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November 23rd,
2006 - Under Fire, US Marines Hand off Battered Fallujah |
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Under Fire, US Marines Hand
off Battered Fallujah Just 300 marines now patrol key Sunni city as Iraqi military takes
over. By Scott Peterson The Christian Science Monitor November 23rd, 2006 Fallujah, Iraq - From
Observation Post Blazer, marines view Fallujah through a thick sheet of
bullet-proof glass - already tested with numerous impacts. Or they stare
through night-vision goggles or a thermal imaging scope that can pick up the
heat of a dog hundreds of yards away. The marines still patrol key
roads. The US military, which still travels boldly through town despite a
surge in deadly sniper attacks and roadside bombs, is spending $200 million
on 60-plus projects to rebuild the city, heavily damaged in fighting two
years ago. But with just 300 marines,
the US military footprint is smaller in this Sunni stronghold of more than
300,000 than it has been in two years. As the marine presence shrinks and
Iraqis take more control, Fallujah - once a template for counterinsurgency
efforts in Iraq, where US forces have controlled all the variables - is
likely again to set a standard for the rest of the country. "A lot of us feel like
we have our hands tied behind our back," says Cpl. Peter Mattice, of
Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment. "In Fallujah,
[insurgents] know our [rules of engagement] - they know when to stop, just
before we engage." During this transition,
frustration runs deep in this fortified bunker, and at a handful of posts
that now dot Fallujah. They are designed to watch the main roads where
marines travel, to prevent the laying of roadside bombs. Here echo the conclusions of
a report written by the chief of intelligence for the Marine Corps in August,
and first described by The Washington Post, which determined that there is
little the military now can do to improve prospects in insurgent-riddled Anbar
Province, which includes Fallujah. "They say we are here
to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, but I just don't see that
happening," says Corporal Mattice, of Gladwin, Mich. OP Blazer is
perched on the northern edge of the city, looking due south down a main
street known to the marines as Ethan, site of numerous roadside bombs. "As soon as we leave,
I'm afraid that the insurgents will take over.... They watch us, as we watch
them," says Mattice, echoing the fears of Fallujans who, while unhappy
with the marine presence, are far more worried that a hurried US departure
will leave them vulnerable to Sunni militants, and exposed to sectarian
killings. That fear has been fueled by
a spike in insurgent attacks since summer, against both Iraqis and US troops.
The 1/24 Marines, a reserve unit headquartered in Detroit and recently
arrived, suffered nine dead and more than 40 seriously wounded in their first
month in Iraq. Another marine died Sunday from a roadside bomb. Since August, an assassination
and intimidation campaign here has also killed the head of the city council
and another prominent member; numerous policemen - including the deputy
police chief - and contractors and workers on US-funded projects have also
been murdered. The numbers underscore the
dilemma for marines in Fallujah, and for US troops across Iraq, as they begin
to pull back and hand more responsibility to Iraqi forces. The 300 marines here are
attacked five to eight times each day. That presence is a significant drop
from the 3,000 marines posted here in March 2005, and the 10,000 that took
part in the late 2004 invasion. Another metric: Officers say
the number of direct fire incidents against US forces has shot up 650 percent
in the past year. Three marines had been hit by snipers in one 48-hour span
earlier this week. "It is no secret,"
Col. Lawrence Nicholson told the Fallujah City Council during their regular
Tuesday meeting. "My mission is to do less, every single day, as Iraqi
forces do more." Fallujah was the test case
counter-insurgency invasion in November 2004 - effectively destroying the
city to root out insurgents in the biggest urban battle for US marines since
Hue City in Vietnam in 1968. Fallujah later became the model for a "go
and stay" strategy attempted in cities along the Euphrates in the fall
of 2005, which the August intelligence report found to have failed. Senior officers now refer to
Fallujah as a "gated community" - putting a deft gloss on the fact
that Fallujah has for two years had only six entry points, and entering Iraqi
residents still require US-issued biometric cards with retinal scans and
fingerprints on file. But among those Iraqi
residents are 150 newcomers a week, fleeing the sectarian violence in Baghdad
to a known "Sunni safe haven," in the words of one officer. Others
say hundreds of highly trained insurgents, Iraqis from outside Fallujah, have
also recently moved in to step up attacks. "Fallujah has an iconic
value to the Marine Corps," says Colonel Nicholson, commander of the
Regimental Combat Team 5, which covers Fallujah and a populated swath of
Anbar Province, in an interview. "Fallujah falling [to insurgents] would
be like Iwo Jima falling to the Japanese again after World War II - it would
be intolerable." Preventing that from
happening is a top priority for the Bravo and Charlie companies of the 1/24
that are now in Fallujah. But local Iraqis know the territory better than US
forces ever will. "The insurgents are
creative and have advantages," says Maj. Jeffrey O'Neill, the Bravo
Company commander from Novi, Mich. "If the Chinese invaded your
[American] neighborhood, you would know where to hide, which dumpster behind
the 7-11 to stash things. If we don't catch them red-handed, they will
probably be on the street again." Many prisoners were released
by the Iraqi government in August amnesties, notes Major O'Neill, and the
rules are changing: Even if someone is found with a sack full of washing
machine timers that could be used to trigger bombs, unless explosives and a
black mask are found too, it may not be enough for an arrest. The insurgents are also
proving agile. On Monday, for example, elements of two US battalions - the
1/24 and 2/6 - staged "Operation Talon," which swept a series of
garages and rural areas a few miles north of Fallujah. As many as seven cells
were thought to work from the area, using it as a staging post for attacks on
the city. A round-up of everybody in
the area-776 men - netted just 13 detainees after full processing, and none
were considered high-value targets. But two Shiite hostages were found and
released; they had been told by their Sunni captors they would be executed
later that same day. Some small weapons caches were also found, and several
thousand ball bearings, along with steel plate apparently used to test their
armor penetration in home-made mines. "I don't think
[insurgents] have succeeded as much as they would like, but they gave it all
they had before the US election to influence people," says Maj.
Christopher Kolomjec from Grosse Pointe, Mich. "It is hard for us to
know the real support [of the US] of the Fallujah people, because if they are
seen to support us, they will have their head cut off tomorrow." "Each precinct in
Chicago or Detroit, makes 100 to 150 arrests per night per 300,000
people," says Major Kolomjec, a lawyer who notes that Fallujah's
population is similar. "Here you take 12 to 40 people per day, and
people are up in arms. You can't expect stability, when you are not even
doing the same level of policing as Detroit." Another source of
frustration: Pursuit in mosques is forbidden without the presence of Iraqi
Army units. Marines say some of Fallujah's 76 mosques are used to hide
weaponry. Some broadcast messages such as, "God help us defeat the
Americans." "Many would ask: What
other war would we allow the enemy to broadcast calls for our defeat, for the
sake of cultural sensitivity?" says O'Neill. But even as insurgents step
up the violence, marines make themselves harder-to-hit targets. "No, it's not worth
it," says 1st Sgt Andrew Tomelleri, of Kansas City, when news came of
the death and injuries from another roadside bomb. The three-time Iraq
veteran had been at the exact location a day earlier. Such patrols are seen
as "magnets" for IEDs. "But it would be [worth
it], if we could fight them muzzle to muzzle, man to man," says Sergeant
Tomelleri. "They know they can't beat us that way." External link:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1124/p01s04-woiq.html |