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The
War Profiteers - War Crimes, Kidnappings & Torture |
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The Second Gulf War/Iraq Invasion II -
U.S. Policy in Iraq |
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Newest media report: Iraqi Parliament Approves
Landmark US Military Pact (27/11/2008/Agence
France Presse) Newest government report: Blocking Property of
Certain Person who Threaten Efforts in Iraq (29/1/2008/CRS report) |
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Bush in
March of 2003: “We carry on the work of peace.” “My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and
coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm
Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. […] “I want Americans and all the world to know that
coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from
harm.[…] “And helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and
free country will require our sustained commitment. We come to Iraq with respect
for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths
they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and
restore control of that country to its own people. […] We will pass through
this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our
freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail. […]” Excerpt of U.S. President Bush’s televised declaration of war |
March 20th, 2003: Bush declares war,
while promising freedom |
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After U.S. airstrike on Falluja: Wounded
Iraqi girl in hospital |
U.N
Secretary General Kofi Annan in December of 2006: “Worse than the civil war
in Lebanon.” Kofi Annan: I think, given the level of violence,
the level of killing and bitterness and the way that forces are arranged
against each other. A few years ago, when we had the strife in Lebanon and
other places, we called that a civil war. This is much worse. BBC: Was it a mistake? Some Iraqis say that life is
worse than it was under a dictator. Kofi Annan: […] If I were an average Iraqi obviously
I would make the same comparison, that they had a dictator who was brutal but
they had their streets, they could go out, their kids could go to school and
come back home without a mother or father worrying, ‘Am I going to see my
child again?’ […] Excerpt of a BBC interview with Kofi
Annan - December 4th, 2006 |
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November 27th, 2008 - Iraqi Parliament Approves
Landmark US Military Pact 1 news
article by Agence France Presse November 21st, 2008 - Security Firms Told They Lose Immunity
in Iraq: Official 1 news
article by Agence France Presse November 16th, 2008 - US Welcomes Iraq’s Approval of
Pact on Military Pullout 1 news
article by Agence France Presse November 7th, 2008 - Dogs of War: Contractors and
Obama 1 news
article by United Press International November 6th, 2008 - Iraqis Seek More ‘Withdrawal’
Talks; U.S. Says They’re Over 1 news
article by McClatchy Newspapers October 28th, 2008 - Report on Iraq Security Lists
310 Contractors 1 news
article by the New York Times October 19th, 2008 - Iraq Wins Right to Prosecute
Crimes by US Troops 1 news
article by Agence France Presse October 15th, 2008 - US Agrees to Limited Iraqi
Jurisdiction 1 news
article by the Associated Press October 8th, 2008 - Iraq, U.S. Near Deal on
Military Future 1 news
article by the Los Angeles Times September 1st, 2008 - Immunity a Sticking Point in
US-Iraq Security Pact: Report 1 news
article by Agence France Presse July 8th, 2008 - Iraqi Official Says Government
Wants Timetable for Withdrawal 1 news article by
the Washington Post June 13th, 2008 - Maliki Says Talks on Iraq-US
Security Pact Deadlocked 1 news article by
Agence France Presse June 5th, 2008 - US Ambassador Says no
Permanent Bases in Iraq 1 news article by
the Associated Press May 15th, 2008 - McCain Outlines Vision of Iraq
Victory 1 news article by
the Associated Press May 12th, 2008 - Ex-State Officials Allege
Corruption Cover Up 1 news article by
the Associated Press April 20th, 2008 - Behind TV Analysts,
Pentagon’s Hidden Hand 1 news
article by the New York Times March 20th, 2008 - Bush Defends Iraq War in
Speech 1 news
article by the New York Times January 31st, 2008 - U.S. Wants to Keep Right to
Hunt Foreign Fighters in Iraq 1 news
article by the Associated Press January 25th, 2008 - U.S. Asking Iraq for Wide Rights
on War 1 news
article by the New York Times September 5th, 2007 - GAO Skeptical that Iraq
Security Can Last 1 news article by the
Los Angeles Times April 26th, 2007 - Senate Passes Iraq War Bill
Requiring Pullout 1 news article by
the New York Times March 17th, 2007 - Iraq War Alters Political
Landscape 1 news article by
the Associated Press March 12th, 2007 - Fallback Strategy for Iraq:
Train Locals, Draw Down Forces 1 news article by
Los Angeles Times January 25th, 2007 - Troops Authorized to Kill
Iranian Operatives in Iraq 1 news
article by the Washington Post January 12th, 2007 - Bush’s Plan for Iraq Runs Into
Opposition 1 news
article by the New York Times January 11th, 2007 - Bush Adds Troops in Bid to
Secure Iraq 1 news
article by the New York Times January 7th, 2007 - Bush Fleshes Out Iraq Strategy
Details 2 news
articles by the Associated Press January 5th, 2007 - Bush Making Changes in His
Iraq Team 1 news
article by the Washington Post January 2nd, 2007 - Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in
’06, Bush Team Says 1 news
article by the New York Times January 1st, 2007 - Rush to Hang Hussein Was
Questioned 1 news article by
the New York Times December 23rd, 2006 - December Proving Deadly for
Troops 1 news article by
the Associated Press December 16th, 2006 - Pentagon To Move Troops Into
Kuwait 2 news articles by
CBS News & the New York Times December 15th, 2006 - U.S. Confronts Reality of
Iraq in 2006 1 news article by
the Associated Press December 11th, 2006 - Talabani Lashes out at
‘Dangerous’ Baker Report on US Role in Iraq 1 news article by
the Guardian December 7th, 2006 - Senate Confirms Gates as
Defense Secretary 1 news article by
the Washington Post December 6th, 2006 - Iraq Panel Calls Conditions
‘Grave and Deteriorating’ 1 news article by
the Washington Post December 5th, 2006 - Gates Says U.S. Not Winning
War in Iraq 1 news article by
the Washington Post December 3rd, 2006 - Rumsfeld Memo on Iraq Proposed
‘Major’ Change 1 news article by
the New York Times December 1st, 2006 - Iraq Panel to Urge Pullout
Of Combat Troops by ‘08 1 news article by
the Washington Post November 29th, 2006 - Bush Adviser’s Memo Cites
Doubts About Iraqi Leader 1 news article by
the New York Times November 26th, 2006 - U.S. Finds Iraq Insurgency Has
Funds to Sustain Itself 1 news article by
the New York Times November 13th, 2006 - Democrats Push for Troop
Cuts Within Months 1 news article by
the New York Times November 11th, 2006 - Military Team Undertakes a
Broad Review of the Iraq War 1 news article by
the New York Times November 9th, 2006 - Robert Gates, a Cautious
Player From a Past Bush Team 1 news article by
the New York Times November 8th, 2006 - Rumsfeld to Step Down as
Defense Secretary 2 news articles by
Washington Post & the New York Times November 5th, 2006 - Bush Calls Saddam Conviction
Milestone in Iraq 1 news
article by Reuters November 4th, 2006 - For U.S. and Top Iraqi,
Animosity Is Mutual 1 news
article by the New York Times November 3rd, 2006 - Neo Culpa 1 news
article by Vanity Fair October 31st, 2006 - Kurdish Commander Wants
Permanent U.S. Base in Northern Iraq 1 news
article by WorldPoliticsWatch October 30th, 2006 - U.S. Is Said to Fail in
Tracking Arms for Iraqis 1 news
article by the New York Times October 25th, 2006 - Bush Tells U.S. ‘I’m Not Happy
With Iraq’ 1 news
article by the Financial Times October 22nd, 2006 - U.S. to Hand Iraq a New
Timetable on Security Role 1 news
article by the New York Times October 21st, 2006 - Bush Holds Strategy Session
on Iraq 1 news
article by the Associated Press October 12th, 2006 - Troop Levels in Iraq Could
Hold Steady through 2010 1 news
article by the Boston Globe October 9th, 2006 - G.O.P.’s Baker Hints Iraq Plan
Needs Change 1 news
article by the New York Times September 27th, 2006 - Backing Policy, President
Issues Terror Estimate 1 news
article by the New York Times |
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Special
Reports on U.S. Policy towards Iraq January 29th, 2008 - Blocking Property of
Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq Report by the
Congressional Research Service “[…] On July 17, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 13,438,
‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in
Iraq.’ It is the latest in a series of executive orders based on the national
emergency declared by President Bush with respect to ‘the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the
United States posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the
restoration and maintenance of peace and security in that country, and the
development of political, administrative and economic institutions in Iraq.’
The broad language of this executive order has been the subject of a degree
of criticism as potentially reaching beyond insurgents in Iraq to third
parties, such as U.S. citizens, who may unknowingly be providing support for
the insurgency. “[…] A list of designees added to OFAC’s Special Designated Nationals
and Blocked Persons List 7 under Executive Order 13,438 was issued by
Treasury on January 9, 2008. It included Ahmed Fouruzandeh, Brigadier
General, Commanding Officer of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps-Qods Force, Ramazan Corps, who ‘leads terrorist operations against
Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces, and directs assassinations of
Iraqi figures.’ Also included were two Iran-based Iraqi nationals, and one Syria-based
Iraqi national as well as Al-Zawra Television Station, based in Syria. The
Treasury announcement includes a description of the activities of the
designees that have led to the prohibition of transactions between them and
any U.S. person and the freezing of any of their assets that are under the
jurisdiction of the United States. […]” August 2007 - Draft Review of Iraqi
Enforcement of Anticorruption Laws Report by the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq “[…] Executive Summary - Currently, Iraq is not capable of even
rudimentary enforcement of anticorruption laws. The study team conducted a
comprehensive study of the cases in Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) and
a review of the performance of the anticorruption institutions. CPI is
currently a passive rather than a true investigatory agency. Though legally
empowered to conduct investigations the combined security situation and the
violent character of the criminal elements within the ministries make
investigation of corruption too hazardous for all but a tactically robust
police force with the support of he Iraqi government. Currently this support
is lacking. “Within the ministries Inspectors General (IG) have repeatedly
complained that fighting corruption is seen as an IG function alone and is
not seen as a concern outside of that office. This lack of support has
allowed corruption to be the norm in many ministries. Unarmed in the red zone
subject to intimidation, reports submitted by the Inspectors General can not
be trusted to truthfully reveal criminal activity against anyone protected by
the violent or powerful. “The court system in Iraq remains weak, intimidated, subject to
political pressure, and clogged with minor cases. “Reviews of the cases and interviews with CPI investigators and
American advisors give a breakdown of the anticorruption efforts in the
ministries that have provided 70% of the corruption complaints. The Ministry
of Interior is seen by Iraqis as untouchable by the anticorruption
enforcement infrastructure of Iraq. Corruption investigations in Ministry of
Defense are judged to be ineffectual. With 196 complaints and only 8 being
sent to court and only one person having been convicted in what is widely
recognized as a troubled ministry, corruption investigations are clearly
inadequate in the Ministry of Trade. The Ministry of Health is a sore point;
corruption is actually affecting its ability to deliver services and
threatens the support of the government. The lack of investigative capacity
and the presence of militia make it beyond the reach of anticorruption
efforts. The high number of dismissals in cases involving alleged political
motivations indicates manipulation of the investigations within Ministry of Oil.
CPI and the IG are completely ill-equipped to handle oil theft cases.
Anticorruption cases concerning the Ministry of Education have been
particularly ineffective. “As is shown by the small number of investigations in the Ministry of
Water Resources it is effectively out of the anticorruption fight with little
to no apparent effort in trying to combat fraud. The number of referrals for
prosecution and failure of even rudimentary cooperation support the
contention that the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs is hostile to the
prosecution of corruption cases. Militia support from Sadr has effectively
made corruption in the Ministry of Transportation wholesale according to
investigators and immune from prosecution. In the Ministry of Displacement
& Migration there has been only one investigation initiated or complaint
made about any person identified with the Shia. “Anticorruption activity efforts are in practical measure devoid in
the Ministry of Science and Technology. In general, the lack of cooperation
within the Ministry of Housing & Construction has left the anticorruption
fight principally to CPI which is not capable of any sustainable campaign
within that ministry. That there are so many complaints about NGOs that it
leads to the conclusion that either NGOs are wrapped up in political intrigue
or they are a significant contributor to the corruption problem. In the
Ministry of Youth & Sports no cases have made it to trial because the
minister has granted Article 136B immunity from trial on wholesale bases. The
concentration on investigating people once they leave the ministry implies
political protection for those currently within the Ministry of Electricity.
Only one conviction has ever come from corruption cases in the entire city of
Baghdad. In the Ministry of Finance the minister has developed a reputation
for ruthlessness in applying the anticorruption laws to control his staff.
CPI is powerless to prevent this type of abuse. […]” September 7th, 2007 - Iraq Government Has Not
Met Most Legislative, Security and Economic Benchmarks Report by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office “[…] The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by
the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met
4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not
been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi
government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do
not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has
been made in several areas, including Anbar Province. “The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the
rights of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The
government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba’athification, oil revenue
sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament. “It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased - a
key security benchmark - since it is difficult to measure whether the
perpetrators’ intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of
population security show differing trends. “As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance
the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with
homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United
States. […]” January 2007 - Prospects for Iraq’s
Stability - A Challenging Road Ahead National
Intelligence Estimate by the Director of U.S. National Intelligence “[…] Key Judgments “Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security
forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence
are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and
political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show
measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18
months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to
deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by
Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more
effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an
opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer
term stability, political progress, and economic recovery. “Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current
winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political
scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation
in the time frame of this Estimate. […]” January 25th, 2007
- Testimony on the
Current Situation in Iraq Prepared statement by Dr. William J. Perry before the U.S. Senate “[…] B. Historical Background “[…] The administration gave three reasons for the invasion of Iraq.
The first was the alleged imminent danger from Iraq’s WMD programs. I believe
that military action to stop an illegal nuclear program would have been
warranted, but it would have been targeted against nuclear facilities, and
not entail the occupation of Iraq. In any event, there was no imminent or
even gathering danger from Iraqi nuclear weapons or other WMD. It appears
that the United Nations inspections had, in fact, been working. “The second reason was the alleged imminent danger to the United
States from Iraq’s support of terrorism. Military action to defeat Al Qaeda
could have been justified, as it was in Afghanistan. But while Al Qaeda used
Afghanistan as a training area, it had no significant presence in Iraq prior
to the invasion, and had no relationship with Iraq’s government. “The third reason was to bring stability to the Middle East by
creating a democratic government in Iraq. Certainly a democratic government
in Iraq could be a blessing to its people and a boon to the region. But the
task of imposing a democratic government in Iraq turned out to be
substantially more difficult than the administration imagined. Indeed, it is
not clear that any strategy could have fully succeeded in achieving a
democratic, stable government in Iraq. But we may never know whether it was
possible, since the administration’s attempts to do so were burdened with
serious strategic errors. “In particular, four errors were the most consequential: “a. The administration failed to get support from regional powers and
from key allies. As a consequence, United States forces comprise almost 90%
of the coalition, as opposed to about 50% in Desert Storm or Bosnia. “b. The administration did not send in enough troops to maintain
security after the Iraqi army was defeated. Thus, after the Iraqi army was
defeated and Iraq broke out in looting, the United States did not have enough
troops to maintain control, giving the insurgency a chance to gain a
foothold. “c. The administration disbanded the Iraqi army, police and civil
servants a few weeks after the Iraqi army was defeated. As a result, 500,000
angry young men were turned loose on Iraqi towns with weapons and no jobs,
and Iraq was left with no security force except for the undersized coalition
military force. “d. The administration pushed the Iraqi provisional government to
establish a constitution and hold elections, but in a faulty process that did
not adequately protect minority rights, thus setting the stage for a bloody
power struggle between Shias and Sunnis. The cumulative affect of all of
those strategic errors is a disastrous security situation in Iraq, which
continues to deteriorate: - More than 25,000 United States military personnel have been killed,
maimed or wounded. - This past year more than 30,000 Iraqis were killed in the sectarian
violence sweeping the major cities of Iraq. - Well over a million Iraqis have left the country, including large
numbers of Iraqi professionals. - And the violence is still trending up. […]” January 25th, 2007
- Testimony on the
Current Situation in Iraq Prepared statement by Ambassador Dennis B. Ross before the U.S. Senate “[…] In my experience, deep-seated conflicts are not transformed by
simply offering inducements to the parties. Inducements, on their own, are
never sufficient to confront history and mythology; on the contrary, it takes
an unmistakable awareness of the daunting costs of continuing to hold out
that finally motivates parties to cross historic thresholds and change their
behavior. From this standpoint, I believe the surge only makes sense if
President Bush has explicitly told Mr. Maliki in private that he has six
months to act credibly on his commitments, and if he does not, we will begin
to withdraw forces and we will stop the process of bolstering those Iraqi
forces that Maliki most wants to receive arms. “If President Bush has not conveyed such a warning in private and
remains unwilling to create consequences for non-performance, I would suggest
that the Congress identify which of the Maliki commitments are most critical
for indicating a readiness on the part of the Iraqi government and sectarian
leaders to transform themselves and actually forge a national compact. While
taking on the militias and the Mahdi army might be the best measure, I would
not create an impossible standard. Instead, I believe a number of other
measures would offer better indicators of the Iraqi government’s intent to
make reconciliation a genuine priority: the sharing of oil revenues and the
rehabilitation of former Ba’athi party members (and not just the adoption of
laws which might never be implemented); the actual investment of monies in
Sunni areas; and the provision of protection to Sunni neighborhoods. […]” January 12th, 2007
- Iraq: Regional
Perspectives and U.S. Policy CRS Report for U.S. Congress January 10th, 2007 - President's Address to the
Nation Press
Release by the Office of the Press Secretary of the U.S. White House “[…] The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American
people - and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought
bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes
have been made, the responsibility rests with me. “It is clear that we need to change our strategy in
Iraq. So my national security team, military commanders, and diplomats
conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted members of Congress from both
parties, our allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefitted
from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan
panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee
Hamilton. In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula
for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in
Iraq would be a disaster for the United States. “The consequences of failure are clear: Radical
Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would
be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the
region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be
emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe
haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On
September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other
side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the
safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq. […] “Now let me explain the main elements of this
effort: The Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy
commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and
National Police brigades across Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces
are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades
committed to this effort, along with local police. These Iraqi forces will
operate from local police stations - conducting patrols and setting up
checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents. “This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our commander | |||
