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The War Profiteers - War Crimes,
Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
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March 11th,
2007 - Surge and Destroy |
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The Brutality Escalates in Iraq By Michael Schwartz TomDispatch.com March 11, 2007 If you are trying to figure
out how the new Bush strategy is progressing, or just trying to figure out
what is happening in Iraq, here is a diagnosis and a bit of a prognosis. In his speech, Bush promised
three prongs to his new strategy: (1) attacking and neutralizing Moqtada
al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia; (2) confronting Iran; and (3) a new offensive
against the Sunni insurgents. Neutralizing the Mahdi Army:
Since 2004, cleric Moqtada al-Sadr has been the Shiite the Bush
administration has most loved to hate. Early in the war, occupation officials
tried to have him arrested and fought three large battles (two in Najaf, one
in the vast Baghdad slum of Sadr City) in an attempt to suppress his
guerrilla militia, the Mahdi Army. Each time, he and his forces, deeply
entrenched in Sadr City, have bounced back stronger and more popular than
ever. In its fourth manifestation, the intention to dislodge, disrupt, or
destroy the Mahdi Army appears guaranteed to fail. It is just a matter of
what sort of failure the U.S. will choose. As the new strategy has so
far been implemented, American military tactics seem designed to yield a
relatively modest failure, though one that may prove indirectly responsible
for significant Iraqi civilian casualties. U.S. troops have begun operations
in Sadrist strongholds (notably Sadr City), which were, until late last year,
American "no-go zones." But they are not attempting to pacify them,
as they have been Sunni neighborhoods in the capital. Instead they are
mounting raids designed to arrest specific Sadrist leaders, while leaving the
rest of the community alone. So far, Sadr's men have decided to lay low and
not resist the American intrusions (though the targeted individuals are
frequently gone when the Americans arrive, often resulting, evidently, in the
arrest of any fighting age man in the vicinity). There are even rumors that
Sadr is cooperating with at least some of the arrests, allowing the Americans
to apprehend "rogue" Mahdi Army leaders who have not been following
his orders. Whatever the story may be,
this strategy will leave the strength of the Mahdis, - who are not just a
militia but, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, a social movement with deep and
complex ties to, and support from, poor Shiite communities - unimpaired. It
cannot generate sufficient arrests to decapitate the militia; nor can its
"hit and run" tactics undermine the political and military
domination exercised by the Sadrists in these neighborhoods. At best, it is a
kind of ongoing harassment, a symbolic denial of Sadrist power. It will not be surprising,
therefore, if the U.S. escalates these raids into larger-scale attacks on
Sadrist strongholds. If this were done, it would involve the sort of brutal
invasions currently being undertaken in Sunni neighborhoods. Typically these
attacks begin when U.S. troops close off an area, demand that all women and
children leave, and then initiate a house-to-house sweep, treating the
community, in essence, as a "free fire zone." Each house is
inspected for lurking insurgents or other suspicious characters (sometimes
simply any men of fighting age) and searched for arms caches (which are
plentiful). Anyone that evades the invaders, hinders the search, or offers
any sort of resistance may be considered an enemy combatant. The level of
destruction can be quite awesome. If the U.S. tries this in
Sadrist strongholds, the Mahdis will have no choice but to fight back; they
will not sit by while their communities are savaged. This could trigger a
guerrilla confrontation in Shiite communities much like the ferocious
fighting that has been seen in Sunni areas. The battle of Tal Afar, which, in
2005, turned parts of that city into ghost neighborhoods and reduced a
quarter of it to rubble (still not cleared away), has been explicitly mentioned
as a "model" for these sorts of offensives. It is one thing to mount
such attacks against Iraq's Sunni minority. Used against the 60% majority
Shia community, these tactics would likely spur a response that would spread
around the country and prove disastrous for American plans, which are already
in tatters. The Mahdis would certainly retaliate in other neighborhoods;
wherever, in fact, the Americans are vulnerable. If the U.S. military is
already almost drowning in the Sunni insurgency, imagine the predicament of
American troops should they suddenly have to fight any significant number of
Shia as well. Such a development would
have two clear consequences: an exponential growth in the strain on an
already overstretched American military and a dramatic increase in the use of
air power to back up embattled troops on the ground. Together, these could
result not just in massacres, but in the rubble-ization of significant parts
of Baghdad and possibly other Iraqi cities. If the U.S. military stays
with its current strategy of surgical incursions, it might escape with only a
modest defeat. If it escalates, it is courting unmitigated disaster in the
wake of unprecedented brutality. Confronting Iran: There are
all sorts of symptoms of the new approach to Iran, including the (mostly
trumped up) accusations about that country supplying Iraqi insurgents with
advanced weaponry, the arrests of accused Iranian infiltrators and their
Iraqi allies, and the stationing of a second aircraft-carrier task force in
the Persian Gulf (with possibly two more on the way). And the U.S. and
foreign media have been carrying a constant stream of reports about possible
U.S. or Israeli air attacks on Iran itself. Bush administration
accusations of Iranian "interference" in the Iraqi political and
military situation are particularly ironic, and not just because the idea of
the U.S. accusing anyone else of "outside interference" in Iraq is
so absurd. The added irony derives from the administration's most dramatic
claim - that the Iranians are supplying the insurgency with a new type of IED
that can pierce armor. There is plenty of dispute
over the accuracy of this charge, but if the Iranians are supplying
sophisticated IEDs, it's to the Shia insurgents (even the U.S. military
admits to that); and the U.S. is not (currently) fighting the Shia
insurgents, it's fighting Sunni insurgents, who hate Iran just as much as -
possibly more than - the U.S. However, this accusation is most often stripped
of this critical "detail" in the media (especially on the TV news).
Therefore, the impression is left that a large proportion of American
casualties are somehow being caused by Iranian technology. That, too, is
absurd. The same can be said about
most other administration claims against Iran, including those about that
country's possible nuclear-weapons program. The latest U.S. intelligence
reports indicate that the Iranians could develop a bomb in perhaps five to
ten years, hardly the sort of immediate threat that might provide a handy
justification for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. But the fact that these
accusations are so spindly only adds to fears that the administration is
constructing a web of lies, half-truths, and cherry-picked intelligence in
order to justify an already-planned attack - just as its top officials did
four years ago in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. There are, unfortunately,
plenty of indications that the U.S. might indeed be preparing to attack Iran
or have the Israelis do it. The presence of two aircraft carrier battle
groups is but the most visible (with a third and even a fourth one rumored to
be en route); the appointment of the first Navy man, Adm. William J. Fallon,
to head Centcom - and he has a background in naval aviation at that - is
another; and the recent reports of behind-the-scenes protests over a possible
air assault on Iran from top military officers (including unprecedented
threats of high-level resignations) are all tangible signs of serious intent. But many similar indications
were present last spring and no attack occurred, presumably because saner
heads inside the Bush administration prevailed. This reflects the fact that,
even from the point of view of many of those who embrace the goal of American
preeminence in the Middle East (which might indeed call for reversing the
upward trajectory of Iranian regional power), such an attack might well
appear to be counterproductive. Instead of stabilizing the
situation in Iraq and reducing Iranian leverage in the region, it would
likely destabilize Iraq further (because Iran's Shia allies there would
certainly respond forcefully and violently), and it might even undermine the
viability of Saudi Arabia (because Shia rebellions could spread to the
oil-rich areas of that country). Most significantly, instead of dislodging
the Iranian regime, an American attack, no matter how powerful, would
probably entrench it - and at a terrible cost. Instead of restoring American
credibility as an indomitable military presence in the Middle East, the
failure of such an attack would further undermine it (as Israel's fruitless
attack on Lebanon did for it last summer). The logic of the situation
suggests that all this is saber-rattling; an attempt to use the threat of war
to wrest concessions from the Iranians. But we are dealing with the Bush
administration, which has a habit of pursuing "counterproductive"
policies. We must watch the events of the coming months, particularly the
current talk about actual negotiations between the administration and the
Iranian regime, carefully. This one could tip either way. Attacking the Sunni
insurgents: What might happen sooner or later in Shia neighborhoods is
already the reality in Sunni communities and cities. For the most part, the
new strategy in Sunni areas of Baghdad is the same old strategy, seen not
only in major battles like those of Falluja and Tal Afar, but in various
neighborhoods of cities like Ramadi, Mosul, or Samarra. There is, however, a
new twist: The Americans now intend to keep troops at fortified mini-bases in
many of Baghdad's Sunni neighborhoods - supposedly to establish long-term
stability and facilitate reconstruction - after (and sometimes even before)
they are "cleared of insurgents." The small forward bases - really
glorified police stations - will be placed in the middle of Baghdad "hot
spots." The first prong of this new
policy is doomed. No area in Baghdad, or for that matter in Iraq, has been
successfully pacified in this manner. That includes Falluja and Tal Afar,
where this very strategy has been applied and has failed. About 1,000
American soldiers, supplemented by Iraqi (Shia) troops, have been in Falluja
for 27 months since the city was "cleared" (that is, largely
destroyed). They have established a particularly harsh form of martial law
and yet the insurgency in the city, without ever having disappeared, has
slowly grown again in strength. Falluja is not pacified and the Americans
have never actually initiated a real program of reconstruction there. In
other cities, with less comprehensive occupations, the insurgency is even
more robust, and there isn't even talk of reconstruction. American implementation of
this plan in Baghdad has already begun, with a devastating offensive in the
Haifa Street area, near the heavily fortified Green Zone, which quickly
escalated into the wholesale destruction of the neighborhood. Once the
initial onslaught was over, the offensive devolved into a case of Shiite
ethnic cleansing; Sunni residents who left during the heavy fighting are not
being allowed back in by the Shia police and troops who arrived with the
Americans. We can expect a regular diet of such clashes, possibly marked by
the liberal use of air power, guaranteed to devastate neighborhoods, followed
by sectarian struggles over who will repossess the destroyed buildings,
usually resolved in favor of the Shia allies of the American troops. The second prong of the new
policy - the creation of a permanent U.S. presence in insurgent strongholds,
is only now beginning to be implemented. Besides the fact that the planned
number of outposts (not more than 50 in any published estimates), could not
hope to purge the city of Sunni insurgents, this tactic will provide
stationary targets for guerrilla fighters - invitations for well-planned
attacks. In Ramadi, where this strategy is being implemented, there has
already been a successful car-bombing at the most important of the American
posts, and it seems likely that this is only the beginning. We should expect
reports of various forms of attacks against these bases as soon as the Sunni
insurgents get their bearings and develop their strategic plans. The Bottom Line: We are
looking at desperate measures aimed at reversing the decline of American
power in the Middle East. In all three areas designated by the surge plan,
this desperation has led to the consideration of, or even the embrace of,
more destructive strategies. The immediate results on the
ground already look disastrous in ways that - though they shouldn't -
invariably seem to catch Americans officials off-guard. For instance, when
they focus the limited forces available to them on Baghdad, the guerillas begin
to look for less well guarded targets elsewhere as seems now to be happening
in the city of Samarra. In addition, even the so far
modest American incursions into Shia areas of the capital have had the
horrifying effect of facilitating some of the most horrendous suicide
car-bombings yet recorded. One instance of this was succinctly described by
New York Times reporters James Wong and Wassam Habeeb: "On Feb. 18, just
two days after Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki called the opening stage
of the security drive a 'dazzling success,' two bombs ripped through a market
in the New Baghdad neighborhood, where American soldiers had been on patrol
just minutes earlier, killing at least 60 people." The way an American patrol
and a car bombing coincided was no accident. The New Baghdad neighborhood,
like almost all Shia communities in the capital, has been policed by the
Mahdi Army on an ongoing basis. Besides enforcing all manner of local law,
the Mahdis are also vigilant about possible suicide bombers, quickly
recognizing strange people or vehicles that enter their neighborhoods. At the
same time, wary citizens are also on the look-out, alerting the local Mahdis
whenever they see someone who looks suspicious. When the Americans come
through on patrol or - even worse - when they set up permanent checkpoints
(either U.S. or Iraqi-manned), the Mahdis have to lie low, since the
Americans (or their Iraqi sidekicks) will arrest or kill them. The community
is then essentially left unprotected and open to intruders. The Sunni jihadists know
this, and they also know that the Americans (and their Iraqi sidekicks) have
neither the ability nor the inclination to spot and interdict suspicious
looking outsiders. So they target precisely those Shia neighborhoods that the
Americans are busy "pacifying." Very often, as in the case of the
New Baghdad bombing, they time their attacks just after the Americans pass
through, and before the Mahdis can return to the streets. Since the surge policy
began, there have been a rash of these almost coordinated bombings, including
the sequential car bombs in Sadr City that killed 215, the demolition of the
Baghdad booksellers market that killed at least 38, and the attack on Shiite
pilgrims outside of Hilla that killed at least 70. In each of these cases,
the bombings coincided with U.S. patrols that virtually "ran
interference" (to use an unfortunately appropriate football term) for
terrorist attacks. And in each case, local residents registered furious complaints
that the Mahdi Army had been forced to "stand down." All of this is unsettling
enough. Worse yet, in the confrontation with the Sadrists, the Bush
administration appears to be edging toward search-and-destroy operations that
will rubble-ize Shia neighborhoods; in the confrontation with Iran, it
appears to be lurching toward a possible air assault on a remarkably wide
range of targets inside that country, guaranteeing staggering levels of
civilian casualties; in the confrontation with the Sunni insurgents, it is
already mobilizing its ground and air power with the promise of the
subsequent imposition of an extreme form of martial law. The hallmark of all
these new strategies is the high level of destruction and mayhem they
promise. There is a larger pattern
that should, by now, be clear in these developments, and all that have come
before. The architects of American policy in the Middle East tend to keep
escalating the level of brutality in search of a way to convince the Iraqis
(and now the Iranians) that the only path that avoids indiscriminate
slaughter is submission to a Pax Americana. Put another way, American policy
in the Middle East has devolved into unadorned state terrorism. Michael Schwartz, Professor
of Sociology and Faculty Director of the Undergraduate College of Global
Studies at Stony Brook University, has written extensively on popular protest
and insurgency, and on American business and government dynamics. His books
include Radical Protest and Social Structure, and Social Policy and the
Conservative Agenda (edited, with Clarence Lo). His work on Iraq has appeared
on numerous internet sites, including Tomdispatch, Asia Times , Mother Jones,
and ZNet; and in print in Contexts, Against the Current, and Z Magazine. Copyright 2007 Michael
Schwartz External link: http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=173730 |