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The War Profiteers - War Crimes,
Kidnappings & Torture |
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October 15th,
2008 - CIA Tactics Endorsed In Secret Memos News article by the Washington Post |
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CIA Tactics Endorsed In
Secret Memos Waterboarding Got White House Nod By Joby Warrick Washington Post October 15, 2008 The Bush administration
issued a pair of secret memos to the CIA in 2003 and 2004 that explicitly
endorsed the agency's use of interrogation techniques such as waterboarding
against al-Qaeda suspects - documents prompted by worries among intelligence
officials about a possible backlash if details of the program became public. The classified memos, which
have not been previously disclosed, were requested by then-CIA Director
George J. Tenet more than a year after the start of the secret
interrogations, according to four administration and intelligence officials
familiar with the documents. Although Justice Department lawyers, beginning
in 2002, had signed off on the agency's interrogation methods, senior CIA
officials were troubled that White House policymakers had never endorsed the
program in writing. The memos were the first -
and, for years, the only - tangible expressions of the administration's
consent for the CIA's use of harsh measures to extract information from
captured al-Qaeda leaders, the sources said. As early as the spring of 2002,
several White House officials, including then-national security adviser
Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Cheney, were given individual briefings
by Tenet and his deputies, the officials said. Rice, in a statement to
congressional investigators last month, confirmed the briefings and
acknowledged that the CIA director had pressed the White House for
"policy approval." The repeated requests for a
paper trail reflected growing worries within the CIA that the administration
might later distance itself from key decisions about the handling of captured
al-Qaeda leaders, former intelligence officials said. The concerns grew more
pronounced after the revelations of mistreatment of detainees at the Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq, and further still as tensions grew between the
administration and its intelligence advisers over the conduct of the Iraq
war. "It came up in the
daily meetings. We heard it from our field officers," said a former
senior intelligence official familiar with the events. "We were already
worried that we" were going to be blamed. A. John Radsan, a lawyer in
the CIA general counsel's office until 2004, remembered the discussions but
did not personally view the memos the agency received in response to its concerns.
"The question was whether we had enough 'top cover,'" Radsan said. Tenet first pressed the
White House for written approval in June 2003, during a meeting with members
of the National Security Council, including Rice, the officials said. Days
later, he got what he wanted: a brief memo conveying the administration's
approval for the CIA's interrogation methods, the officials said. Administration officials
confirmed the existence of the memos, but neither they nor former
intelligence officers would describe their contents in detail because they
remain classified. The sources all spoke on the condition of anonymity
because they were not cleared to discuss the events. The second request from
Tenet, in June 2004, reflected growing worries among agency officials who had
just witnessed the public outcry over the Abu Ghraib scandal. Officials who
held senior posts at the time also spoke of deteriorating relations between
the CIA and the White House over the war in Iraq - a rift that prompted some
to believe that the agency needed even more explicit proof of the
administration's support. "The CIA by this time
is using the word 'insurgency' to describe the Iraq conflict, so the White
House is viewing the agency with suspicion," said a second former senior
intelligence official. As recently as last month,
the administration had never publicly acknowledged that its policymakers knew
about the specific techniques, such as waterboarding, that the agency used
against high-ranking terrorism suspects. In her unprecedented account to
lawmakers last month, Rice, now secretary of state, portrayed the White House
as initially uneasy about a controversial CIA plan for interrogating top
al-Qaeda suspects. After learning about
waterboarding and similar tactics in early 2002, several White House
officials questioned whether such harsh measures were "effective and
necessary ... and lawful," Rice said. Her concerns led to an
investigation by the Justice Department's criminal division into whether the
techniques were legal. But whatever misgivings
existed that spring were apparently overcome. Former and current CIA
officials say no such reservations were voiced in their presence. In interviews, the officials
recounted a series of private briefings about the program with members of the
administration's security team, including Rice and Cheney, followed by more
formal meetings before a larger group including then-Attorney General John D.
Ashcroft, then-White House counsel Alberto R. Gonzales and then-Defense
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. None of the officials recalled President Bush
being present at any of the discussions. Several of the key meetings
have been previously described in news articles and books, but Rice last
month became the first Cabinet-level official to publicly confirm the White
House's awareness of the program in its earliest phases. In written responses
to questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee, Rice said Tenet's
description of the agency's interrogation methods prompted her to investigate
further to see whether the program violated U.S. laws or international
treaties, according to her written responses, dated Sept. 12 and released
late last month. "I asked that ...
Ashcroft personally advise the NSC principles whether the program was
lawful," Rice wrote. Current and former
intelligence officials familiar with the briefings described Tenet as
supportive of enhanced interrogation techniques, which the officials said
were developed by CIA officers after the agency's first high-level captive,
al-Qaeda operative Zayn al-Abidin Muhammed Hussein, better known as Abu
Zubaida, refused to cooperate with interrogators. "The CIA believed then,
and now, that the program was useful and helped save lives," said a
former senior intelligence official knowledgeable about the events. "But
in the agency's view, it was like this: 'We don't want to continue unless you
tell us in writing that it's not only legal but is the policy of the
administration.' " One administration official
familiar with the meetings said the CIA made such a convincing case that no
one questioned whether the methods were necessary to prevent further
terrorist attacks. "The CIA had the White
House boxed in," said the official. "They were saying, 'It's the
only way to get the information we needed, and - by the way - we think
there's another attack coming up.' It left the principals in an extremely
difficult position and put the decision-making on a very fast track." But others who were present
said Tenet seemed more interested in protecting his subordinates than in
selling the administration on a policy that administration lawyers had
already authorized. "The suggestion that
someone from CIA came in and browbeat everybody is ridiculous," said one
former agency official familiar with the meeting. "The CIA understood
that it was controversial and would be widely criticized if it became
public," the official said of the interrogation program. "But given
the tenor of the times and the belief that more attacks were coming, they
felt they had to do what they could to stop the attack." The CIA's anxiety was partly
fueled by the lack of explicit presidential authorization for the
interrogation program. A secret White House "memorandum of
notification" signed by Bush on Sept. 15, 2001, gave the agency broad
authority to wage war against al-Qaeda, including killing and capturing its
members. But it did not spell out how captives should be handled during
interrogation. But by the time the CIA
requested written approval of its policy, in June 2003, the population of its
secret prisons had grown from one to nine, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed,
the alleged principal architect of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. Three of the
detainees had been subjected to waterboarding, which involves strapping a
prisoner to a board, covering his face and pouring water over his nose and
mouth to simulate drowning. By the spring of 2004, the
concerns among agency officials had multiplied, in part because of shifting
views among administration lawyers about what acts might constitute torture,
leading Tenet to ask a second time for written confirmation from the White
House. This time the reaction was far more reserved, recalled two former
intelligence officials. "The Justice Department
in particular was resistant," said one former intelligence official who
participated in the discussions. "They said it doesn't need to be in
writing." Tenet and his deputies made
their case in yet another briefing before the White House national security
team in June 2004. It was to be one of the last such meetings for Tenet, who
had already announced plans to step down as CIA director. Author Jane Mayer,
who described the briefing in her recent book, "The Dark Side,"
said the graphic accounts of interrogation appeared to make some participants
uncomfortable. "History will not judge us kindly," Mayer quoted
Ashcroft as saying. Participants in the meeting
did not recall whether a vote was taken. Several weeks passed, and Tenet left
the agency without receiving a formal response. Finally, in mid-July, a memo
was forwarded to the CIA reaffirming the administration's backing for the
interrogation program. Tenet had acquired the statement of support he sought. Staff researcher Julie Tate
contributed to this report. External link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/10/14/AR2008101403331.html |