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November 28th,
2006 - Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker News article by the Washington Post |
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Anbar Picture Grows Clearer,
and Bleaker By Dafna Linzer and Thomas E. Ricks Washington Post Staff Writers Tuesday, November 28, 2006; A01 The U.S. military is no
longer able to defeat a bloody insurgency in western Iraq or counter
al-Qaeda's rising popularity there, according to newly disclosed details from
a classified Marine Corps intelligence report that set off debate in recent
months about the military's mission in Anbar province. The Marines recently filed
an updated version of that assessment that stood by its conclusions and
stated that, as of mid-November, the problems in troubled Anbar province have
not improved, a senior U.S. intelligence official said yesterday. "The
fundamental questions of lack of control, growth of the insurgency and
criminality" remain the same, the official said. The Marines' August memo, a
copy of which was shared with The Washington Post, is far bleaker than some
officials suggested when they described it in late summer. The report
describes Iraq's Sunni minority as "embroiled in a daily fight for
survival," fearful of "pogroms" by the Shiite majority and
increasingly dependent on al-Qaeda in Iraq as its only hope against growing
Iranian dominance across the capital. True or not, the memo says,
"from the Sunni perspective, their greatest fears have been realized:
Iran controls Baghdad and Anbaris have been marginalized." Moreover,
most Sunnis now believe it would be unwise to count on or help U.S. forces
because they are seen as likely to leave the country before imposing
stability. Between al-Qaeda's violence,
Iran's influence and an expected U.S. drawdown, "the social and
political situation has deteriorated to a point" that U.S. and Iraqi
troops "are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in
al-Anbar," the assessment found. In Anbar province alone, at least 90
U.S. troops have died since Sept. 1. The Post first reported on
the memo's existence in September, as it was being circulated among military
and national security officials. Several officials who read the report
described its conclusions as grim. But the contents have not
previously been made public. Read as a complete assessment, it paints a stark
portrait of a failed province and of the country's Sunnis - once dominant
under Saddam Hussein - now desperate, fearful and impoverished. They have
been increasingly abandoned by religious and political leaders who have fled
to neighboring countries, and other leaders have been assassinated. And
unlike Iraq's Shiite majority, or Kurdish groups in the north, the Sunnis are
without oil and other natural resources. The report notes that illicit oil
trading is providing millions of dollars to al-Qaeda while "official
profits appear to feed Shiite cronyism in Baghdad." As a result, "the
potential for economic revival appears to be nonexistent" in Anbar, the
report says. The Iraqi government, dominated by Iranian-backed Shiites, has
not paid salaries for Anbar officials and Iraqi forces stationed there.
Anbar's resources and its ability to impose order are depicted as limited at
best. "Despite the success of
the December elections, nearly all government institutions from the village
to provincial levels have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and
infiltrated by Al Qaeda in Iraq," or a smattering of other insurgent
groups, the report says. The five-page report -
written by Col. Peter Devlin, a senior and seasoned military intelligence
officer with the Marine Expeditionary Force - is marked secret, for
dissemination to U.S. and allied troops in Iraq only. It does not appear to
have been made available to Iraqi national forces fighting alongside
Americans. The report, "State of
the Insurgency in Al-Anbar," focuses on conditions in the province that
is home to 1.25 million Iraqis, most of whom live in violence-ridden towns
such as Fallujah, Haditha, Hit, Qaim and Ramadi. Devlin wrote that attacks on
civilians rose 57 percent between February and August of this year.
"Although it is likely that attack levels have peaked, the steady rise
in attacks from mid-2003 to 2006 indicates a clear failure to defeat the
insurgency in al-Anbar." Devlin suggested that
without the deployment of an additional U.S. military division - 15,000 to
20,000 troops - plus billions of dollars in aid to the province, "there
is nothing" U.S. troops "can do to influence" the insurgency. He described al-Qaeda in
Iraq as the "dominate organization of influence in al-Anbar,"
surpassing all other groups, the Iraqi government and U.S. troops "in
its ability to control the day-to-day life of the average Sunni." Al-Qaeda itself, now an
"integral part of the social fabric of western Iraq," has become so
entrenched, autonomous and financially independent that U.S. forces no longer
have the option "for a decapitating strike that would cripple the
organization," the report says. That is why, it says, the death of
al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June "had so little
impact on the structure and capabilities of al-Qaeda," especially in
Anbar province. The senior intelligence
official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity
of his work, said yesterday that he largely agrees with Devlin's assessment,
except that he thinks it overstates the role of al-Qaeda in the province.
"We argue that it is a major element in Anbar, but it is not the largest
or most dominant group," he said. In a final section of the
report, titled "Way Ahead," Devlin outlined several possibilities
for bringing stability to the area, including establishing a Sunni state in
Anbar, creating a local paramilitary force to protect Sunnis and to offset Iranian
influence, shifting local budget controls, and strengthening a committed
Iraqi police force that has "proven remarkably resilient in most
areas." Devlin ended the assessment
by saying that while violence has surged, the presence of U.S. troops in
Anbar has had "a real suppressive effect on the insurgency." He
said the suffering of "Anbar's citizens undoubtedly would be far worse
now if it was not for the very effective efforts" of U.S. forces. The Marine Corps
headquarters had no comment on the August report or the updated assessment,
Lt. Col. Scott J. Fazekas, a spokesman, said yesterday. Staff researcher Julie Tate
contributed to this report. External link: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/27/AR2006112701287.html Hezbollah
Said to Help Shiite Army in Iraq By Michael R. Gordon and Dexter Filkins New York Times November 28, 2006 Washington,
Nov. 27 - A senior American intelligence official said Monday that the
Iranian-backed group Hezbollah had been training members of the Mahdi Army,
the Iraqi Shiite militia led by Moktada al-Sadr. The
official said that 1,000 to 2,000 fighters from the Mahdi Army and other
Shiite militias had been trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon. A small number of
Hezbollah operatives have also visited Iraq to help with training, the
official said. Iran
has facilitated the link between Hezbollah and the Shiite militias in Iraq,
the official said. Syrian officials have also cooperated, though there is
debate about whether it has the blessing of the senior leaders in Syria. The
intelligence official spoke on condition of anonymity under rules set by his
agency, and discussed Iran’s role in response to questions from a reporter. The
interview occurred at a time of intense debate over whether the United States
should enlist Iran’s help in stabilizing Iraq. The Iraq Study Group, directed
by James A. Baker III, a former Republican secretary of state, and Lee H.
Hamilton, a former Democratic lawmaker, is expected to call for direct talks
with Tehran. The
claim about Hezbollah’s role in training Shiite militias could strengthen the
hand of those in the Bush administration who oppose a major new diplomatic
involvement with Iran. The
new American account is consistent with a claim made in Iraq this summer by a
mid-level Mahdi commander, who said his militia had sent 300 fighters to
Lebanon, ostensibly to fight alongside Hezbollah. “They are the best-trained
fighters in the Mahdi Army,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity. The
specific assertions about Iran’s role went beyond those made publicly by
senior American officials, though Gen. Michael V. Hayden, the director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, did tell Congress this month that “the Iranian
hand is stoking violence” in Iraq. The
American intelligence on Hezbollah was based on human sources, electronic
means and interviews with detainees captured in Iraq. American
officials say the Iranians have also provided direct support to Shiite
militias in Iraq, including explosives and trigger devices for roadside
bombs, and training for several thousand fighters, mostly in Iran. The
training is carried out by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Ministry
of Intelligence and Security, they say. In
Congressional testimony this month, General Hayden said he was initially
skeptical of reports of Iran’s role but changed his mind after reviewing
intelligence reports. “I’ll
admit personally,” he said at one point in the hearing, “that I have come
late to this conclusion, but I have all the zeal of a convert as to the ill
effect that the Iranians are having on the situation in Iraq.” Lt.
Gen. Michael D. Maples, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
offered a similar assessment in his testimony. Neither
General Hayden nor General Maples described Hezbollah’s role during the
hearing. In
the interview on Monday, the senior intelligence official was asked for
further details about the purported Iranian role. “They
have been a link to Lebanese Hezbollah and have helped facilitate Hezbollah
training inside of Iraq, but more importantly Jaish al-Mahdi members going to
Lebanon,” the official said, describing Iran’s role and using the Arabic name
for the Mahdi Army. The
official said the Hezbollah training had been conducted with the knowledge of
Mr. Sadr, the most influential Shiite cleric. While
Iran wants a stable Iraq, the official said, it sees an advantage in “managed
instability in the near term” to bog down the American military and defeat
the Bush administration’s objectives in the region. “There
seems to have been a strategic decision taken sometime over late winter or
early spring by Damascus, Tehran, along with their partners in Lebanese
Hezbollah, to provide more support to Sadr to increase pressure on the U.S.,”
the American intelligence official said. Some
Middle East experts were skeptical about the assessment of Hezbollah’s
training role. “That
sound to me a little bit strained,” said Flynt Leverett, a senior fellow at
the New America Foundation and a Middle East expert formerly on the National
Security Council staff. “I have a hard time thinking it is a really
significant piece of what we are seeing play out on the ground with the
various Shiite militia forces.” But
other specialists found the assessment plausible. “I think it is plausible
because Hezbollah is the best in the business, and it enhances their position
with Iran, Syria and Iraq,” said Judith Kipper, of the Council on Foreign
Relations. The
Mahdi Army and other militia fighters traveled to Lebanon in groups of 15 and
20 and some were present during the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel
this summer, though there was no indication they had taken part in the
fighting, the American intelligence official said. Asked
what the militia members had learned, the official replied, “Weapons,
bomb-making, intelligence, assassinations, the gambit of skill sets.” There
is intelligence that indicates that Iran shipped machine tools to Lebanon
that could be used to make “shaped charges,” sophisticated explosive devices
designed to penetrate armor, American officials have said. But it is not
known how the equipment was in fact used. The
officials said that because the Iraqi militia members went through Syrian
territory, at least some Syrian officials were complicit. There are also
reports of meetings between Imad Mugniyah, a senior Hezbollah member; Ghassem
Soleimani of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; and Syrian representatives to
discuss ways of stepping up the pressure on the United States in Iraq. The
mid-level Mahdi commander interviewed this summer said the group sent to
Lebanon was called the Ali al-Hadi Brigade, named for one of two imams buried
at the Askariya Mosque in Samarra. The bombing of that shrine in February
unleashed the fury of Shiite militias and accelerated sectarian violence. According
to the Mahdi commander, the brigade was organized and dispatched by a senior
Mahdi officer known as Abu Mujtaba. It went by bus to Syria in July, and was
then led across the border into Lebanon, he said. He said the fighters were
from Diwaniya and Basra, as well as from the Shiite neighborhoods of Shoala
and Sadr City in Baghdad. “They
travel as normal people from Iraq to Syria,” one of the militiamen said. “Once
they get to Syria, fighters in Syria take them in.” Among
American officials, concern over the purported Iranian, Syrian or Hezbollah
role grew recently when an advanced antitank weapon, an RPG-29, was used
against an American M-1 tank in Iraq. “The
first time we saw it was not in Iraq,” Gen. John P. Abizaid, the head of the
United States Central Command, told reporters in September. “We saw it in
Lebanon. So to me, No. 1, it indicates an Iranian connection.” American
intelligence officials said the source of the weapon was still unclear. General
Abizaid also said it was hard to pin down some details of relationships
between armed factions in the Middle East, adding: “There are clearly links
between Hezbollah training people in Iran to operate in Lebanon and also
training people in Iran that are Shia splinter groups that could operate
against us in Iraq These linkages exist, but it is very, very hard to pin
down with precision.” Mark
Mazzetti contributed reporting from Washington, and Hosham Hussein from
Baghdad. Copyright
2006 The New York Times Company External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/world/middleeast/28military.html |