|
The War Profiteers - War Crimes,
Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
|
February 4th,
2008 - Leak on Cross-Border Chases From Iraq |
|
Leak on Cross-Border Chases
From Iraq By Eric Schmitt & Michael R. Gordon New York Times February 4, 2008 Washington - American
military forces in Iraq were authorized to pursue former members of Saddam
Hussein’s government and terrorists across Iraq’s borders into Iran and
Syria, according to a classified 2005 document that has been made public by
an independent Web site. The document, which was
disclosed by the organization Wikileaks and which American officials said
appeared authentic, outlined the rules of engagement for the American
division that was based in Baghdad and central Iraq that year. It also provided
instructions for how to deal with the radical Shiite cleric Moktada al-Sadr:
his status as a hostile foe was “suspended,” and he and his key associates were
not to be attacked except in self-defense. Wikileaks, a Web site that
encourages posting of leaked materials, says its goal in disclosing secret
documents is to reveal “unethical behavior” by governments and corporations.
It has previously posted the United States military’s manual for operating its
prison in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; a military assessment of a 2004 attack in
Falluja; and lists of American military equipment in Iraq. The American military
command in Baghdad on Sunday sharply criticized the group’s decision to post
the document. “While we will not comment
on whether this is, in fact, an official document, we do consider the
deliberate release of what Wikileaks believes to be a classified document is
irresponsible and, if valid, could put U.S. military personnel at risk,” said
Rear Adm. Gregory J. Smith, a spokesman for the command. Rules of engagement in Iraq,
which cover the procedures for using force on a battlefield in which
insurgents and terrorists mix with civilians, have long been considered
highly classified. The American military’s concern is that adversaries will
be able to adjust their tactics if they know the rules that describe the
specific circumstances in which force may and may not be used. The 2005 document covers the
procedures used by Multi-National Division Baghdad, the American unit that
operated in the Iraqi capital and central Iraq. At a time when sectarian
divisions had brought Iraq to a low-level civil war, the document suggests
that capturing and killing former members of Mr. Hussein’s government was
still a concern. In a section on crossing
international borders, the document said the permission of the American
defense secretary was required before American forces could cross into or fly
over Iranian or Syrian territory. Such actions, the document suggested, would
probably also require the approval of President Bush. But the document said that
there were cases in which such approval was not required: when American
forces were in hot pursuit of former members of Mr. Hussein’s government or
terrorists. Approval by the defense
secretary “is not required to conduct uninterrupted pursuit and engagement of
positively identified former regime military aircraft, terrorist and senior
[former] military leadership and senior nonmilitary elements of former Iraqi
regime command and control across international borders,” the document said. It stated that the American
commander engaged in the pursuit, however, should consult with top commanders
in Baghdad, “time permitting.” It is not known if the
authority to conduct hot pursuits across the Iranian and Syrian borders was
ever used or what authority exists today. In October 2005, The New York Times
reported that there had been a series of clashes between Army Rangers and
Syrian troops along the border with Iraq. According to the 2005 document,
American forces were also authorized to respond to a “hostile force” that
used Syrian or Iranian territory to attack American troops in Iraq or that
posed an “imminent threat” to American operations there. They were instructed
to consult with a senior American commander if there was time. Apparently in a carryover
from the intelligence failures of the Iraq invasion in early 2003, the
document says the United States Central Command, which oversees operations in
the Middle East, gave American commanders in Iraq the authority to attack
mobile “W.M.D. labs”; such labs for making germ weapons were later determined
not to exist. The 2005 document also
referred to a Central Command list of the “hostile forces” that may be
“engaged and destroyed.” It focused heavily on Mr. Hussein’s former security
forces, like the Special Republican Guard and members of the Baath Party
militia that were said to have shifted from “overt conventional resistance to
insurgent methods of resistance.” Reflecting the clash the
year before between American forces and Mr. Sadr’s militia, the document said
the militia and other armed supporters of the cleric had also been on the
list of paramilitary forces deemed to be “hostile.” L. Paul Bremer III, the
head of the American occupation authority in Iraq until June 2004, had
branded Mr. Sadr an outlaw, and an Iraqi judge had issued a secret warrant
for his arrest. But a truce was later worked
out with Mr. Sadr, and Iraqi politicians sought to bring him into the
political process. Apparently as a result of those developments, the rules of
engagement were modified. Referring to Mr. Sadr and the Mahdi Army, the
document says: “Their status as a declared hostile force, however, is
suspended and such individuals will not be engaged except in self-defense.” External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/washington/04rules.html |