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November 29th,
2006 - Bush Adviser’s Memo Cites Doubts About Iraqi Leader News article by the New York Times |
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Bush Adviser’s Memo Cites
Doubts About Iraqi Leader By Michael R. Gordon New York Times November 29, 2006 Washington, Nov. 28 - A
classified memorandum by President Bush’s national security adviser expressed
serious doubts about whether Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki had the
capacity to control the sectarian violence in Iraq and recommended that the
United States take new steps to strengthen the Iraqi leader’s position. The Nov. 8 memo was prepared
for Mr. Bush and his top deputies by Stephen J. Hadley, the national security
adviser, and senior aides on the staff of the National Security Council after
a trip by Mr. Hadley to Baghdad. The memo suggests that if
Mr. Maliki fails to carry out a series of specified steps, it may ultimately
be necessary to press him to reconfigure his parliamentary bloc, a step the
United States could support by providing “monetary support to moderate
groups,” and by sending thousands of additional American troops to Baghdad to
make up for what the document suggests is a current shortage of Iraqi forces. The memo presents an
unvarnished portrait of Mr. Maliki and notes that he relies for some of his
political support on leaders of more extreme Shiite groups. The five-page
document, classified secret, is based in part on a one-on-one meeting between
Mr. Hadley and Mr. Maliki on Oct. 30. “His intentions seem good
when he talks with Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying
to stand up to the Shia hierarchy and force positive change,” the memo said
of the Iraqi leader. “But the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests
Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his
intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good
intentions into action.” An administration official
made a copy of the document available to a New York Times reporter seeking
information on the administration’s policy review. The Times read and
transcribed the memo. The White House has sought
to avoid public criticism of Mr. Maliki, who is scheduled to meet with Mr.
Bush in Jordan on Wednesday. The latest surge of sectarian violence in
Baghdad and the Democratic victories in the midterm elections are prompting
calls for sharp changes in American policy. Such changes are among options
being debated by the Iraq Study Group, the bipartisan panel led by James A.
Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton. A senior administration
official discussed the memorandum in general terms after being told The New
York Times was preparing an article on the subject. The official described
the document as “essentially a trip report” and not a result of the
administration’s review of its Iraq policy, which is still under way. He said the purpose of the
memo “was to provide a snapshot of the challenges facing Prime Minister
Maliki and how we can best enhance his capabilities, mindful of the complex
political and security environment in which he is operating.” The American delegation that
went to Iraq with Mr. Hadley included Meghan L. O’Sullivan, the deputy
national security adviser, and three other members of the National Security
Council staff. The memo, prepared after that trip, has been circulated to
cabinet-level officials who are participating in the administration’s review
of Iraq strategy. There is nothing in the memo
that suggests the Bush administration is interested in replacing Mr. Maliki
as prime minister. But while Mr. Bush has stated that he has confidence in
the Iraqi leader, the memo questions whether Mr. Maliki has the will and
ability to establish a genuine unity government, saying the answer will emerge
from actions he takes in the weeks and months ahead. “We returned from Iraq
convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and
able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others,” the memo
says. “Do we and Prime Minister Maliki share the same vision for Iraq? If so,
is he able to curb those who seek Shia hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni
power? The answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have
the right strategy in Iraq.” In describing the Oct. 30
meeting between Mr. Hadley and Mr. Maliki, it says: “Maliki reiterated a
vision of Shia, Sunni and Kurdish partnership, and in my one-on-one meeting
with him, he impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having
difficulty figuring out how to do so.” It said the Iraqi leader’s assurances
seemed to have been contradicted by developments on the ground, including the
Iraqi government’s approach to the Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia known in
Arabic as Jaish al-Mahdi and headed by Moktada al-Sadr. “Reports of nondelivery of
services to Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister’s office to stop
military action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni
ones, removal of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and
efforts to ensure Shia majorities in all ministries - when combined with the
escalation of Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) killings - all suggest a campaign to
consolidate Shia power in Baghdad.” Among the concerns voiced in
the memo was that Mr. Maliki was surrounded by a small group of advisers from
the Shiite Dawa Party, a narrow circle that American officials worry may skew
the information he receives. The memo outlines a number
of short-term steps Mr. Maliki could undertake to establish control. The
Iraqi leader has recently indicated his intention to take some of those
steps, like announcing his intention to expand the size of the Iraqi Army and
declaring that Iraq will seek an extension of the United Nations mandate that
provides for the deployment of the American-led multinational force in Iraq.
The United Nations Security Council voted on Tuesday to extend that mandate. The memo also lists steps
the United States can take to strengthen Mr. Maliki’s position. They include
efforts to persuade Saudi Arabia to use its influence with the Sunnis in Iraq
and encourage them to turn away from the insurgency and to seek a political
accommodation. Addressing Mr. Bush, the
memo said one option was for the president to “direct your cabinet to begin
an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a leadership role on Iraq,
connecting this role with other areas in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S.
action.” Although the memo did not offer specifics, this appeared to be an
allusion to a more active American role in the Arab-Israeli peace process.
Recently, Israel’s prime minister, Ehud Olmert, has reached out to the
Palestinians and has said he wants to move ahead with peace talks. But the
memo’s authors also contemplate the possibility that Mr. Maliki’s position
may be too tenuous for him to take the steps needed to curb the power of
Shiite militias, to establish a more diverse and representative personal staff
and to arrest the escalating sectarian strife. In that case, the memo
suggests, it may ultimately be necessary for Mr. Maliki to recast his
parliamentary bloc, a step the United States could support by pressing
moderates to align themselves with the Iraqi leader and providing them with
monetary support. The memo refers to “the
current four-brigade gap in Baghdad,” a seeming acknowledgment that there is
a substantial shortfall of troops in the Iraqi capital compared with the
level needed to provide security there, in part because the Iraqi government
has not dispatched all the forces it has promised. An American brigade
generally numbers about 3,500 troops, though Iraqi units can be smaller.
While Democrats have advocated beginning troop withdrawals as a means of
putting pressure on Mr. Maliki, the memo suggests that such tactics may
backfire by stirring up opposition against a politically vulnerable leader. “Pushing Maliki to take
these steps without augmenting his capabilities could force him to failure -
if the Parliament removes him from office with a majority vote or if action
against the Mahdi militia (JAM) causes elements of the Iraqi Security Forces
to fracture and leads to major Shia disturbances in southern Iraq,” the memo
says. The memo lists a number of
possible steps to build up Mr. Maliki’s capability. They include asking Gen.
George W. Casey Jr., the senior American commander, to develop a plan to
strengthen the Iraqi leader. This could involve the
formation of a new National Strike Force, significantly increasing the number
of American advisers working with the Iraqi National Police, a force that has
been infiltrated by Shiite militias, and putting more Iraqi forces directly
under Mr. Maliki’s control. In addition, the memorandum
suggests that Mr. Bush ask the Pentagon and General Casey “to make a
recommendation about whether more forces are needed in Baghdad.” The administration appears
to have already begun carrying out some of the steps recommended in the
document. Among them were a trip over the weekend by Vice President Dick
Cheney to Saudi Arabia as part of an effort to seek help from Sunni Arab
powers in encouraging Sunni groups in Iraq to seek a political compromise
with Mr. Maliki. The senior administration
official who agreed to discuss the memo would do so only on condition of
anonymity. The official said some of the steps projected in the document were
being carried out. The official also stressed
that the administration retains confidence in the Iraqi leader. “What we are
seeing is that he had the right intentions and is willing to act,” the senior
official said. “Our own review has opened a consultative process on where
Maliki wants to take the government. A successful strategy has to be one that
is driven by the Iraqis.” Copyright 2006 The New York
Times Company External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29military.html Text of U.S. Security
Adviser’s Iraq Memo Following is the text of a
Nov. 8 memorandum prepared for cabinet-level officials by Stephen J. Hadley,
the national security adviser, and his aides on the National Security
Council. The five-page document, classified secret, was read and transcribed
by The New York Times. We returned from Iraq
convinced we need to determine if Prime Minister Maliki is both willing and
able to rise above the sectarian agendas being promoted by others. Do we and
Prime Minister Maliki share the same vision for Iraq? If so, is he able to
curb those who seek Shia hegemony or the reassertion of Sunni power? The
answers to these questions are key in determining whether we have the right
strategy in Iraq. Maliki reiterated a vision
of Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish partnership, and in my one-on-one meeting with
him, he impressed me as a leader who wanted to be strong but was having
difficulty figuring out how to do so. Maliki pointed to incidents, such as
the use of Iraqi forces in Shia Karbala, to demonstrate his even hand.
Perhaps because he is frustrated over his limited ability to command Iraqi
forces against terrorists and insurgents, Maliki has been trying to show
strength by standing up to the coalition. Hence the public spats with us over
benchmarks and the Sadr City roadblocks. Despite Maliki’s reassuring
words, repeated reports from our commanders on the ground contributed to our
concerns about Maliki’s government. Reports of nondelivery of services to
Sunni areas, intervention by the prime minister’s office to stop military
action against Shia targets and to encourage them against Sunni ones, removal
of Iraq’s most effective commanders on a sectarian basis and efforts to
ensure Shia majorities in all ministries - when combined with the escalation
of Jaish al-Mahdi’s (JAM) [the Arabic name for the Mahdi Army] killings - all
suggest a campaign to consolidate Shia power in Baghdad. While there does seem to be
an aggressive push to consolidate Shia power and influence, it is less clear
whether Maliki is a witting participant. The information he receives is
undoubtedly skewed by his small circle of Dawa advisers, coloring his actions
and interpretation of reality. His intentions seem good when he talks with
Americans, and sensitive reporting suggests he is trying to stand up to the
Shia hierarchy and force positive change. But the reality on the streets of
Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on,
misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet
sufficient to turn his good intentions into action. Steps Maliki Could Take There is a range of actions
that Maliki could take to improve the information he receives, demonstrate
his intentions to build an Iraq for all Iraqis and increase his capabilities.
The actions listed below are in order of escalating difficulty and, at some
point, may require additional political and security resources to execute, as
described on Page 3 of this memo. Maliki should: - Compel his ministers to
take small steps - such as providing health services and opening bank branches
in Sunni neighborhoods - to demonstrate that his government serves all ethnic
communities; - Bring his political
strategy with Moktada al-Sadr to closure and bring to justice any JAM actors
that do not eschew violence; - Shake up his cabinet by
appointing nonsectarian, capable technocrats in key service (and security)
ministries; - Announce an overhaul of
his own personal staff so that “it reflects the face of Iraq”; - Demand that all government
workers (in ministries, the Council of Representatives and his own offices)
publicly renounce all violence for the pursuit of political goals as a
condition for keeping their positions; - Declare that Iraq will
support the renewal of the U.N. mandate for multinational forces and will
seek, as appropriate, to address bilateral issues with the United States
through a SOFA [status of forces agreement] to be negotiated over the next
year; - Take one or more immediate
steps to inject momentum back into the reconciliation process, such as a
suspension of de-Baathification measures and the submission to the Parliament
or “Council of Representatives” of a draft piece of legislation for a more
judicial approach; - Announce plans to expand
the Iraqi Army over the next nine months; and - Declare the immediate
suspension of suspect Iraqi police units and a robust program of embedding
coalition forces into MOI [Ministry of the Interior] units while the MOI is
revetted and retrained. What We Can Do to Help Maliki If Maliki is willing to move
decisively on the actions above, we can help him in a variety of ways. We
should be willing to: - Continue to target Al
Qaeda and insurgent strongholds in Baghdad to demonstrate the Shia do not
need the JAM to protect their families — and that we are a reliable partner; - Encourage Zal [Zalmay
Khalilzad, the American ambassador] to move into the background and let
Maliki take more credit for positive developments. (We want Maliki to exert
his authority - and demonstrate to Iraqis that he is a strong leader - by
taking action against extremists, not by pushing back on the United States
and the Coalition.); - Continue our diplomatic
efforts to keep the Sunnis in the political process by pushing for the
negotiation of a national compact and by talking up provincial council
elections next spring/summer as a mechanism for Sunni empowerment; - Support his announcement
to expand the Iraqi Army and reform the MOI more aggressively; - Seek ways to strengthen
Maliki immediately by giving him additional control over Iraqi forces,
although we must recognize that in the immediate time frame, we would likely
be able to give him more authority over existing forces, not more forces; - Continue to pressure Iran
and Syria to end their interference in Iraq, in part by hitting back at
Iranian proxies in Iraq and by Secretary Rice holding an Iraq-plus-neighbors
meeting in the region in early December; and - Step up our efforts to get
Saudi Arabia to take a leadership role in supporting Iraq by using its
influence to move Sunni populations in Iraq out of violence into politics, to
cut off any public or private funding provided to the insurgents or death
squads from the region and to lean on Syria to terminate its support for
Baathists and insurgent leaders. Augmenting Maliki’s Political and Security Capabilities The above approach may prove
difficult to execute even if Maliki has the right intentions. He may simply
not have the political or security capabilities to take such steps, which
risk alienating his narrow Sadrist political base and require a greater
number of more reliable forces. Pushing Maliki to take these steps without
augmenting his capabilities could force him to failure - if the Parliament
removes him from office with a majority vote or if action against the Mahdi
militia (JAM) causes elements of the Iraqi Security Forces to fracture and
leads to major Shia disturbances in southern Iraq. We must also be mindful of
Maliki’s personal history as a figure in the Dawa Party - an underground
conspiratorial movement - during Saddam’s rule. Maliki and those around him
are naturally inclined to distrust new actors, and it may take strong
assurances from the United States ultimately to convince him to expand his
circle of advisers or take action against the interests of his own Shia
coalition and for the benefit of Iraq as a whole. If it is Maliki’s assessment
that he does not have the capability - politically or militarily - to take
the steps outlined above, we will need to work with him to augment his
capabilities. We could do so in two ways. First, we could help him form a new
political base among moderate politicians from Sunni, Shia, Kurdish and other
communities. Ideally, this base would constitute a new parliamentary bloc
that would free Maliki from his current narrow reliance on Shia actors. (This
bloc would not require a new election, but would rather involve a realignment
of political actors within the Parliament). In its creation, Maliki would
need to be willing to risk alienating some of his Shia political base and may
need to get the approval of Ayatollah Sistani for actions that could split
the Shia politically. Second, we need to provide Maliki with additional
forces of some kind. This approach would require
that we take steps beyond those laid out above, to include: - Actively support Maliki in
helping him develop an alternative political base. We would likely need to
use our own political capital to press moderates to align themselves with
Maliki’s new political bloc; - Consider monetary support
to moderate groups that have been seeking to break with larger, more
sectarian parties, as well as to support Maliki himself as he declares
himself the leader of his bloc and risks his position within Dawa and the
Sadrists; and - Provide Maliki with more
resources to help build a nonsectarian national movement. - If we expect him to adopt
a nonsectarian security agenda, we must ensure he has reasonably nonsectarian
security institutions to execute it - such as through a more robust embedding
program. - We might also need to fill
the current four-brigade gap in Baghdad with coalition forces if reliable
Iraqi forces are not identified. Moving Ahead We should waste no time in
our efforts to determine Maliki’s intentions and, if necessary, to augment
his capabilities. We might take the following steps immediately: - Convince Maliki to deliver
on key actions that might reassure Sunnis (open banks and direct electricity
rebuilding in Sunni areas, depoliticize hospitals); - Tell Maliki that we
understand that he is working his own strategy for dealing with the Sadrists
and that: - you have asked General
Casey to support Maliki in this effort - it is important that we
see some tangible results in this strategy soon; - Send your personal
representative to Baghdad to discuss this strategy with Maliki and to press
other leaders to work with him, especially if he determines that he must
build an alternative political base; - Ask Casey to develop a
plan to empower Maliki, including: - Formation of National
Strike Forces - Dramatic increase in
National Police embedding - More forces under Maliki
command and control - Ask Secretary of Defense
and General Casey to make a recommendation about whether more forces are need
in Baghdad; - Ask Secretary of Defense
and General Casey to devise a more robust embedding plan and a plan to
resource it; - Direct your cabinet to
begin an intensive press on Saudi Arabia to play a leadership role on Iraq,
connecting this role with other areas in which Saudi Arabia wants to see U.S.
action; - If Maliki seeks to build
an alternative political base: - Press Sunni and other
Iraqi leaders (especially Hakim) [Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the
Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a Maliki rival] to
support Maliki - Engage Sistani to reassure
and seek his support for a new nonsectarian political movement. External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/world/middleeast/29mtext.html |