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April 21st, 2007 - Report On Haditha Condemns Marines

News article by the Washington Post

News article by the San Diego Union-Tribune

Summary of the Haditha Massacre

Report On Haditha Condemns Marines

Signs of Misconduct Were Ignored, U.S. General Says

 

By Josh White

Washington Post

April 21, 2007; A01

 

The Marine Corps chain of command in Iraq ignored "obvious" signs of "serious misconduct" in the 2005 slayings of two dozen civilians in Haditha, and commanders fostered a climate that devalued the life of innocent Iraqis to the point that their deaths were considered an insignificant part of the war, according to an Army general's investigation.

 

Maj. Gen. Eldon A. Bargewell's 104-page report on Haditha is scathing in its criticism of the Marines' actions, from the enlisted men who were involved in the shootings on Nov. 19, 2005, to the two-star general who commanded the 2nd Marine Division in Iraq at the time. Bargewell's previously undisclosed report, obtained by The Washington Post, found that officers may have willfully ignored reports of the civilian deaths to protect themselves and their units from blame. Though Bargewell found no specific coverup, he concluded that there also was no interest at any level in investigating allegations of a massacre.

 

"All levels of command tended to view civilian casualties, even in significant numbers, as routine and as the natural and intended result of insurgent tactics," Bargewell wrote. He condemned that approach because it could desensitize Marines to the welfare of noncombatants. "Statements made by the chain of command during interviews for this investigation, taken as a whole, suggest that Iraqi civilian lives are not as important as U.S. lives, their deaths are just the cost of doing business, and that the Marines need to get 'the job done' no matter what it takes."

 

Bargewell's sharp criticism of the Marine command appears to have been a contributing factor in subsequent efforts by top leaders to ensure that U.S. troops exercise appropriate restraint around civilians. Lt. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli, who was the top field commander in Iraq last year, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, now the top U.S. commander there, have emphasized the importance of protecting the civilian population in counterinsurgency operations and have ordered aggressive investigations of alleged wrongdoing.

 

Though Bargewell completed his secret report in June 2006, it has not been publicly released because of ongoing criminal investigations of three Marines on murder allegations and four Marine officers who allegedly failed to look into the case. Bargewell's report, now unclassified, focuses on the reporting of the incident and the training and command climate within the Marine Corps leadership; it does not address the actual incident in detail.

 

The investigation began in March 2006 after an initial inquiry concluded that the Marines did not intentionally kill civilians. Bargewell's team interviewed Marines in Asad in western Iraq and in the United States in April 2006. His final report was submitted to Chiarelli on June 15, 2006.

 

A Marine Corps spokesman declined to comment yesterday. Marine officials have generally not discussed the incident because it is under investigation.

 

In the Haditha incident, which has become one of the most notorious alleged atrocities of the Iraq war, Marines killed two dozen civilians after a huge roadside bomb ripped through a Humvee in their convoy, killing one Marine instantly and injuring two others. A Naval Criminal Investigative Service report found that the Marines then killed five unarmed civilians whom they ordered out of a car - one Marine alleged that another got down on one knee and shot them one by one - before storming several houses and killing women and children, some of them still in their pajamas and lying in bed.

 

The Marines have told investigators that they believed they were taking small-arms fire from the houses and that they were following their rules of engagement when they threw grenades and then shot everyone inside.

 

Bargewell found that, though the Marines were trained correctly, some "did not follow proper house and room techniques" by not positively identifying their targets. Lt. William T. Kallop, the only officer on the scene at the time, ordered the attack on the houses and told investigators that he did not believe the Marines did anything wrong. Kallop received immunity this month and will probably testify at the hearings for the other Marines.

 

The report notes errors and oversights at all levels of the Marine command in Iraq. Bargewell says that Marines at the squad level came up with a false story; that Kilo Company officers and the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, passed along insufficient information to the regimental commander; and that regimental officers and officers at the 2nd Marine Division ignored signs of a problem and believed the incident to be insignificant. He also accuses the entire chain of failing to recognize the importance of civilian deaths.

 

Of particular concern to Bargewell was that nearly all Marines looked the other way when confronted with early reports that many civilians had been shot in fighting on the streets of Haditha after a roadside bomb killed a member of their unit. His investigation found that Marines and officers present that day immediately reported numerous civilian deaths to superiors but that the reports were "untimely, inaccurate and incomplete" - failures he attributed to "inattention and negligence, in certain cases willful negligence."

 

Then, no one asked any further questions, Bargewell wrote, despite gruesome photographs circulating among junior Marines that showed that women and children had been killed in their beds. He cited several opportunities to investigate that were not taken, such as when more than $40,000 in condolence payments went to Iraqis after the killings.

 

"I found that the duty to inquire further was so obvious in this case that a reasonable person with knowledge of these events would have certainly made further inquiries," Bargewell wrote. "The most remarkable aspect of the follow-on action with regard to the civilian casualties from the 19 November 2005 Haditha incident was the absence of virtually any kind of inquiry at any level of command into the circumstances surrounding the deaths."

 

No one recommended an investigation until a Time magazine reporter began asking questions about the attack in January 2006. Maj. Gen. Richard A. Huck, the division commander, dismissed the allegations as insurgent propaganda, according to the report. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Jeffrey Chessani, also refused to investigate, saying, "My marines are not murderers," according to two of his top subordinates. Bargewell called this "an unwillingness, bordering on denial," to examine an incident that could be harmful to his unit.

 

Chessani's attorneys have denied that he did anything wrong and have said that he informed his commanders about the incident.

 

The regimental commander, Col. Stephen Davis, was also not interested in investigating, according to the report. "The RCT-2 Commander, however, expressed only mild concern over the potential negative ramifications of indiscriminate killing based on his stated view that the Iraqis and insurgents respect strength and power over righteousness," the report says.

 

None of Chessani's superiors has been charged with a crime, but in addition to the battalion commander, two captains and a lieutenant have been charged with failing to investigate or with impeding the investigation.

 

Bargewell found that Huck's division staff viewed the allegations of inappropriate killings as part of insurgent "information operations" and an attempt to make the Marines look bad. He also noted a proclivity among senior officers to look past such allegations even if there was a chance they could be accurate. Bargewell called that approach "myopic and overly simplistic" and said it produced a tendency to judge credibility based on the source of the information rather than on the facts.

 

Excerpts from Army Maj. Gen. Eldon A. Bargewell’s report:

 

“[…] The response to the Haditha incident

 

“I found no direct evidence of any orchestrated effort or any effort on the part of any individual above the squad level to cover up this incident. I did find that individuals above the squad level were complicit, whether intentionally or unintentionally, in attempts to hide criminal conduct. Leaders from the platoon through the 2nd Marine Division level, particularly at the Company and Battalion level, exhibited a determination to ignore indications of serious misconduct, perhaps to avoid conducting an inquiry that could prove adverse to themselves or their Marines. […]

 

“The most remarkable aspect of the follow-on action with regard to the civilian casualties from the 19 November 2005 Haditha incident was the absence of virtually any kind of inquiry at any level of command into the circumstances surrounding the deaths. […]

 

“It also suggests an unwillingness, bordering on denial, on the part of the Battalion Commander to examine an incident that might prove harmful to him and his Marines. […]

 

“Attitudes toward civilian life

 

“Statements made by the chain of command during interviews for this investigation, taken as a whole, suggest that Iraqi civilian lives are not as important as U.S. lives, their deaths are just the cost of doing business, and that the Marines need to get 'the job done' no matter what it takes. These comments had the potential to desensitize the Marines to concern for the Iraqi populace and portray them all as the enemy even if they are noncombatants. […]

 

“Most witnesses also noted that civilian casualties were to be expected because the insurgents intentionally hid among civilians, used them as shields and/or intentionally tried to provoke coalition responses that would produce civilian casualties. Although this proposition may accurately reflect insurgent tactics, the officers from Company K and 3/1 who were interviewed raised this point so uniformly in response to questions about the number of casualties that it almost appeared rehearsed. […]

 

“The RCT-2 Commander, however, expressed only mild concern over the potential negative ramifications of indiscriminate killing based on his stated view that the Iraqis and insurgents respect strength and power over righteousness.

 

“Recommendations

 

“I recommend that this investigation be used to inform the continuing development and improvement of ROE [rules of engagement] reset training and that it be used as a case study for training in staff procedures and reporting. The lessons are particularly applicable to ROE application in counterinsurgency operations against an unscrupulous enemy employing hit and run tactics designed to provoke indiscriminate, disproportionate, or simply misdirected responses from coalition forces. The lessons for staff procedures and reporting are basic, but the case study will illustrate how simple failures can lead to disastrous results. […]”

 

External link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/20/AR2007042002308.html


Immunity Given to 7 in Haditha Slayings

Prosecutors trying to get more witnesses to testify

 

By Rick Rogers

San Diego Union-Tribune

April 21, 2007

 

Camp Pendleton - Prosecutors have granted immunity to at least seven Camp Pendleton Marines linked to the killings of 24 civilians in Haditha, Iraq, according to newly leaked documents and sources close to the case.

 

The strategy resembles one that prosecutors have used effectively in another high-profile murder case involving servicemen from the base: bolstering their odds of winning by enticing more witnesses to testify.

 

Last summer, seven Marines and a sailor were charged with the April 26 abduction and execution-style death of an Iraqi grandfather in Hamdaniya, Iraq. The defendants initially banded together and pledged to fight the allegations.

 

But their unity melted once the Marine Corps started making plea deals, with prosecutors offering lighter prison sentences to some servicemen in exchange for their testimony against the remaining defendants. Five of the accused have taken plea agreements.

On Tuesday, the Marine Corps announced that it had dropped all charges, including five counts of murder, against Sgt. Sanick P. Dela Cruz and given him immunity in exchange for his testimony.

 

Cruz and three other enlisted Marines are accused of going on a deadly rampage Nov. 19, 2005, in Haditha after a roadside bomb claimed one of their own. The defendants have acknowledged killing the 24 civilians but said they were following the military's rules for combat engagement.

 

In addition, four officers are charged with failing to fully investigate the incident.

 

Yesterday, several lawyers and documents acquired by The Washington Post  confirmed that prosecutors have extended immunity to at least six other Marines in the Haditha case. Those men, including the only officer present during the killings, apparently had not been charged with any crime.

 

Immunity may sound like a good thing, but not everybody wants it.

 

“Some of these guys are being given immunity so Marine prosecutors can then order them to testify,” said a military source with knowledge of the case. The source requested anonymity because Marine commanders haven't released the latest immunity documents or allowed people involved in the Haditha proceedings to speak publicly about them.

 

“Their Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate themselves only applies when facing charges,” the source said. “(Now) ... they have to testify or face charges.”

 

Failure to testify could send them to prison for two years.

 

“Marines are a pretty tightknit group of people. They don't like testifying against each other,” said John Hutson, president and dean of the Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, N.H., and former judge advocate general of the Navy.

 

However, not all the Haditha immunity deals are guaranteed to boost the prosecution's chances. The testimony of Lt. William T. Kallop, the sole officer at the killing scene, could support defendants' contention that they were following lawful orders.

 

Kallop reached the Haditha site minutes after the roadside bomb went off, according to military reports. In testimony given later to investigators, he said the squad leader, Staff Sgt. Frank D. Wuterich, and another Marine heard gunfire coming from a nearby house.

 

Kallop told the investigators that he ordered Wuterich and the other men in his platoon to “take the house.”

 

“I'm convinced that we did nothing wrong,” Kallop is quoted as saying in documents The Washington Post  obtained from anonymous sources.

 

The Marines also killed people in two other homes and a nearby vehicle.

 

“During the four years as a military trial lawyer, I don't recall a defense witness ever being given immunity,” said Tom Umberg, a former military defense counsel, prosecutor and judge.

 

Umberg theorized that Kallop's immunity deal might help the prosecution avoid certain problems if the defendants file appeals. He also said prosecutors might use some portions of Kallop's testimony to their advantage.

 

External link: http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/northcounty/20070421-9999-1m21haditha.html

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