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The War Profiteers - War Crimes,
Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
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December 24th,
2007 - Warnings Unheeded on Guards in Iraq |
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Warnings Unheeded on Guards in
Iraq Despite Shootings, Security Companies Expanded Presence By Steve Fainaru Washington Post December 24, 2007 The U.S. government
disregarded numerous warnings over the past two years about the risks of using
Blackwater Worldwide and other private security firms in Iraq, expanding
their presence even after a series of shooting incidents showed that the
firms were operating with little regulation or oversight, according to
government officials, private security firms and documents. The warnings were conveyed
in letters and memorandums from defense and legal experts and in high-level
discussions between U.S. and Iraqi officials. They reflected growing concern
about the lack of control over the tens of thousands of private guards in Iraq,
the largest private security force ever employed by the United States in
wartime. Neither the Pentagon nor the
State Department took substantive action to regulate private security
companies until Blackwater guards opened fire Sept. 16 at a Baghdad traffic
circle, killing 17 Iraqi civilians and provoking protests over the role of
security contractors in Iraq. "Why is it they
couldn't see this coming?" said Christopher Beese, chief administrative
officer for ArmorGroup International, a British security firm with extensive
operations in Iraq. "That amazes me. Somebody - it could have been
military officers, it could have been State - anybody could have waved a flag
and said, 'Stop, this is not good news for us.' " Private security firms
rushed into Iraq after the March 2003 invasion. The U.S. military, which
entered the country with 130,000 troops, needed additional manpower to
protect supply convoys, military installations and diplomats. Private
security companies appeared "like mushrooms after a rainstorm,"
recalled Michael J. Arrighi, who has worked in private security in Iraq since
2004. Last year, the Pentagon
estimated that 20,000 hired guns worked in Iraq; the Government
Accountability Office estimated 48,000. On Feb. 7, 2006, Blackwater
guards allegedly killed three Kurdish civilians outside the northern city of
Kirkuk. That incident triggered demonstrations outside the U.S. Consulate and
led Rizgar Ali, president of the Kirkuk provincial council, to complain to
U.S. authorities in Kirkuk and Baghdad, Ali said in an interview. The
incident was one of several shootings that caused friction between the U.S.
and Iraqi governments. On Christmas Eve 2006, a
Blackwater employee killed the bodyguard of an Iraqi vice president in the
Green Zone. Six weeks later, a Blackwater sniper killed three security guards
for the state-run media network. On May 24, a Blackwater team shot and killed
a civilian driver outside the Interior Ministry gates, sparking an armed
standoff between the Blackwater guards and Iraqi security forces in downtown
Baghdad. By June 6, concerns about
Blackwater had reached Iraq's National Intelligence Committee, which included
senior Iraqi and U.S. intelligence officials, including Maj. Gen. David B.
Lacquement, the Army's deputy chief of staff for intelligence. Maj. Gen.
Hussein Kamal, who heads the Interior Ministry's intelligence directorate,
called on U.S. authorities to crack down on private security companies. U.S. military officials told
Kamal that Blackwater was under State Department authority and outside their
control, according to notes of the meeting. The matter was dropped. "We set this thing up
for failure from the beginning," said T.X. Hammes, a retired Marine
colonel who advised the new Iraqi army from January to March 2004. He added
that private security guards regularly infuriated his Iraqi staff with their
aggressive tactics and that he reported the problems "up the chain of
command." "We're just sorting it
out now," Hammes said. "I still think, from a pure counterinsurgency
standpoint, armed contractors are an inherently bad idea, because you cannot
control the quality, you cannot control the action on the ground, but you're
held responsible for everything they do." U.S. officials argue that
security contractors save money and free up troops for more urgent tasks,
such as fighting insurgents. "Certainly there have been moments of
frustration where people here have said, 'Maybe we should just take over the
whole operation, even if it stretches our forces more,'" Pentagon
spokesman Geoff Morrell said. "But the reality is that we think our
resources are better utilized taking it to the bad guys than guarding
warehouses and escorting convoys." The State Department
investigated previous Blackwater shootings and found no indication of
wrongdoing, according to a senior official involved in security matters. He
said the U.S. Embassy discussed any concerns the Iraqi government had about
the company's conduct. "I'm not aware of the significant warnings,"
said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because of ongoing
investigations related to the Sept. 16 shooting. The Defense Department has
paid $2.7 billion for private security since 2003, according to USA Spending,
a government-funded project that tracks contracting expenditures; the
military said it currently employs 17 companies in Iraq under contracts worth
$689.7 million. The State Department has paid $2.4 billion for private
security in Iraq - including $1 billion to Blackwater - since 2003, USA
Spending figures show. On Dec. 5, the State and
Defense departments signed a memorandum of agreement designed to increase
cooperation between the two and better define their authority over private
security contractors. The nine-page agreement, which was approved by Ryan C.
Crocker, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, the
commander of U.S. forces there, for the first time set common guidelines for
reporting serious incidents, the use of deadly force, coordination on the
battlefield and possession of firearms. But the laws governing
security contractors still have not been clarified. On Sept. 30, 2006,
Congress passed a provision aimed at giving the military authority over all
contractors in Iraq, including Blackwater. But the provision has not been
implemented by the Pentagon. The 15-month delay "has led to much confusion
over who will be covered ... and has called into question whether the
Department plans to utilize this provision," Sen. Lindsey O. Graham
(R-S.C.) and Sen. John F. Kerry (D-Mass.), who sponsored the provision, wrote
in a letter to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates shortly after the Sept. 16
incident. The Pentagon is studying
whether the provision can withstand legal scrutiny, Pentagon spokesman Bryan
Whitman said. Contractors in Combat In previous wars, the
Pentagon had prohibited contractors from participating in combat. But in
Iraq, military planners rewrote the policy to match the reality on the
ground. On Sept. 20, 2005, the military issued an order authorizing
contractors to use deadly force to protect people and assets. In June 2006,
the order was codified as an "interim rule" in the Federal
Register. It took effect immediately without public debate. Critics, including the
American Bar Association and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, warned that the
Pentagon had used an obscure defense acquisition rule to push through a
fundamental shift in American war-fighting without fully considering the
potential legal and strategic ramifications. The provision enabled the
military to significantly raise troop levels with contractors whose
"combat roles now closely parallel those of Constitutionally and
Congressionally authorized forces," wrote Herbert L. Fenster, a partner
with McKenna Long & Aldridge, a Washington-based international law firm
that represents several major defense contractors. Fenster questioned the
provision's legality in a lengthy comment he filed in opposition. The
practice "smacks of a mercenary approach," he wrote in an e-mail. But neither the military nor
the State Department set guidelines for regulating tens of thousands of hired
guns on the battlefield. Oversight was left to overburdened government
contracting officers or the companies themselves, which conducted their own
investigations when a shooting incident occurred. Dozens of security
companies operated under layers of subcontracts that often made their
activities all but impossible to track. They were accountable to no one for
violent incidents, according to U.S. officials and security company
representatives familiar with the contracting arrangements. U.S. officials often turned
to the Private Security Company Association of Iraq, a trade group funded by
the security companies. Lawrence T. Peter, a retired Navy intelligence
officer, served as the association's director while also working as a
consultant to the Pentagon's Defense Reconstruction Support Office, which
administers contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whitman, the Pentagon
spokesman, said Peter earned "a few thousand dollars a year" as a
consultant. The association operated out
of an office inside the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Logistics Directorate in
the Green Zone. Jack Holly, a retired Marine colonel who heads corps
logistics in Iraq, said that Peter and the association play "a critical
role to help the private security community improve and regulate
itself," adding, "They tried to fill a void that had been left by
the U.S. government's failure to recognize the problem." "The department didn't
see him as an advocate" for the security industry, Whitman said,
referring to Peter. "They saw him as a conduit for information to
understand the role of private security contractors in the reconstruction
process." But others saw a conflict of
interest. "It violates all the best lessons of what goes into good
policy and smart business," said Peter W. Singer, a Brookings
Institution senior fellow who has written a book on private security.
"You do not hand over these questions to parties that are not merely
mildly interested but they're the ones you are seeking to regulate." The association sometimes
resisted regulation. Earlier this year, Peter opposed the military's efforts
to enforce orders requiring private security firms to obtain formal weapons
permits from the Iraqi government, arguing that the authorization process was
unworkable. Peter did not return messages seeking comment. His deputy, H.C.
Lawrence Smith, said during an interview in Baghdad this year that the
association sometimes helped the military in "writing the language in
contracts relating to the role that private security companies play. We don't
care what the contract is about, as long as the companies are treated
fairly." Maj. Gen. Darryl A. Scott,
who oversees Pentagon contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, said the
association had never "provided any input on contract language." He
said he viewed it as a trade group that made unsolicited comments on policy
on behalf of its membership. To employ Peter as a consultant, Scott said,
"wouldn't be proper." Fury and Frustration On June 27, 2004, one day before
he left Baghdad, L. Paul Bremer, administrator of the now-defunct U.S.
occupation government, signed CPA Order 17, a decree granting contractors
immunity from Iraqi law. Two years later, Matthew
Degn, a then-36-year-old civilian contractor from Seattle, arrived in Baghdad
as a senior policy adviser to the Interior Ministry. One of his assignments
was to help the Iraqis regulate private security. He started by reading CPA Order
17. Degn, a no-nonsense Army
veteran who had taught national security and terrorism studies at
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, offered a blunt assessment of the
document. "You have no power," he told Iraqi officials. Hostility toward Blackwater
was already high in the Interior Ministry, which was dominated by Shiite
militias. The February 2006 shooting incident in Kirkuk had damaged
U.S.-Iraqi relations in the area, leaving the Americans "hated and
ostracized," according to Ali, the provincial council president. Ali said he "sent
official letters to the American and the British consulates and met them in
my office to find out who the murderers were. They didn't do anything or give
me clear answers. They only said, 'The ones who did it were from the
Blackwater company.'" A Blackwater spokeswoman did
not respond to e-mails or phone messages seeking comment. U.S. officials said
they could not recall the incident. Blackwater, based in Moyock,
N.C., was founded in 1996 by a former Navy SEAL, Erik Prince. In Iraq, the
company protects the U.S. ambassador and other diplomats. Blackwater has lost
25 employees in Iraq, according to Labor Department figures based on
insurance claims. The firm says no one under its protection has been killed. The State Department's
reliance on Blackwater expanded dramatically in 2006, when together with the
U.S. firms DynCorp and Triple Canopy it won a new, multiyear contract worth
$3.6 billion. Blackwater's share was $1.2 billion, up from $488 million, and
the company more than doubled its staff, from 482 to 1,082. From January 2006
to April 2007, the State Department paid Blackwater at least $601 million in
38 transactions, according to government data. The company developed a
reputation for aggressive street tactics. Even inside the fortified Green
Zone, Blackwater guards were known for running vehicles off the road and
pointing their weapons at bystanders, according to several security company
representatives and U.S. officials. "They're universally
despised in the" Green Zone, said Arrighi, who has managed security for
several companies since 2004. "That's not an overstatement. 'Universally
despised' is probably a kind way to put it." The Iraqis' fury grew as
they realized that Blackwater was untouchable, Degn said. After the May 24
shooting of a civilian Iraqi driver outside the Interior Ministry gates,
Blackwater guards refused to divulge their names or details of the incident
to the Iraqi authorities. Degn, who was working in the ministry at the time,
recalled that the Iraqis were outraged and the American advisers felt
threatened. "After that day, people
looked at us a little different," Degn said. "There was a palpable
feeling. ... We knew that something monumental had happened, that we were in
deep water. And we felt like we weren't getting anything done. We were going
up and coming down, but they weren't listening to a darn thing we were
saying." The State Department
official who spoke on condition of anonymity said Blackwater became
synonymous with private security, "like Kleenex or Reynolds Wrap"
being used to describe generic products, and was blamed for incidents even
when it wasn't involved. He said the shootings should be viewed in the
context of the several thousand missions that Blackwater conducted safely on
Baghdad's dangerous streets. On June 6, Kamal, the deputy
minister, brought up the issue of Blackwater before the National Intelligence
Committee. The committee's weekly meetings at the Iraqi parliament were
headed by Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq's national security adviser, and attended
by several U.S. officials, including Lacquement, the Army's deputy chief of
staff for intelligence. A spokesman for Lacquement,
who is now commander of the Army Intelligence and Security Command, said that
for "reasons of classification and security," he could not address
whether Blackwater was discussed. "Clearly the overall
philosophy and tactics of Blackwater were not in keeping with winning hearts
and minds," said a senior defense official involved in private security
policy. The company's aggressive tactics provoked widespread frustration
among U.S. commanders in Iraq, but the complaints "never got out of the
brigade level" until after the Sept. 16 incident, he said. Kamal's pleas to do
something about the private security firms went nowhere. "Kamal was
ballistic," Degn said. The May 24 shooting "had happened right on
Interior Ministry grounds. That's what made it so explosive. But once again,
the Americans blew it off, so where are you going to take it after
that?" Degn said he was also
frustrated. "We sent many memos up the chain of command," he said.
"I thought it was a huge issue. The coalition knew about it, but it was
just another part of the war, so nothing was ever done. I felt it was
completely ignored." "I mean, how many of
these incidents does it take before you're finally aware?" Degn added. ‘An Interesting Question’ In the spring of 2005, while
on a one-year tour in Baghdad, Army Maj. Robert Bateman watched a Blackwater
convoy barrel through a congested traffic circle, indiscriminately firing
warning shots. Bateman, who frequently writes and blogs on military issues,
described what he saw to his fiancee, Kate Turner, a first-year graduate
student at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies. On Dec. 5 that year, Turner
decided to ask Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, who was visiting Johns
Hopkins, what laws governed security contractors in Iraq. "Iraq's a sovereign
country. They have their laws, and they're going to govern," Rumsfeld
replied. Four months later, Turner
raised the issue with President Bush when he visited the school. "I asked your secretary
of defense a couple months ago what law governs their actions," Turner
said, according to a transcript of the exchange. "I was going to ask
him," the president responded, drawing laughter as he issued a mock
entreaty. "Go ahead. Help." "Mr. Rumsfeld answered
that Iraq has its own domestic laws which he assumed applied to those private
military contractors," Turner said. "However, Iraq is clearly not
capable of enforcing its laws. I would submit to you that this is one case
that privatization is not a solution. And, Mr. President, how do you propose
to bring private military contractors under a system of law?" "I wasn't kidding. I
was going to pick up the phone and say, 'Mr. Secretary, I've got an
interesting question,'" Bush replied. "I don't mean to be dodging
the questions, although it's kind of convenient in this case." Turner received a letter two
weeks later from the Pentagon's Office of General Counsel. It directly
contradicted Rumsfeld: "Contractors are ... subject to oversight and
accountability for their actions on the basis of U.S. law and regulation." To date, not a single case
has been brought against a private security contractor in Iraq. "The
reality is the military has not had any oversight on this issue until
recently," Arrighi said. "We could hire the Rockettes and give them
guns, and they wouldn't know. It was a total wasteland." Special correspondent Naseer
Nouri in Baghdad and staff researcher Julie Tate in Washington contributed to
this report. External link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/story/2007/12/23/ST2007122302511.html |