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The War Profiteers - War Crimes,
Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
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August 3rd, 2005 - The IED Marketplace
in Iraq News article by the Defense News |
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By Greg Grant Defense News August 3, 2005 The following revealing
picture of how these cells operate and why they remain so hard to penetrate
comes from extensive interviews with military intelligence officers with the
U.S. Army's 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq, briefing documents, and interviews
and presentations at an Army sponsored counter IED conference June 13-17 at
the Army's National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Ca. Much of what U.S.
officials know about IED cells was gathered through the interrogation of
captured Iraqi insurgents. Decentralized Structure Traditional insurgent groups
follow a highly centralized, hierarchically organized model.
Counterinsurgency forces have long studied the pyramidal model, with strong
leadership at the top and the group expanding in size at each lower level, to
the foot soldiers at the bottom. That type of guerrilla organization was
highly vulnerable to a decapitation strike that would often lead to its
collapse. The groups in Iraq have no hierarchical structure, the officers
said. Vast numbers of small, adaptive insurgent cells operate independently
without central guidance. There may be some loose coordination of attacks,
but then the cells go their separate ways. This highly decentralized
characteristic of the IED cells makes them nearly impossible to penetrate.
Their small size allows them to focus on specific American units, learn their
tactics, patrol schedules, transportation routes and readily adapt to
counter-IED techniques. One U.S. intelligence officer said that if you
capture the leader of an IED cell, the leaderless foot soldiers simply get
rolled up into another cell or start their own splinter cell. By cutting off
the heads, you don't fix the problem, as other heads emerge. Taking down the
foot soldiers causes a temporary disruption, as new people must be recruited.
But even then, the cell is disrupted only for two weeks or so. The only way
to get rid of the cell is to target the whole group - and there are a lot of
cells. Commercial Connections Small, highly skilled IED
cells often operate as a package and hire themselves out to the more
well-known insurgent groups, such as Amman Al Zarqawi's al-Qaida in Iraq or
the Sunni group Ansaar al Sunna. They advertise their skills on the Internet
and are temporarily contracted on a per-job basis, but otherwise remain
autonomous. This more linear, rather than pyramidal structure, means a
decapitation operation is not an option. The IED cells are patient and
methodical and they follow an identifiable operational cycle. Five days is
usually spent conducting reconnaissance of prospective targets, conducting
pattern analysis of U.S. patrols and looking for vulnerabilities. Target Selection The insurgents try to discover
why and at what times American patrols travel along specific routes.
Insurgents have even used hoax IEDs placed in plain view so they can watch
the American response and gather intelligence on security methods and bomb
disposal team operations to prepare for future attacks. IED target selection
is done with the intent of maximizing casualties and media exposure. Favorite
targets include convoys of civilian SUVs, as they believe these transport
American government officials and intelligence agents. They also target fuel
tankers, as the flames and billowing smoke from a burning fuel tanker makes
for compelling television footage. "If the insurgent has a burning
fueler or bodies in the street, he wants to get Arab media," said Col.
Mike Formica, recently returned from Iraq, at the June IED conference. The
target site must also have multiple escape routes. The components are then
assembled at a well-concealed bomb factory and then moved from any area
likely to be searched by American patrols to a holding area until the weapon
is placed. IEDs are often kept in what
the military calls "rolling weapons caches," cars with false
bottoms or trunks loaded with explosives that blend into the thousands of
vehicles on Iraq's crowded city streets. Five days of preparation are then
followed by 10 days of heavy IED attacks, then the cycle starts again. After
a successful attack or if a device is detected by a U.S. patrol, the IED cell
evaluates the results and adjusts its tactics accordingly for the next
strike. Training Nine times out of 10, the
military and intelligence officers said, the insurgents videotape IED
attacks. The insurgents scrutinize the tapes - much as a coach watches
postgame films - to prepare for future attacks. They're also used as
motivational tools for new recruits and to advertise a cell's technical
proficiency. Business Process: Financier While all IED cells in Iraq
are not alike, they tend to follow a similar organizational pattern. They are
almost exclusively made up of Sunni extremists. The typical IED cell numbers
no more than six to eight people who collect intelligence on American forces,
gather explosive materials, manufacture the bomb, place the device, carry out
the attack and then evaluate the results. At the top of the IED cell is the
planner or financier ("hot money"), a "money man" who is
most often a well educated and intelligent former Baathist government
official or military officer. He is ideologically
motivated in his fight against the American occupation. These "white
collar" leaders are the most difficult cell members to identify,
explained Formica. Even if fingered by an informant or other means, the
leaders are so good at covering their tracks it's nearly impossible to
develop sufficient evidence to detain them. And if captured, they're smart
enough not to say anything. Only 5 percent to 10 percent of the insurgents
captured by the Americans are cell leaders. Business Process: Bomb Maker Below the financier is the
bomb maker. He also is typically ideologically motivated, a former regime
member or Sunni Arab angered at the American occupation. As with the
financier, American officers said the only way of getting the bomb makers to
stop the attacks is by capturing or killing them. Initially, IEDs were
constructed by former Iraqi Republican Guard or Special Republican Guard
soldiers. That skill has spread throughout the country over the past two
years. According to Army intelligence officers, outside expertise also has
come into the country, both from Hizbollah, which has extensive bomb-making
expertise, and from Iranian intelligence. Bomb-making skills proliferate
rapidly among IED cells in Iraq via the Internet, used by insurgents to share
skills. The insurgents' technical
proficiency has increased over time with experience. In recent months,
shaped-charge explosives have become more common, Votel said. Also called
platter charges, these devices combine an explosive charge with a low melting
point metal like copper that is shaped in a concave way. When the blast
occurs it shapes the metal into a molten slug that can penetrate the heaviest
armor. That technical expertise wasn't in Iraq when the insurgency began and
is suspected as having come in from Iran or Syria, said Lt. Col. Shawn Weed,
an intelligence officer with the 3rd Infantry Division. The military has
found no appreciable decrease in IED attacks when a bomb maker is killed, and
it represents at best a temporary setback for the insurgency as that talent
is easily replaced. Business Process: Emplacer The next person in the cell
is the "emplacer." This person usually has some military expertise
and is skilled at moving unnoticed into and out of an area while transporting
an IED. While some IEDs are small, 60mm or 81mm mortar rounds, more common is
the wired 155mm shell that can weigh 100 pounds. Moving these objects around
unseen and placing them along high-trafficked roads takes experience and
daring, as he knows if he's spotted placing an IED he'll be killed. He is
familiar with American patrolling tactics and techniques and is often
supported by lookouts armed with cell phones who will tip him when a patrol
nears. The emplacer's primary
motivation is money. He is a foot soldier, is often paid as little as $50,
and told to place an IED in a specific location at a specific time. A common
technique is to pull a car over to the side of the road to change a tire or
appear as if it's broken down. He places the IED - 75 percent of IEDs are
placed in a hole previously used for the same purpose - covers it up with
something, turns the switch on and drives away. Often they don't even stop,
as insurgents use cars with a hole cut in the floor so they only have to slow
down and drop the device onto the road. Of all the members of the IED cell,
the emplacer's skills are the most difficult to replace. When taken out, an
IED cell's activity is at least temporarily disrupted as a replacement is
sought. Business Process: Triggerman The next person in the cell
is the triggerman, the one who lies in wait until an American convoy passes.
Often in a car, the triggerman detonates the IED either by remote trigger or
command wire. Remote detonation is the preferred means, as it allows the
insurgent to be further away from the blast. Captured triggermen said they
prefer to hit the second vehicle in a patrol. The first vehicle passes the
IED and they time it, then they hit the second vehicle. Like the emplacer,
the triggerman's primary motivation is money. Sometimes these lower-level
operatives will hire themselves out as a package, changing affiliations based
on money. If an alternative means of earning money is provided for the
emplacer and the triggerman, they can take them out of operation, Formica
said. Business Process: Suicide Car Bombers Suicide car bomb cells are
similar in structure, although the bomb maker's technical expertise is
usually greater as the triggering often requires engineering skills. Car
bombs are assembled in a factory assembly line-like process that begins
usually in small towns south of Baghdad. There, a vehicle is modified in an
auto chop shop, with space cleared inside the vehicle to fit the explosives,
suspensions strengthened to carry the additional weight and windows
blackened. As the vehicle is driven north to Baghdad, where most car bombs
are detonated, additional components are added. This decentralized
construction process makes it more difficult for American intelligence to
identify a car bomb factory and eliminate it. Intelligence gathered from a
captured would-be suicide car bomber, who was a member of Zarqawi's group,
provided U.S. officials with the best insight into the inner workings of a
suicide car bombing cell. The cell is kept small and
focused, and contact with insurgents outside the suicide group is strictly
controlled. Suicide bombers are selected on a first-come basis, with no
shortage of recruits. The bombers are most often foreigners and enter Iraq
from Saudi Arabia or Kuwait with the specific intention of martyrdom. The
only training they receive is the target information and instruction on how
to trigger the device. Two vehicles are commonly used. The first transports
the bomber to the location of a pre-positioned car bomb and then follows
behind to guide the bomber along the route and videotape the attack. The
captured car bomber said it would be easy to drive around Baghdad and pick
out up to 20 soft targets. External link:
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2005/08/the_ied_marketp.html |