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The War Profiteers - War Crimes,
Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
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November 22nd,
2006 - Perfect Killing Method, but Clear Targets Are Few |
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Perfect Killing Method, but
Clear Targets Are Few for Marines in Iraq By C. J. Chivers New York Times November 22, 2006 Karma, Iraq, Nov. 16 - The
sniper team left friendly lines hours ahead of the sun. They were a group of
marines walking through the chill, hoping to be in hiding before the mullahs’
predawn call to prayer would urge this city awake. They reached an abandoned
building. Two marines stepped inside, swept the ground floor and signaled to
the others to follow them to the flat roof, where they crawled to spots along
its walls in which they had previously chiseled out small viewing holes. Out came their gear: a map,
spotting scopes, binoculars, two-way radios and stools. The snipers took
their places, peering through the holes, watching an Iraqi neighborhood from
which insurgents often fire. They were hoping an insurgent would try to fire
on this day. The waiting began. If the recent pattern was
any indication, the waiting could last a long time. This was this sniper
team’s 30th mission in Anbar Province since early August. They had yet to
fire a shot. More than three years after
the insurgency erupted across much of Iraq, sniping - one of the methods that
the military thought would be essential in its counterinsurgency operations -
is proving less successful in many areas of Iraq than had been hoped, Marine
officers, trainers and snipers say. In theory, Western snipers
are a nearly perfect method of killing Iraq’s insurgents and thwarting their
attacks, all with little risk of damaging property or endangering passers-by.
But in practice, the snipers say, they are seeing fewer clear targets than
previously, and are shooting fewer insurgents than expected. In 2003, one Marine sniper
killed 32 combatants in 12 days, the snipers say, and many others had
double-digit kill totals during tours in Iraq. By this summer, sniper
platoons with several teams had typically been killing about a dozen
insurgents in seven-month tours, with totals per platoon ranging from 3 to as
high as 26. The gap between the
expectations and the results has many causes, but is in part a reflection of
the insurgency’s duration. With the war in its fourth year, many of the best
sniping positions are already well known to the insurgents, and veteran
insurgents have become more savvy and harder to kill. In some areas of Iraq, where
the insurgents are less experienced or still fight frontally, snipers have
had better rates of success, including the platoon with 26 kills. But many
areas, the snipers say, have become maddening places in which to hide and
hunt. “A lot of Marine battalions
have rotated through these same areas for six or seven months at a time,”
said Staff Sgt. Christopher D. Jones, the platoon sergeant of the Scout
Sniper Platoon in the Second Battalion, Eighth Marines. “But the insurgents
live here. They know almost all the best places that have been used. Before
we even get here, they know where we are going to go.” Moreover, the insurgents
have developed safeguards, using shepherds and children to look for snipers
in buildings and heavily overgrown areas, and networks of informants to
spread the word when a sniper team has taken up a new position. “These days
we’re lucky if we can go 12 hours without getting compromised,” he said. In the Marine Corps, snipers
have long been a culture within the culture, a group of quiet, highly
competent infantrymen selected for their field skills, self-discipline and
shooting expertise. Picked from the ranks, they
are trained at a 10-week school that develops their skills in hiding,
stalking and long-range marksmanship. Each infantry battalion has a platoon
of snipers, who typically work in small teams apart from the rifle companies.
They are considered elite. But some snipers now worry
that the difficulties they face have been compounded by rules and conditions
placed on them by senior military leaders. Marine snipers have
customarily trained to work in two-man teams who hide and stalk for days,
seeking targets a half-mile or more away. Often an area might be saturated
with snipers, so they can support and protect one another while confusing an
enemy force with different angles of fire. This way, according to their
thinking, they can kill more enemy combatants, and sow more fear. Those two-man teams are not
allowed in Iraq, in part because of the killings of two groups of snipers
earlier in the war. In the first episode, in
2004 in Ramadi, four Marine snipers were killed without firing a shot,
apparently after being surprised in a shooting position in an urban area,
known in sniper jargon as a hide. An investigation suggested that they had
been overwhelmed and executed. In 2005, a six-man sniper
team from a Marine reserve unit was killed in Haditha. The insurgents
videotaped a display of the slain team’s equipment, including a marine’s dog
tags, and circulated the spectacle on the Internet. The losses have made
commanders hesitant to send out small teams, Marine officers said, a decision
that many snipers said inhibits their work. Snipers argue a
counterintuitive point, saying that even though two-man teams have less
firepower and fewer men, they are safer because they can hide more
effectively. Sgt. Joseph W. Chamblin, the
leader of the battalion’s First Sniper Team, said the sniper community was
suffering from an overreaction. “It’s sad that they got killed, but when you
think about it, we’ve been here three years, going on four, and we’ve only
had two teams killed,” he said. “That’s not that dramatic.” Sergeant Chamblin killed for
the first time on Nov. 10, shooting an insurgent who was putting a makeshift
bomb beside a bridge near Saqlawiya, near Falluja, a spot where a similar
bomb killed three marines and a translator this summer. He said snipers were willing
to assume the risk of traveling in pairs. “It’s a war,” he said. “People are
going to die, and the American public needs to get over that. They need to
get over that and let us do our job.” Snipers also say that other
force-protection issues are limiting their operations, including requirements
to wear helmets and flak jackets, which slow snipers down and make hiding
more difficult. “You go to a 10-week sniper
course and never in that course are you in Kevlar and a helmet,” Sergeant
Jones said. “Then you come to Iraq and immediately you’re in your flak jacket
and helmet, and you’ve got a huge pack of gear.” Sergeant Chamblin agreed.
“We are carrying way more stuff than we can be tactically sound with,” he
said. “My arms are numb because my pack is so heavy. Sometimes, on my
missions, my pack has weighed more than I have, and I weigh 150 pounds.” The military has also
tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the
requirements before a sniper may shoot an Iraqi. Potential targets must be
engaged in a hostile act, or show clear hostile intent. The marines say insurgents
know the rules, and now rarely carry weapons in the open. Instead, they pose
as civilians and keep their weapons concealed in cars or buildings until just
before they need them. Later, when they are done shooting, they put them
swiftly out of sight and mingle with civilians. With almost no Iraqi police
officers available in Anbar Province to check loiterers and suspicious cars,
the snipers said, the insurgents have moved freely, making it difficult to
tell from afar which people are dangerous, even when they have been violating
the law. Although the teams are
frustrated, Lt. Col. Kenneth M. DeTreux, the battalion’s commander, said they
still influenced the insurgents, who tend to avoid areas that are watched.
The presence of snipers can keep a road free of bombs, he said. “Our scout sniper teams have
a deterrent effect,” he said. “That’s not wishful thinking. The insurgents
fear our snipers.” Still, the snipers want to
thin the insurgents’ ranks, not just deter them. Some of their difficulties
were evident on the roof on a recent day, when the battalion’s Fourth Sniper
Team sat, watching through holes in the wall. Karma is a scene of frequent
violence, and below them was a favored insurgent area. Once during the day
they thought they had been spotted, and three marines swept the building
below to make sure they were safe. They were. They returned to peering
through the holes. Other holes could be seen in buildings nearby - previous
sniper positions, and a sign that insurgents probably knew the area is often
watched. “I’ve got a shady-looking
guy,” Lance Cpl. Nathan D. Leach, the assistant team leader, said as he
observed a suspicious man. “He’s got his hand behind him. Looks like he’s got
something under his shirt.” Lance Cpl. Keeghan O’Brien,
the radio operator, interjected, “You see where that guy went?” Cpl. Jason A. Dufault, the
team leader, responded, “No, he walked behind a building and disappeared.” A
few hours later, several shots were heard from the neighborhood, and
rifle-launched grenades sailed through the air. They landed behind the
snipers, near a platoon-sized Marine position, exploding with a series of
thunderous cracks. The snipers peered around,
seeking a shot. Another sniper team was also in the area, watching over the
Marine position, too. No one saw a thing. The insurgents were within a
few hundred yards, but had found a seam. Several hours later, in the
blackness again, the team picked up and moved, still waiting for a target
after more than three months in Iraq. Copyright 2006 The New York
Times Company External link: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/22/world/middleeast/22sniper.html |