ambassador’s point about rapid government turnover, they urged him to impress upon his hosts the importance of predictability and the sanctity of contracts in order to attract more Western investment. At the same time, they pointed out that none of this was necessary to attract Russian, Kazakh, or Chinese investments.  It appeared to them that the Kyrgyz were satisfied with their level and on the verge of "not bothering" with making the necessary improvements to attract Western investments. Returning to what is obviously a favorite theme, Prince Andrew cracked: "They won’t need to make any changes to attract the French either!" Again turning thoughtful, the Prince mused that outsiders could do little to change the culture of corruption here. "They themselves have to have a change of heart. Just like you have to cure yourself of anorexia. No one else can do it for you."

PLAYING THE GREAT GAME (BY EXTENSION THE AMERICANS TOO)
-------------------------------------------------------

9. (C) Addressing the Ambassador directly, Prince Andrew then turned to regional politics. He stated baldly that "the United Kingdom, Western Europe (and by extension you Americans too") were now back in the thick of playing the Great Game. More animated than ever, he stated cockily: "And this time we aim to win!" Without contradicting him, the Ambassador gently reminded him that the United States does not see its presence in the region as a continuation of the Great Game. We support Kyrgyzstan’s independence and sovereignty but also welcome good relations between it and all of its neighbors, including Russia.

10. (C) The Prince pounced at the sound of that name. He told the Ambassador that he was a frequent visitor to Central Asia and the Caucasus and had noticed a marked increase in Russian pressure and concomitant anxiety among the locals post-August events in Georgia. He stated the following story related to him recently by Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev. Aliyev had received a letter from President Medvedev telling him that if Azerbaijan supported the designation of the Bolshevik artificial famine in Ukraine as "genocide" at the United Nations, "then you can forget about seeing Nagorno-Karabakh ever again." Prince Andrew added that every single other regional President had told him of receiving similar "directive" letters from Medvedev except for Bakiyev.  He asked the Ambassador if Bakiyev had received something similar as well. The Ambassador answered that she was not aware of any such letter.

11. (C) The Duke then stated that he was very worried about Russia’s resurgence in the region. As an example, he cited the recent Central Asian energy and water-sharing deal (septel), which he claimed to know had been "engineered by Russia, who finally pounded her fist on the table and everyone fell into line." (NOTE: Interestingly, the Turkish Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic recently described her analysis of the deal to the Ambassador in strikingly similar language. END NOTE.)

12. (C) Showing that he is an equal-opportunity Great Game player, HRH then turned to the topic of China. He recounted that when he had recently asked the President of Tajikistan what he thought of growing Chinese influence in Central Asia, the President had responded "with language I won’t use in front of ladies." His interlocutors told the Prince that while Russians are generally viewed sympathetically throughout the region, the Chinese are not. He nodded, terming Chinese economic and possibly other expansion in the region "probably inevitable, but a menace."

RUDE LANGUAGE A LA BRITISH
--------------------------

13. (C) The brunch had already lasted almost twice its allotted time, but the Prince looked like he was just getting started. Having exhausted the topic of Kyrgyzstan, he turned to the general issue of promoting British economic interests abroad. He railed at British anti-corruption investigators, who had had the "idiocy" of almost scuttling the Al-Yamama deal with Saudi Arabia. (NOTE: The Duke was referencing an investigation, subsequently closed, into alleged kickbacks a senior Saudi royal had received in exchange for the multi-year, lucrative BAE Systems contract to provide equipment and training to Saudi security forces. END NOTE.) His mother’s subjects seated around the table roared their approval. He then went on to "these (expletive) journalists, especially from the National Guardian, who poke their noses everywhere" and (presumably) make it harder for British businessmen to do business. The crowd practically clapped. He then capped this off with a zinger: castigating "our stupid (sic) British and American governments which plan at best for ten years whereas people in this part of the world plan for centuries." There were calls of "hear, hear" in the private brunch hall. Unfortunately for the assembled British subjects, their cherished Prince was now late to the Prime Minister’s. He regretfully tore himself away from them and they from him. On the way out, one of them confided to the Ambassador: "What a wonderful representative for the British people! We could not be prouder of our royal family!"
COMMENT

-------

14. (C) COMMENT: Prince Andrew reached out to the Ambassador with cordiality and respect, evidently valuing her insights. However, he reacted with almost neuralgic patriotism whenever any comparison between the United States and United Kingdom came up. For example, one British businessman noted that despite the "overwhelming might of the American economy compared to ours" the amount of American and British investment in Kyrgyzstan was similar. Snapped the Duke: "No surprise there. The Americans don’t understand geography. Never have. In the U.K., we have the best geography teachers in the world!" END COMMENT.

GFOELLER

2008/12/03 - Subject: Spain: Alleged Detainee Flights Issue Blows Up in Media

Mon, 6 Dec 2010 01:56:38 +0100

Confidential Report by the U.S. Embassy in Madrid, Spain

VZCZCXRO8488
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #1280/01 3391342
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041342Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5723
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA 3694
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 001280

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: MARR PREF PGOV PTER KPAO SP
SUBJECT: SPAIN: ALLEGED DETAINEE FLIGHTS ISSUE BLOWS UP IN
MEDIA

REF: A. 07 MADRID 173
B. MADRID 1021

MADRID 00001280 001.2 OF 003

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Arnold A. Chacon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: A hot issue in the Spanish press since 2005, the detainee transfer flights that allegedly transited Spain from 2002 until 2006 have once again hit the headlines. The most recent flurry of reporting began November 30 when El Pais, Spain's leading newspaper, printed several stories based on internal GOS documents purporting to relate U.S. requests in 2002 for permission to use Spanish airports should an emergency arise on flights transporting terrorism detainees to Guantanamo. Although GOS officials past and present continue to deny knowledge of any illegality, this long-running saga could have implications for our Agreement on Defense Cooperation (ADC). END SUMMARY.

The Story that Will Not Die
---------------------------

2. (SBU) The Guantanamo detainee flight story has long since become a press staple in Spain. The story appears on front pages (starting in El Pais) and disappears every two or three months. An investigation is underway in a Spanish court, brought by an NGO which claims illegally detained persons were transported via Spain. The press reporting almost invariably mixes so-called "CIA flights" and U.S. military flights via Rota and Moron (of which there are thousands annually) indiscriminantly. It also draws heavily on claims by various NGOs interested in Guantanamo and presents their allegations as fact (e.g., lists of aircraft tail numbers from planes alleged to have passed through Spain carrying detainees). The progress of the case appears desultory and that translates into a periodic rash of stories each time the judge receives new information, say from air traffic control authorities or the Spanish MOD. Naturally, no allowance is made in the press for the fact that Guantanamo, aside from being home to the detention facility, is also a U.S. military base visited by routine logistical flights.

Leaks
-----

3. (SBU) The current iteration of the story is the most virulent so far. It began November 30 when El Pais reported a document recounting a 2002 meeting between the then-Spanish MFA Director General for North America and the Embassy's Political-Military Counselor (NFI) in which the U.S. asked to use Spain as an emergency landing destination for flights moving detainees from Afghanistan to Guantanamo. The
newspaper also described a second document from the same MFA official, addressed to the MOD Secretary General for Defense Policy, expressing the MFA's willingness to grant the U.S. request and suggesting use of a "discreet" military airport such as Moron. In a related article December 3, El Pais published a February 2007 letter from the Spanish President of the joint Permanent Committee which manages implementation of the ADC, asking the U.S. section to confirm that the U.S. was in compliance with Article 25.2 of the ADC with respect to U.S. military flights to and from Guantanamo (that article exempts from blanket flight clearances any plane carrying persons or cargo that would be controversial for Spain). The newspaper also published the U.S. section response, which was in the affirmative. (Note: In March 2007, the MOD decided that all flights to and from Guantanamo would require individual clearances; that is the procedure in use today).

Know Nothings
-------------

4. (SBU) Trying to get ahead of the story, FM Moratinos announced December 1 the formation of an independent investigative team including the Chiefs of Staff to the FM, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs as well as the FM's parliamentary advisor. On December 2, Moratinos confirmed press reports the investigative team has not been able to locate the original of the 2002 document described in paragraph 1 (although El Pais has printed a facsimile). This has only added to the government's embarrassment.

MADRID 00001280 002.2 OF 003

5. (C) President Zapatero and his cabinet have let it be known that they had no knowledge of any arrangements the previous administration (that of Jose Maria Aznar) might have made with the U.S. This tactic could be effective but is blunted by allegations the flights continued into 2006, well into Zapatero's first term. Given the Socialists' consistent, outspoken anti-Guantanamo line, it would be a political disaster if they were shown to have winked at detainee flights. It would be only somewhat less damaging if they were perceived to be so incompetent they did not notice the flights. Moratinos has denied any knowledge. Two former Zapatero MODs, current President of Congress Jose Bono and current senior Socialist Party congressional spokesman Jose Antonio Alonso, have said they knew of no illegal U.S. activity in Spain. The opposition Popular Party (PP – the party Aznar led) has accused the Zapatero administration of leaking documents in an effort to discredit them and to distract public attention from Zapatero's alleged mishandling of the ailing Spanish economy. The PP has also pointed out that of two of the alleged flights occurred under Aznar and nine came under Zapatero's presidency. PP leader Mariano Rajoy has told the press he knew nothing about the flights, although he was First Vice President in Aznar's government at the time of the alleged agreement. A unsubstantiated rumor claims the leaker is the head of Spain's National Intelligence Center who is allegedly trying to pressure his former mentor Bono into supporting a renewal of his term as director. We put little credence in such rumors, but they give a sense of how heated this has become. Adding to Zapatero's discomfort, the small but noisy far-left party (United Left) is in full cry over the story.

Subpoenas?
----------

6. (SBU) The prosecutor handling the related court case indicated last year that there was no plan to request information from the USG (ref a). However, the latest round of stories has included speculation that the court might seek testimony from Aznar and members of his administration as well as from U.S. Embassy officials. We have received no official notification of any such requests, and consider it unlikely.

Comment
-------

7. (C) Beyond the fact that it sells newspapers, there are a variety of reasons for this story,s longevity. Although anti-Americanism in Spain is more theoretical than practical (the Spanish people fundamentally like the U.S. and want strong relations, and the Spanish government is anxious to establish closer ties with the incoming U.S. Administration), there remains an important segment in the media that is old-school European left. More importantly, the left-of-center press here enjoys bashing Aznar and his party, especially for their support for the war in Iraq. Additionally, although itself left-of-center, El Pais has its differences with Zapatero and may not mind inflicting pain on him as well as Aznar. Neither is El Pais very fond of Moratinos.

8. (C) Whatever the motive, the continual media muddling of so-called "CIA flights" and U.S. military flights is unhelpful. The ADC provides us the extremely valuable use of two military bases in southern Spain midway between the continental U.S. and the theaters of operation in Afghanistan and Iraq. To the extent our ADC -- which generally receives little public attention in Spain -- is hauled onto the front pages in connection with the detention facility at Guantanamo, we run the risk of seeing political support for the ADC and our mil-mil relationship undermined. By unfortunate coincidence, the ADC was already in the press in recent weeks thanks to MOD Chacon,s repeated references to her hope that the U.S. would elevate it to the level of a treaty (septel).

MADRID 00001280 003.2 OF 003

9. (C) In general, we have taken the approach that the less said by us to the press on the overflight topic, the better. The MFA North America Desk has told us in the past that they strongly prefer the Embassy not say anything, fearing it might stir the pot. In any case, our ability to beat down this story is constrained by the fact that we do not ourselves know, factually, what might have transpired five or six years ago as the battles in Afghanistan and Iraq began yielding large numbers of potentially dangerous terrorist detainees and unlawful combatants. Naturally, we are not going to answer questions on the activities of intelligence agencies, so in any conversation about these issues we run the risk of appearing less than transparent and thus seeming to confirm the media,s worst insinuations. When we do speak publicly on the issue, our mantra is that we have not violated Spanish law and have complied fully with the ADC. Needless to say, we decline to comment on any leaked internal GOS documents. We also try at every opportunity to make the larger point about the war on terror and the very difficult choices that are faced when the U.S. captures suspected terrorists on foreign battlefields. Frankly, this is a losing argument with a Spanish public that – although attuned to the dangers of terrorism -- largely rejects the
muscular U.S. approach to fighting it overseas.

10. (C) Thus far, the MOD and MFA have done a reasonably good job in their public affairs efforts of making clear that they do not believe we have violated the ADC. The MOD issued a December 2 statement saying it knew of no U.S. military flights that were either illegal or in violation of our bilateral agreements (this echoes what MOD officials have told us privately -- e.g. ref b). However, we have no illusions. Politicians are not going to throw themselves on a grenade to protect a predecessor government they despise. More than anything, these stories are directed at Aznar and his party, and the damage to U.S. interests is in some measure collateral.

11. (C) Our guess is that the story will continue to rear its head every month or two for the foreseeable future. It is irresistible copy for Spanish editors, and Aznar is the left,s favorite bogeyman. The court case, winding its way slowly through the system, also provides periodic opportunities to revive it. Also, the release in the U.S. at some point in the future of information relating Guantanamo and Spain would certainly generate renewed press interest here. Baring a categorical statement from the USG that no detainees passed through Spain -- and we understand that might be undesirable from a policy standpoint even if factually correct -- nothing but time is going to make this go away.
AGUIRRE

2007/02/06 - Al-Masri Case - Chancellery aware of USG Concerns

Thu, 2 Dec 2010 00:08:11 +0100

VZCZCXYZ0015
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #0242 0371748
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061748Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6940

SECRET BERLIN 000242

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR S/ES-O, EUR AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2017
TAGS: KJUS PTER PREL PGOV GM
SUBJECT: AL-MASRI CASE -- CHANCELLERY AWARE OF USG CONCERNS

REF: A. BERLIN 230

B. BERLIN 200

Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1.  (S/NF) In a February 6 discussion with German Deputy National Security Adviser Rolf Nikel, the DCM reiterated our strong concerns about the possible issuance of international arrest warrants in the al-Masri case.  The DCM noted that the reports in the German media of the discussion on the issue between the Secretary and FM Steinmeier in Washington were not accurate, in that the media reports suggest the USG was not troubled by developments in the al-Masri case.  The DCM emphasized that this was not the case and that issuance of international arrest warrants would have a negative impact on our bilateral relationship.  He reminded Nikel of the repercussions to U.S.-Italian bilateral relations in the wake of a similar move by Italian authorities last year.

2.  (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that our intention was not to threaten Germany, but rather to urge that the German Government weigh carefully at every step of the way the implications for relations with the U.S.  We of course recognized the independence of the German judiciary, but noted that a decision to issue international arrest warrants or extradition requests would require the concurrence of the German Federal Government, specifically the MFA and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).  The DCM said our initial  indications had been that the German federal authorities would not allow the warrants to be issued, but that subsequent contacts led us to believe this was not the case.

3.  (S/NF) Nikel also underscored the independence of the German judiciary, but confirmed that the MFA and MOJ would have a procedural role to play.  He said the case was subject to political, as well as judicial, scrutiny.  From a judicial standpoint, the facts are clear, and the Munich prosecutor has acted correctly.  Politically speaking, said Nikel, Germany would have to examine the implications for relations with the U.S.  At the same time, he noted our political differences about how the global war on terrorism should be waged, for example on the appropriateness of the Guantanamo facility and the alleged use of renditions.

4.  (S/NF) Nikel also cited intense pressure from the Bundestag and the German media.  The German federal Government must consider the "entire political context," said Nikel.  He assured the DCM that the Chancellery is well aware of the bilateral political implications of the case, but added that this case "will not be easy."  The Chancellery would nonetheless try to be as constructive as possible.

5.  (S/NF) The DCM pointed out that the USG would likewise have a difficult time in managing domestic political implications if international arrest warrants are issued.  He reiterated our concerns and expressed the hope that the Chancellery would keep us informed of further developments in the case, so as to avoid surprises.  Nikel undertook to do so, but reiterated that he could not, at this point "promise that everything will turn out well."

TIMKEN JR

2010/09/03 - Blackwater Won Contracts Through a Web of Companies

Sat, 4 Sep 2010 13:22:04 +0200

By James Risen & Mark Mazzetti
New York Times
September 3, 2010

Washington - Blackwater Worldwide created a web of more than 30 shell companies or subsidiaries in part to obtain millions of dollars in American government contracts after the security company came under intense criticism for reckless conduct in Iraq, according to Congressional investigators and former Blackwater officials.

While it is not clear how many of those businesses won contracts, at least three had deals with the United States military or the Central Intelligence Agency, according to former government and company officials. Since 2001, the intelligence agency has awarded up to $600 million in classified contracts to Blackwater and its affiliates, according to a United States government official.

The Senate Armed Services Committee this week released a chart that identified 31 affiliates of Blackwater, now known as Xe Services. The network was disclosed as part of a committee’s investigation into government contracting. The investigation revealed the lengths to which Blackwater went to continue winning contracts after Blackwater guards killed 17 Iraqi civilians in Baghdad in September 2007. That episode and other reports of abuses led to criminal and Congressional investigations, and cost the company its lucrative security contract with the State Department in Iraq.

The network of companies - which includes several businesses located in offshore tax havens - allowed Blackwater to obscure its involvement in government work from contracting officials or the public, and to assure a low profile for any of its classified activities, said former Blackwater officials, who, like the government officials, spoke only on condition of anonymity.

Senator Carl Levin, the Michigan Democrat who is chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said in a statement that it was worth "looking into why Blackwater would need to create the dozens of other names" and said he had requested that the Justice Department investigate whether Blackwater officers misled the government when using subsidiaries to solicit contracts.

The C.I.A.’s continuing relationship with the company, which recently was awarded a $100 million contract to provide security at agency bases in Afghanistan, has drawn harsh criticism from some members of Congress, who argue that the company’s tarnished record should preclude it from such work. At least two of the Blackwater-affiliated companies, XPG and Greystone, obtained secret contracts from the agency, according to interviews with a half dozen former Blackwater officials.

A C.I.A. spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, said that Xe’s current duties for the agency were to provide security for agency operatives. Contractors "do the tasks we ask them to do in strict accord with the law; they are supervised by C.I.A. staff officers; and they are held to the highest standards of conduct" he said. "As for Xe specifically, they help provide security in tough environments, an assignment at which their people have shown both skill and courage."

Congress began to investigate the affiliated companies last year, after the shooting deaths of two Afghans by Blackwater security personnel working for a subsidiary named Paravant, which had obtained Pentagon contracts in Afghanistan. In a Senate hearing earlier this year, Army officials said that when they awarded the contract to Paravant for training of the Afghan Army, they had no idea that the business was part of Blackwater.

While Congressional investigators have identified other Blackwater-linked businesses, it was not the focus of their inquiry to determine how much money from government contracts flowed through the web of corporations, especially money earmarked for clandestine programs. The former company officials say that Greystone did extensive work for the intelligence community, though they did not describe the nature of the activities. The firm was incorporated in Barbados for tax purposes, but had executives who worked at Blackwater’s headquarters in North Carolina.

The former company officials say that Erik Prince, the business’s founder, was eager to find ways to continue to handle secret work after the 2007 shootings in Baghdad’s Nisour Square and set up a special office to handle classified work at his farm in Middleburg, Va.

Enrique Prado, a former top C.I.A. official who joined the contractor, worked closely with Mr. Prince to develop Blackwater’s clandestine abilities, according to several former officials. In an internal e-mail obtained by The New York Times, Mr. Prado claimed that he had created a Blackwater spy network that could be hired by the American government.

"We have a rapidly growing, worldwide network of folks that can do everything from surveillance to ground truth to disruption operations," Mr. Prado wrote in the October 2007 message, in which he asked another Blackwater official whether the Drug Enforcement Administration might be interested in using the spy network. "These are all foreign nationals," he added, "so deniability is built in and should be a big plus."

It is not clear whether Mr. Prado’s secret spy service ever conducted any operations for the government. From 2004 to 2006, both Mr. Prado and Mr. Prince were involved in a C.I.A. program to hunt senior leaders of Al Qaeda that had been outsourced to Blackwater, though current and former American officials said that the assassination program did not carry out any operations. Company employees also loaded bombs and missiles onto Predator drones in Pakistan, work that was terminated last year by the C.I.A.

Both Mr. Prince and Mr. Prado declined to be interviewed for this article.

The company is facing a string of legal problems, including the indictment in April of five former Blackwater officials on weapons and obstruction charges, and civil suits stemming from the 2007 shootings in Iraq.

The business is up for sale by Mr. Prince, who colleagues say is embittered by the public criticism and scrutiny that Blackwater has faced. He has not been implicated in the criminal charges against his former subordinates, but he has recently moved his family to Abu Dhabi, where he hopes to focus on obtaining contracts from governments in Africa and the Middle East, according to colleagues and former company officials.

After awarding Blackwater the new security contract in June, the C.I.A. director, Leon E. Panetta, publicly defended the decision, saying Blackwater had "cleaned up its act."

But Rep. Jan Schakowsky, an Illinois Democrat and a member of the House Intelligence Committee, said she could not understand why the intelligence community had been unwilling to cut ties to Blackwater. "I am continually and increasingly mystified by this relationship," she said. "To engage with a company that is such a chronic, repeat offender, it’s reckless."

It is unclear how much of Blackwater’s relationship with the C.I.A. will become public during the criminal proceedings in North Carolina because the Obama administration won a court order limiting the use of classified information. Among other things, company executives are accused of obtaining large numbers of AK-47s and M-4 automatic weapons, but arranging to make it appear as if they had been bought by the sheriff’s department in Camden County, N.C. Such purchases were legal only if made by law enforcement agencies.

But defense lawyers say they hope to argue that Blackwater had a classified contract with the C.I.A. and wanted at least some of the guns for weapons training for agency officers.

External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/04/world/middleeast/04blackwater.html