The War Profiteers - War Crimes, Kidnappings & Torture

 

War Profiteers Main Index

U.S. Military Complex Index

U.S. Department of Defense Index

 

 

The Second Gulf War/Iraq Invasion II - U.S. Policy in Iraq

Background

Media Reports

Special Reports

Photo Credits

Newest media report: Slow Sunni Integration a Risk to Iraq Security - US (31/7/2009/Reuters)

Newest government report: Blocking Property of Certain Person who Threaten Efforts in Iraq (29/1/2008/CRS report)

 

Bush in March of 2003: “We carry on the work of peace.”

 

“My fellow citizens, at this hour, American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger. […]

 

“I want Americans and all the world to know that coalition forces will make every effort to spare innocent civilians from harm.[…]

 

“And helping Iraqis achieve a united, stable and free country will require our sustained commitment. We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice. We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people. […] We will pass through this time of peril and carry on the work of peace. We will defend our freedom. We will bring freedom to others and we will prevail. […]”

 

Excerpt of U.S. President Bush’s televised declaration of war

 March 20th, 2003: Bush declares war, while promising freedom

 

 

After U.S. airstrike on Falluja: Wounded Iraqi girl in hospital

U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan in December of 2006: “Worse than the civil war in Lebanon.”

 

Kofi Annan: I think, given the level of violence, the level of killing and bitterness and the way that forces are arranged against each other. A few years ago, when we had the strife in Lebanon and other places, we called that a civil war. This is much worse.

 

BBC: Was it a mistake? Some Iraqis say that life is worse than it was under a dictator.

 

Kofi Annan: […] If I were an average Iraqi obviously I would make the same comparison, that they had a dictator who was brutal but they had their streets, they could go out, their kids could go to school and come back home without a mother or father worrying, ‘Am I going to see my child again?’ […]

 

Excerpt of a BBC interview with Kofi Annan - December 4th, 2006

 

Media Reports

 

July 31st, 2009 - Slow Sunni Integration a Risk to Iraq Security - US

1 news article from Reuters

 

June 29th, 2009 - Why Iraq is Now the Most Corrupt Country on the Planet

1 feature article from Counterpunch

 

June 24th, 2009 - No Change to Iraq Pullout: White House

2 news articles from Agence France Presse & Associated Press

 

June 15th, 2009 - US Commander: US to Stick to Iraq Withdrawal Date

1 news article from the Associated Press

 

February 27th, 2009 - Officials: Obama Sets Aug. 2010 as Iraq End Date

1 news article from the Associated Press

 

February 10th, 2009 - US Dominance Over Iraq Has Ended: Maliki

3 news articles from Agence France Presse, Reuters & International Herald Tribune

 

January 21st, 2009 - Diplomats, Generals Join Obama in War Meeting

2 news articles from the Associated Press & Los Angeles Times

 

November 27th, 2008 - Iraqi Parliament Approves Landmark US Military Pact

1 news article by Agence France Presse

 

November 21st, 2008 - Security Firms Told They Lose Immunity in Iraq: Official

1 news article by Agence France Presse

 

November 16th, 2008 - US Welcomes Iraq’s Approval of Pact on Military Pullout

1 news article by Agence France Presse

 

November 7th, 2008 - Dogs of War: Contractors and Obama

1 news article by United Press International

 

November 6th, 2008 - Iraqis Seek More ‘Withdrawal’ Talks; U.S. Says They’re Over

1 news article by McClatchy Newspapers

 

October 28th, 2008 - Report on Iraq Security Lists 310 Contractors

1 news article by the New York Times

 

October 19th, 2008 - Iraq Wins Right to Prosecute Crimes by US Troops

1 news article by Agence France Presse

 

October 15th, 2008 - US Agrees to Limited Iraqi Jurisdiction

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

October 8th, 2008 - Iraq, U.S. Near Deal on Military Future

1 news article by the Los Angeles Times

 

September 1st, 2008 - Immunity a Sticking Point in US-Iraq Security Pact: Report

1 news article by Agence France Presse

 

July 8th, 2008 - Iraqi Official Says Government Wants Timetable for Withdrawal

1 news article by the Washington Post

 

June 13th, 2008 - Maliki Says Talks on Iraq-US Security Pact Deadlocked

1 news article by Agence France Presse

 

June 5th, 2008 - US Ambassador Says no Permanent Bases in Iraq

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

May 15th, 2008 - McCain Outlines Vision of Iraq Victory

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

May 12th, 2008 - Ex-State Officials Allege Corruption Cover Up

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

April 20th, 2008 - Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand

1 news article by the New York Times

 

March 20th, 2008 - Bush Defends Iraq War in Speech

1 news article by the New York Times

 

January 31st, 2008 - U.S. Wants to Keep Right to Hunt Foreign Fighters in Iraq

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

January 25th, 2008 - U.S. Asking Iraq for Wide Rights on War

1 news article by the New York Times

 

September 5th, 2007 - GAO Skeptical that Iraq Security Can Last

1 news article by the Los Angeles Times

 

April 26th, 2007 - Senate Passes Iraq War Bill Requiring Pullout

1 news article by the New York Times

 

March 17th, 2007 - Iraq War Alters Political Landscape

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

March 12th, 2007 - Fallback Strategy for Iraq: Train Locals, Draw Down Forces

1 news article by Los Angeles Times

 

January 25th, 2007 - Troops Authorized to Kill Iranian Operatives in Iraq

1 news article by the Washington Post

 

January 12th, 2007 - Bush’s Plan for Iraq Runs Into Opposition

1 news article by the New York Times

 

January 11th, 2007 - Bush Adds Troops in Bid to Secure Iraq

1 news article by the New York Times

 

January 7th, 2007 - Bush Fleshes Out Iraq Strategy Details

2 news articles by the Associated Press

 

January 5th, 2007 - Bush Making Changes in His Iraq Team

1 news article by the Washington Post

 

January 2nd, 2007 - Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in ’06, Bush Team Says

1 news article by the New York Times

 

January 1st, 2007 - Rush to Hang Hussein Was Questioned

1 news article by the New York Times

 

December 23rd, 2006 - December Proving Deadly for Troops

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

December 16th, 2006 - Rumsfeld Honored at Pentagon Departure Ceremony

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

December 16th, 2006 - Pentagon To Move Troops Into Kuwait

2 news articles by CBS News & the New York Times

 

December 15th, 2006 - U.S. Confronts Reality of Iraq in 2006

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

December 11th, 2006 - Talabani Lashes out at ‘Dangerous’ Baker Report on US Role in Iraq

1 news article by the Guardian

 

December 7th, 2006 - Senate Confirms Gates as Defense Secretary

1 news article by the Washington Post

 

December 6th, 2006 - Iraq Panel Calls Conditions ‘Grave and Deteriorating’

1 news article by the Washington Post

 

December 5th, 2006 - Gates Says U.S. Not Winning War in Iraq

1 news article by the Washington Post

 

December 3rd, 2006 - Rumsfeld Memo on Iraq Proposed ‘Major’ Change

1 news article by the New York Times

 

December 1st, 2006 - Iraq Panel to Urge Pullout Of Combat Troops by ‘08

1 news article by the Washington Post

 

November 29th, 2006 - Bush Adviser’s Memo Cites Doubts About Iraqi Leader

1 news article by the New York Times

 

November 26th, 2006 - U.S. Finds Iraq Insurgency Has Funds to Sustain Itself

1 news article by the New York Times

 

November 13th, 2006 - Democrats Push for Troop Cuts Within Months

1 news article by the New York Times

 

November 11th, 2006 - Military Team Undertakes a Broad Review of the Iraq War

1 news article by the New York Times

 

November 9th, 2006 - Robert Gates, a Cautious Player From a Past Bush Team

1 news article by the New York Times

 

November 8th, 2006 - Rumsfeld to Step Down as Defense Secretary

2 news articles by Washington Post & the New York Times

 

November 5th, 2006 - Bush Calls Saddam Conviction Milestone in Iraq

1 news article by Reuters

 

November 4th, 2006 - For U.S. and Top Iraqi, Animosity Is Mutual

1 news article by the New York Times

 

November 3rd, 2006 - Neo Culpa

1 news article by Vanity Fair

 

October 31st, 2006 - Kurdish Commander Wants Permanent U.S. Base in Northern Iraq

1 news article by WorldPoliticsWatch

 

October 30th, 2006 - U.S. Is Said to Fail in Tracking Arms for Iraqis

1 news article by the New York Times

 

October 25th, 2006 - Bush Tells U.S. ‘I’m Not Happy With Iraq’

1 news article by the Financial Times

 

October 22nd, 2006 - U.S. to Hand Iraq a New Timetable on Security Role

1 news article by the New York Times

 

October 21st, 2006 - Bush Holds Strategy Session on Iraq

1 news article by the Associated Press

 

October 12th, 2006 - Troop Levels in Iraq Could Hold Steady through 2010

1 news article by the Boston Globe

 

October 9th, 2006 - G.O.P.’s Baker Hints Iraq Plan Needs Change

1 news article by the New York Times

 

September 27th, 2006 - Backing Policy, President Issues Terror Estimate

1 news article by the New York Times

 

Special Reports on U.S. Policy towards Iraq

 

January 29th, 2008 - Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq

Report by the Congressional Research Service

 

“[…] On July 17, 2007, President Bush issued Executive Order No. 13,438, ‘Blocking Property of Certain Persons Who Threaten Stabilization Efforts in Iraq.’ It is the latest in a series of executive orders based on the national emergency declared by President Bush with respect to ‘the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States posed by obstacles to the orderly reconstruction of Iraq, the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in that country, and the development of political, administrative and economic institutions in Iraq.’ The broad language of this executive order has been the subject of a degree of criticism as potentially reaching beyond insurgents in Iraq to third parties, such as U.S. citizens, who may unknowingly be providing support for the insurgency.

 

“[…] A list of designees added to OFAC’s Special Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List 7 under Executive Order 13,438 was issued by Treasury on January 9, 2008. It included Ahmed Fouruzandeh, Brigadier General, Commanding Officer of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, Ramazan Corps, who ‘leads terrorist operations against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces, and directs assassinations of Iraqi figures.’ Also included were two Iran-based Iraqi nationals, and one Syria-based Iraqi national as well as Al-Zawra Television Station, based in Syria. The Treasury announcement includes a description of the activities of the designees that have led to the prohibition of transactions between them and any U.S. person and the freezing of any of their assets that are under the jurisdiction of the United States. […]”

 

August 2007 - Draft Review of Iraqi Enforcement of Anticorruption Laws

Report by the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq

 

“[…] Executive Summary - Currently, Iraq is not capable of even rudimentary enforcement of anticorruption laws. The study team conducted a comprehensive study of the cases in Commission on Public Integrity (CPI) and a review of the performance of the anticorruption institutions. CPI is currently a passive rather than a true investigatory agency. Though legally empowered to conduct investigations the combined security situation and the violent character of the criminal elements within the ministries make investigation of corruption too hazardous for all but a tactically robust police force with the support of he Iraqi government. Currently this support is lacking.

 

“Within the ministries Inspectors General (IG) have repeatedly complained that fighting corruption is seen as an IG function alone and is not seen as a concern outside of that office. This lack of support has allowed corruption to be the norm in many ministries. Unarmed in the red zone subject to intimidation, reports submitted by the Inspectors General can not be trusted to truthfully reveal criminal activity against anyone protected by the violent or powerful.

 

“The court system in Iraq remains weak, intimidated, subject to political pressure, and clogged with minor cases.

 

“Reviews of the cases and interviews with CPI investigators and American advisors give a breakdown of the anticorruption efforts in the ministries that have provided 70% of the corruption complaints. The Ministry of Interior is seen by Iraqis as untouchable by the anticorruption enforcement infrastructure of Iraq. Corruption investigations in Ministry of Defense are judged to be ineffectual. With 196 complaints and only 8 being sent to court and only one person having been convicted in what is widely recognized as a troubled ministry, corruption investigations are clearly inadequate in the Ministry of Trade. The Ministry of Health is a sore point; corruption is actually affecting its ability to deliver services and threatens the support of the government. The lack of investigative capacity and the presence of militia make it beyond the reach of anticorruption efforts. The high number of dismissals in cases involving alleged political motivations indicates manipulation of the investigations within Ministry of Oil. CPI and the IG are completely ill-equipped to handle oil theft cases. Anticorruption cases concerning the Ministry of Education have been particularly ineffective.

 

“As is shown by the small number of investigations in the Ministry of Water Resources it is effectively out of the anticorruption fight with little to no apparent effort in trying to combat fraud. The number of referrals for prosecution and failure of even rudimentary cooperation support the contention that the Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs is hostile to the prosecution of corruption cases. Militia support from Sadr has effectively made corruption in the Ministry of Transportation wholesale according to investigators and immune from prosecution. In the Ministry of Displacement & Migration there has been only one investigation initiated or complaint made about any person identified with the Shia.

 

“Anticorruption activity efforts are in practical measure devoid in the Ministry of Science and Technology. In general, the lack of cooperation within the Ministry of Housing & Construction has left the anticorruption fight principally to CPI which is not capable of any sustainable campaign within that ministry. That there are so many complaints about NGOs that it leads to the conclusion that either NGOs are wrapped up in political intrigue or they are a significant contributor to the corruption problem. In the Ministry of Youth & Sports no cases have made it to trial because the minister has granted Article 136B immunity from trial on wholesale bases. The concentration on investigating people once they leave the ministry implies political protection for those currently within the Ministry of Electricity. Only one conviction has ever come from corruption cases in the entire city of Baghdad. In the Ministry of Finance the minister has developed a reputation for ruthlessness in applying the anticorruption laws to control his staff. CPI is powerless to prevent this type of abuse. […]”

 

September 7th, 2007 - Iraq Government Has Not Met Most Legislative, Security and Economic Benchmarks

Report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office

 

“[…] The benchmarks were derived from commitments first articulated by the Iraqi government in June 2006. The Iraqi government met 3, partially met 4, and did not meet 11 of its 18 benchmarks. Overall, key legislation has not been passed, violence remains high, and it is unclear whether the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion in reconstruction funds. These results do not diminish the courageous efforts of coalition forces and progress that has been made in several areas, including Anbar Province.

 

“The Iraqi government met one of eight legislative benchmarks: the rights of minority political parties in Iraq’s legislature are protected. The government has not enacted legislation on de-Ba’athification, oil revenue sharing, provincial elections, amnesty, and militia disarmament.

 

“It is unclear whether sectarian violence in Iraq has decreased - a key security benchmark - since it is difficult to measure whether the perpetrators’ intents were sectarian in nature, and other measures of population security show differing trends.

 

“As the Congress considers the way forward in Iraq, it should balance the achievement of the 18 Iraqi benchmarks with military progress and with homeland security goals, foreign policy goals, and other goals of the United States. […]”

 

January 2007 - Prospects for Iraq’s Stability - A Challenging Road Ahead

National Intelligence Estimate by the Director of U.S. National Intelligence

 

“[…] Key Judgments

 

“Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the term of this Estimate, the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. If strengthened Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), more loyal to the government and supported by Coalition forces, are able to reduce levels of violence and establish more effective security for Iraq’s population, Iraqi leaders could have an opportunity to begin the process of political compromise necessary for longer term stability, political progress, and economic recovery.

 

“Nevertheless, even if violence is diminished, given the current winner-take-all attitude and sectarian animosities infecting the political scene, Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the time frame of this Estimate. […]”

 

January 25th, 2007 - Testimony on the Current Situation in Iraq

Prepared statement by Dr. William J. Perry before the U.S. Senate

 

“[…] B. Historical Background

 

“[…] The administration gave three reasons for the invasion of Iraq. The first was the alleged imminent danger from Iraq’s WMD programs. I believe that military action to stop an illegal nuclear program would have been warranted, but it would have been targeted against nuclear facilities, and not entail the occupation of Iraq. In any event, there was no imminent or even gathering danger from Iraqi nuclear weapons or other WMD. It appears that the United Nations inspections had, in fact, been working.

 

“The second reason was the alleged imminent danger to the United States from Iraq’s support of terrorism. Military action to defeat Al Qaeda could have been justified, as it was in Afghanistan. But while Al Qaeda used Afghanistan as a training area, it had no significant presence in Iraq prior to the invasion, and had no relationship with Iraq’s government.

 

“The third reason was to bring stability to the Middle East by creating a democratic government in Iraq. Certainly a democratic government in Iraq could be a blessing to its people and a boon to the region. But the task of imposing a democratic government in Iraq turned out to be substantially more difficult than the administration imagined. Indeed, it is not clear that any strategy could have fully succeeded in achieving a democratic, stable government in Iraq. But we may never know whether it was possible, since the administration’s attempts to do so were burdened with serious strategic errors.

 

“In particular, four errors were the most consequential:

 

“a. The administration failed to get support from regional powers and from key allies. As a consequence, United States forces comprise almost 90% of the coalition, as opposed to about 50% in Desert Storm or Bosnia.

 

“b. The administration did not send in enough troops to maintain security after the Iraqi army was defeated. Thus, after the Iraqi army was defeated and Iraq broke out in looting, the United States did not have enough troops to maintain control, giving the insurgency a chance to gain a foothold.

 

“c. The administration disbanded the Iraqi army, police and civil servants a few weeks after the Iraqi army was defeated. As a result, 500,000 angry young men were turned loose on Iraqi towns with weapons and no jobs, and Iraq was left with no security force except for the undersized coalition military force.

 

“d. The administration pushed the Iraqi provisional government to establish a constitution and hold elections, but in a faulty process that did not adequately protect minority rights, thus setting the stage for a bloody power struggle between Shias and Sunnis. The cumulative affect of all of those strategic errors is a disastrous security situation in Iraq, which continues to deteriorate:

- More than 25,000 United States military personnel have been killed, maimed or wounded.

- This past year more than 30,000 Iraqis were killed in the sectarian violence sweeping the major cities of Iraq.

- Well over a million Iraqis have left the country, including large numbers of Iraqi professionals.

- And the violence is still trending up. […]”

 

January 25th, 2007 - Testimony on the Current Situation in Iraq

Prepared statement by Ambassador Dennis B. Ross before the U.S. Senate

 

“[…] In my experience, deep-seated conflicts are not transformed by simply offering inducements to the parties. Inducements, on their own, are never sufficient to confront history and mythology; on the contrary, it takes an unmistakable awareness of the daunting costs of continuing to hold out that finally motivates parties to cross historic thresholds and change their behavior. From this standpoint, I believe the surge only makes sense if President Bush has explicitly told Mr. Maliki in private that he has six months to act credibly on his commitments, and if he does not, we will begin to withdraw forces and we will stop the process of bolstering those Iraqi forces that Maliki most wants to receive arms.

 

“If President Bush has not conveyed such a warning in private and remains unwilling to create consequences for non-performance, I would suggest that the Congress identify which of the Maliki commitments are most critical for indicating a readiness on the part of the Iraqi government and sectarian leaders to transform themselves and actually forge a national compact. While taking on the militias and the Mahdi army might be the best measure, I would not create an impossible standard. Instead, I believe a number of other measures would offer better indicators of the Iraqi government’s intent to make reconciliation a genuine priority: the sharing of oil revenues and the rehabilitation of former Ba’athi party members (and not just the adoption of laws which might never be implemented); the actual investment of monies in Sunni areas; and the provision of protection to Sunni neighborhoods. […]”

 

January 12th, 2007 - Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy

CRS Report for U.S. Congress

 

January 10th, 2007 - President's Address to the Nation

Press Release by the Office of the Press Secretary of the U.S. White House

 

“[…] The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the American people - and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely. They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made, the responsibility rests with me.

 

“It is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq. So my national security team, military commanders, and diplomats conducted a comprehensive review. We consulted members of Congress from both parties, our allies abroad, and distinguished outside experts. We benefitted from the thoughtful recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel led by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton. In our discussions, we all agreed that there is no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear: Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States.

 

“The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. Iran would be emboldened in its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq. […]

 

“Now let me explain the main elements of this effort: The Iraqi government will appoint a military commander and two deputy commanders for their capital. The Iraqi government will deploy Iraqi Army and National Police brigades across Baghdad's nine districts. When these forces are fully deployed, there will be 18 Iraqi Army and National Police brigades committed to this effort, along with local police. These Iraqi forces will operate from local police stations - conducting patrols and setting up checkpoints, and going door-to-door to gain the trust of Baghdad residents.

 

“This is a strong commitment. But for it to succeed, our commanders say the Iraqis will need our help. So America will change our strategy to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad. This will require increasing American force levels. So I've committed more than 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. The vast majority of them - five brigades - will be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi units and be embedded in their formations. Our troops will have a well-defined mission: to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs. […]”

 

January 10th, 2007 - Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials

Press Release by the Office of the Press Secretary of the U.S. White House

 

January 10th, 2007 - Fact Sheet: The New Way Forward in Iraq

Press Release by the Office of the Press Secretary of the U.S. White House

 

December 6th, 2006 - The Iraqi Study Group Report

Report by the Iraqi Study Group

 

November 30th, 2005 - National Strategy for Victory in Iraq

Strategy paper by the U.S. National Security Council

 

“[…] Our National Strategy For Victory In Iraq: Helping the Iraqi People Defeat the Terrorists and Build an Inclusive Democratic State

 

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages

 

Short term: Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.

Medium term: Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.

Longer term: Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

 

Victory in Iraq is a Vital U.S. Interest

 

Iraq is the central front in the global war on terror. Failure in Iraq will embolden terrorists and expand their reach; success in Iraq will deal them a decisive and crippling blow.

The fate of the greater Middle East – which will have a profound and lasting impact on American security – hangs in the balance.

 

Failure is Not an Option

 

Iraq would become a safe haven from which terrorists could plan attacks against America, American interests abroad, and our allies.

Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and human rights in the region – a historic opportunity lost.

The resultant tribal and sectarian chaos would have major consequences for American security and interests in the region. […]

 

“Through FY2006, Congress has appropriated a total of about $437 billion for military operations, base security, reconstruction, foreign aid, embassy costs, and veterans’ health care for the three operations initiated since the 9/11 attacks: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) covering Afghanistan and other Global War on Terror (GWOT) operations, Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) providing enhanced security at military bases, and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Iraq. […]

 

“If the FY2007 defense appropriation bill passes, total war appropriations for all three operations would reach about $507 billion. Another $2 billion is included in other appropriations bills for foreign and diplomatic operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and VA medical costs. In its July 2006 mid-session update, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates that war funding in FY2007 will total $110 billion, including bridge funding. Based on this OMB projection, cumulative war funding for all of FY2007 would reach about $549 billion. OMB also assumes a $50 billion bridge fund for FY2008. […]”

 

Photo Credits

 

Background

 

1) President George W. Bush addresses the nation from the Oval Office at the White House Wednesday evening, March 19, 2003. White House photo by Paul Morse;

2) A young girl receives treatment at a hospital, after sustaining injuries during U.S. airstrikes late Thursday night and early Friday morning in Fallujah, Iraq. Hospital officials say at least 30 people were killed and 40 wounded in U.S. strikes on Fallujah and nearby villages. - September 17th, 2004 - Bilal Hussein/Associated Press;

 

Back to U.S. Department of Defense

Back to main index