The War Profiteers - The U.S. Department of Defense - U.S. Military Strategy & Operations in Iraq

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The Second Gulf War/Iraq Invasion II - U.S. Military Strategy & Operations in Iraq
Background	Media Reports	Military Reports		Photo Credits

U.S. soldier blindfolds an Iraqi		Background - A look back: December 2003 “As the guerrilla war against Iraqi insurgents intensifies, American soldiers have begun wrapping entire villages in barbed wire. In selective cases, American soldiers are demolishing buildings thought to be used by Iraqi attackers. They have begun imprisoning the relatives of suspected guerrillas, in hopes of pressing the insurgents to turn themselves in. The Americans embarked on their get-tough strategy in early November, goaded by what proved to be the deadliest month yet for American forces in Iraq, with 81 soldiers killed by hostile fire. […] “‘You have to understand the Arab mind,’ Capt. Todd Brown, a company commander with the Fourth Infantry Division, said as he stood outside the gates of Abu Hishma. ‘The only thing they understand is force - force, pride and saving face.’ […]” Excerpt of a New York Times article from December 7^th, 2003.

Media Reports February 18^th, 2010 - Iraq War to Be Rebranded ‘Operation New Dawn’ 1 news article from Agence France Presse January 2^nd, 2010 - Troop Withdrawal from Iraq on Track, Commander Says 1 news article from the Associated Press September 17^th, 2009 - US Closes its Largest Iraq Jail in the Heat of the Night 1 news article from Agence France Presse September 8^th, 2009 - Attacks Complicate U.S. Moves in Iraq 1 news article from the New York Times July 20^th, 2009 - Iraqis Restrict US Operations in Baghdad 1 news article from the Associated Press June 28^th, 2009 - Some Fear U.S. Pullout From Iraqi Cities 1 news article from CBS News June 20^th, 2009 - US Hands Over Sadr City Base to Iraq 1 news article from Agence France Presse June 3^rd, 2009 - Iraq’s New Death Squad 1 feature article from The Nation May 31^st, 2009 - US: Unclear Troop Number Remaining in Iraq Cities 1 news article from the Associated Press April 11^th, 2009 - As Marines’ Exit Gathers Pace, Some Iraqis Fret 1 news article from the Associated Press March 8^th, 2009 - Drawdown in Iraq Begins: 12,000 Troops to Return by Fall 1 news article from the Christian Science Monitor January 3^rd, 2009 - The Last Day of the Iraq War 1 news article from Newsweek August 11^th, 2008 - Money as a Weapon 1 news article by the Washington Post July 26^th, 2008 - 4,000 US Combat Deaths, and Just a Handful of Images 1 news article by the New York Times May 19^th, 2008 - US: 500 Youths Detained in Iraq; 10 in Afghanistan 1 news article by the Associated Press March 24^th, 2008 - US Death Toll in Iraq War Hits 4,000 1 news article by the Associated Press March 15^th, 2008 - Kickbacks, Weapons and Suicide: The US Army’s Battle with Corruption 1 analysis by kippreport February 4^th, 2008 - Leak on Cross-Border Chases From Iraq 1 news article by the New York Times December 31^st, 2007 - 2007 is America’s Deadliest Year in Iraq 1 news article by the Guardian November 7^th, 2007 - 2007 Is Deadliest Year for U.S. Troops in Iraq 1 news article by the New York Times September 24^th, 2007 - U.S. Aims To Lure Insurgents With ‘Bait’ 1 news article by the Washington Post September 9^th, 2007 - At Street Level, Unmet Goals of Troop Buildup 1 news article by the New York Times August 25^th, 2007 - GIs’ Morale Dips as Iraq War Drags On 1 news article by the Los Angeles Times June 11^th, 2007 - U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old Qaeda Allies 1 news article by the New York Times June 4^th, 2007 - Commanders Say Push in Baghdad Is Short of Goal 1 news article by New York Times April 9^th, 2007 - Patterns of War Shift in Iraq Amid U.S. Buildup 2 news articles by the New York Times March 13^th, 2007 - Tables Turn Quickly in Baghdad Raids 1 news article by Los Angeles Times February 28^th, 2007 - Military Chiefs Give US Six Months to Win Iraq War 1 news article by the Guardian February 3^rd, 2007 - Soldiers in Iraq View Troop Surge as a Lost Cause 1 news article by McClatchy Newspapers January 12^th, 2007 - Pentagon Memo Predicts 10,000 or More American Soldiers Could Die 1 news article by Capitol Hill Blue January 2^nd, 2007 - Marines Locked in Anbar Standoff 1 news article by the Baltimore Sun November 28^th, 2006 - Anbar Picture Grows Clearer, and Bleaker 2 news articles by the Washington Post & the New York Times November 22^nd, 2006 - Perfect Killing Method, but Clear Targets Are Few 1 news article by the New York Times November 20^th, 2006 - Pentagon May Suggest Short-Term Buildup Leading to Iraq Exit 1 news article by the Washington Post November 18^th, 2006 - U.S. Generals Say Civil War, Not Insurgency, Is Greatest Threat 1 news article by the New York Times November 1^st, 2006 - Along Iraq-Syria Border, a Struggle to Cover the Terrain 1 news article by the Washington Post October 25^th, 2006 - Iraqi Realities Undermine the Pentagon’s Predictions 1 news article by the New York Times October 16^th, 2006 - 5 Americans Killed in Iraq, Bringing Month’s Toll to 53 1 news article by the New York Times August 3^rd, 2005 - The IED Marketplace in Iraq 1 news article by the Defense News December 7^th, 2003 - Tough New Tactics by U.S. Tighten Grip on Iraq Towns 1 news article by the New York Times
War Scenes from Iraq
Iraqi girl in Baghdad hospital	Three Survivors of U.S. attack		Remnants of U.S. airstrike in Karabila

Military Reports, Strategy Papers, Field Manuals and Testimonies July 2^nd, 2009 - Troop Levels in the Afghan and Iraq Wars: Cost and Other Potential Issues Report by the Congressional Research Service “[…] In February and March 2009, the Obama Administration announced its plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan and decrease troop levels in Iraq. In Afghanistan, 30,000 more troops are deploying this year while in Iraq, troops will gradually decline to 35,000 to 50,000 by August 31, 2011 with all troops to be out of Iraq by December 31, 2011. The most commonly cited measure of troop strength is ‘Boots on the Ground’ or the number of troops located in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Based on average monthly Boots on the Ground figures, the number of troops in Afghanistan and Iraq increased from 5,200 in FY2002 to a peak of 187,900 in FY2008 primarily because of increases in Iraq beginning with the invasion in March 2003. In FY2009, total troop strength is expected to remain the same as planned increases in Afghanistan offset declines in Iraq. By FY2012, overall troop strength for the two wars is likely to decline to 67,500 when the withdrawal from Iraq is expected to be complete. “[…] For Iraq, troops in-country nearly doubled between FY2003 and FY2004 reaching 130,600. By the following year, average strength grew by another 13,000 to 143,800, with that level maintained in FY2006. During the surge in troops initiated by President Bush, average troop strength in Iraq grew by 7,000 or 6% in FY2007 and another 9,500 or 9% in FY2008, reaching a peak of 157,800. CRS estimates that average troop strength in Iraq will decline to 135,600 in FY2009, 88,300 in FY2010, 42,800 in FY2011, and 4,100 in FY2012. While it is not clear whether war costs will change precisely in tandem with troop levels, these changes can provide a benchmark to assess requests. Based on changes in troop levels and other adjustments, CRS estimates that war costs could be about $8 billion less than the Department of Defense (DOD) $141 billion request for FY2009, and about $13 billion below its $130 billion request for FY2010. For the next year, FY2011, CRS estimates that DOD’s requests could be $42 billion more than the current planning figure of $50 billion. And in FY2012, CRS estimates war costs could be $20 billion higher than the Administration’s estimate of $50 billion. […]” November 2008 - Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan Report by the Rand Corporation “[…] The demands on coalition military personnel serving in Afghanistan and Iraq are among the most diicult in the member nations’ histories. Part diplomat, part mayor, part social worker, part municipal-services engineer, part politician, part mentor, and always soldier, sailor, marine, or airman, the challenges ask much of both the most senior and junior personnel. he most complex problems, unsurprisingly, tend to be products of urban environments; akin to a black hole, diiculties there compress in time and space to present a dense mass of tribulations for any seeking peace and stability. […] “The pages that follow concentrate on two speciic areas of consideration before delving into more general coverage of COIN issues that emerged as worthy of selection during our readings and the 92 interviews conducted in support of this efort. Chapter Two contemplates intelligence (intel) operations during counterinsurgency; Chapter hree ponders issues associated with the deinition, development, and use of metrics in the same environment. Both were selected for attention because they were repeatedly evident in our previous years’ work, in writings on ongoing U.S. deployments, and in many of the more than 300 interviews in support of this ongoing series of studies between October 2003 and September 2006. We did not limit our investigations during the 12 months following that three-year period to intel and metric issues alone. Chapter Four addresses additional issues: the aforementioned COIN topics not falling into either of the two previous categories yet deemed suiciently important to merit their presentation for reader consideration. The fifth and final chapter summarizes the potential impact of recommendations made in earlier pages and considers them in light of tasks that our men and women in uniform will likely face during future deployments. […]” July 15^th, 2007 - Iraq: U.S. Military Operations CRS Report for Congress February 1^st, 2007 - Advance Policy Questions for General George W. Casey Prepared statement for nomination hearing of George Casey for Chief of Staff, U.S. Army before the U.S. Senate January 12^th, 2007 - Testimony on Iraq Prepared statement by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates before the U.S. Senate November 15^th, 2006 - Testimony 1 on Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Prepared statement by General John P. Abizaid, Commander, U.S. Central Command before the U.S. Senate November 15^th, 2006 - Testimony 2 on Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Prepared statement by David M. Satterfield, Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq before the U.S. Senate November 15^th, 2006 - Testimony 3 on Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Prepared statement by Michael D. Maples, USA Director, D.I.A. before the U.S. Senate November 15^th, 2006 - Testimony 4 on Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Prepared statement by Michael V. Hayden, Director, C.I.A. before the U.S. Senate September 25^th, 2006 - IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures CRS Report for U.S. Congress “[…] Since October 2001, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs, or roadside bombs) have been responsible for many of the more than 2,000 combat deaths in Iraq, and 178 combat deaths in Afghanistan. IEDs are hidden behind signs and guardrails, under roadside debris, or inside animal carcasses, and encounters with these bombs are becoming more numerous and deadly in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The threat includes vehicle-borne IEDs, in which extremists drive cars laden with explosives directly into a target. DOD efforts to counter IEDs have proven only marginally effective, and U.S. forces continue to be exposed to the threat at military checkpoints, or whenever on patrol. IEDs are increasingly being used in Afghanistan, and DOD reportedly is concerned that they might eventually be more widely used by other insurgents and terrorists worldwide. This report will be updated as events warrant. […] “To evaluate countermeasures, DOD has set up the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), directed by retired Army Gen. Montgomery Meigs, to work with various national laboratories, the Department of Energy, contractors, and academia. Countermeasures are tested at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. The technologies being evaluated include electronic jammers, radars, X-ray equipment, robotic explosive ordnance disposal equipment, physical security equipment, and armor for vehicles and personnel. […]” September 2006 - American Military Performance in Iraq Article by Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center August 17^th, 2006 - State of the Insurgency in Al-Anbar Report by Colonel Peter Devlin of the U.S. Marine Corps “[…] General Situation: As of mid August, 2006, the daily average number of attacks exceeds 50 per day in al-Anbar Province. This activity reflects a 57% increase in overall attack numbers since I MEF assumed control of the province in February. Intensifying violence is reflected in the preponderantly negative outlook of the Sunni population, in the continuing inability to develop adequate Iraqi security forces, and in the near complete failure of reconstruction and development projects across western Iraq. The social and political situation has deteriorated to a point that MNF and ISF are no longer capable of militarily defeating the insurgency in al-Anbar. “Social Collapse: Underlying this decline in stability is the near complete collapse of social order in al-Anbar. The tribal system has wholly failed in AO Raleigh and Topeka, and has only limited efficacy in AO Denver. Prominent leaders have exiled themselves to neighboring Jordan and Syria, including some leading imams. Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government institutions from the village to provincial level have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) or criminal/insurgent gangs. Violence and criminality are now the principle driving factors behind daily life for most Anbar Sunni; they commit violence or crime, avoid violence or crime through corruption and acquiescence, or become victims. […]” July, 2006 - Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center “[…] Today’s counterinsurgency warfare involves a competition between human networks - ours and theirs. To understand their networks, we must understand the networks’ preexisting links and the cultural and historical context of the society. We also have to understand not just the insurgent’s network, but those of the host-nation government, its people, our coalition partners, NGOs, and, of course, our own. “Counterinsurgency is completely different from insurgency. Rather than focusing on fighting, strategy must focus on establishing good governance by strengthening key friendly nodes while weakening the enemy’s. In Iraq, we must get the mass of the population on our side. Good governance is founded on providing effective security for the people and giving them hope for their future; it is not based on killing insurgents and terrorists. To provide that security, we must be able to visualize the fight between and within the human networks involved. Only then can we develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents. […]” June 7^th, 2006 - Manual for Countering Irregular Threats Manual by the U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command June 2006 - Small-Unit Leaders’ Guide to Counterinsurgency Manual by the U.S. Marine Corps May 25^th, 2006 - Information Operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom Monograph by Major Joseph L. Cox, US Army May, 2006 - Assessing Iraq’s Sunni Arab Insurgency Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center “[…] Three years after the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein, confusion and controversy still surround the insurgency in Iraq’s Sunni Triangle. Part of this is due to the nontraditional character of the Sunni Arab insurgency, which is being waged by amorphous, locally and regionally based groups and networks lacking a unifying ideology, central leadership, or clear hierarchical organization. “The ambiguities inherent in insurgent warfare also make insurgencies difficult to assess. In conventional military conflicts, we can compare opposing orders of battle, evaluate capabilities, and assess the fortunes of belligerents using traditional measures: destruction of enemy forces, capture of key terrain, or seizure of the enemy’s capital city. “Insurgents are often not organized into regular formations, making it difficult (even for their own leaders) to assess their numerical strength accurately. Usually, there are no front lines whose location could offer insight into the war’s progress, and, at any rate, military factors are usually less important than political and psychological considerations in deciding the outcome of such conflicts. As a result, we need different analytic measures to assess the insurgency’s nature, scope, intensity, and effectiveness. […]” May, 2006 - A Brigade Combat Team Commander’s Perspective on Information Operations Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center May, 2006 - A Case Study in Aggressive Information Operations Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center “[…] The Current Information Situation “In an open letter to President George W. Bush published in the January 2006 issue of the Armed Forces Journal, Joseph Collins, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations in Bush’s administration, predicted that ‘[i]f our strategic communications on Iraq don’t improve, the strategy for victory will fail and disastrous consequences will follow.’ We are not consistently achieving synergy and mass in our strategic communications (consisting of IO [= Information Operations], public affairs [PA], public diplomacy, and military diplomacy) from the strategic to the tactical level, but blaming the IO component for the overall situation is too convenient and too narrow. The perception that IO should shoulder the blame is based on expectations that are beyond the doctrinal charter or operational capabilities of IO as currently resourced. The collective belief is that we lack the necessary skills, resources, and guidance to synchronize IO in order to achieve tangible effects on the battlefield. “Further complicating our efforts in the information domain is the fact that we are facing an adaptive, relentless, and technologically savvy foe who recognizes that the global information network is his most effective tool for attacking what he perceives to be our center of gravity: public opinion, both domestic and international. And the truth of the matter is that our enemy is better at integrating information-based operations, primarily through mass media, into his operations than we are. In some respects, we seem tied to our legacy doctrine and less than completely resolved to cope with the benefits and challenges of information globalization. We are too wedded to procedures that are anchored in the Cold War-Industrial Age. “Nevertheless, there appears to be an emerging recognition among warfighters that a broader and more aggressive, comprehensive, and holistic approach to IO - an approach that recognizes the challenges of the global information environment and seamlessly integrates the functions of traditional IO and PA - is required to succeed on the information-age battlefield. Furthermore, a clear need exists for strategic and operational commanders to become as aggressive and as offensive-minded with information operations as they have always been with other elements of combat power and warfighting functions - movement and maneuver, fire support, intelligence, and so on. Given the follow-on successes of XVIII Airborne Corps and the current success of V Corps, we are clearly making progress, but we still have much to do to ingrain these advances into the institutional structure. […]” May, 2006 - “Twenty-Eight Articles”: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center “[…] What is Counterinsurgency? “If you have not studied counterinsurgency theory, here it is in a nutshell: Counterinsurgency is a competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population. You are being sent in because the insurgents, at their strongest, can defeat anything with less strength than you. But you have more combat power than you can or should use in most situations. Injudicious use of firepower creates blood feuds, homeless people, and societal disruption that fuel and perpetuate the insurgency. The most beneficial actions are often local politics, civic action, and beat-cop behaviors. “For your side to win, the people don’t have to like you but they must respect you, accept that your actions benefit them, and trust your integrity and ability to deliver on promises, particularly regarding their security. In this battlefield, popular perceptions and rumor are more influential than the facts and more powerful than a hundred tanks. Within this context, what follows are observations from collective experience, the distilled essence of what those who went before you learned. They are expressed as commandments, for clarity, but are really more like folklore. Apply them judiciously and skeptically. […]” March 16^th, 2006 - Testimony 1 from Commanders on Strategy & Op. Requirements for FY 2007 Prepared statement by General John P. Abizaid, Commander, United States Central Command “[…] The focus of U.S. and Coalition military operations in Iraq has proceeded from invasion, to liberation, to “2006 is likely to be a year of significant transition in Iraq. The process of moving capable Iraqi forces to the forefront of fighting the insurgency has already begun. In liberating Tal Afar from extremist control last summer, 11 Iraqi battalions and five U.S. Army battalions carried the fight. Iraqi forces also took the lead in providing security for the December 2005 elections and in dealing with the post-Samarra bombing tensions. We will work to accelerate this transition in 2006. But shifting the balance of Iraqi forces to the forefront of the fight is not a simple task. If it is not done well, a security vacuum could develop in certain areas of the country, to be filled by terrorists and Saddamists. The timing of this transition should be dictated by sound strategy and an assessment of intangibles such as leadership, unit cohesion, and loyalty, not fixed timetables or other arbitrary deadlines. “The same holds true for CENTCOM recommendations on determining the appropriate number of U.S. troops in Iraq. Our long-term strategy in the region will not likely be furthered by the continuing presence of a large U.S. military footprint in the Middle East. But our current strategy would be undermined by a precipitous withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. The timing of when to reduce our forces in the region, therefore, becomes the crucial issue. Unexpected tensions or widespread violence could lead to a need for more American forces in Iraq. “CENTCOM recommendations on the issue of troop levels to our civilian leadership will continue to be based on conditions on the ground in Iraq, as well as an assessment of how the U.S. force posture in the region bolsters America’s national interest in the broader fight against terrorism and extremism. We have recently transitioned from 17 to 15 brigades in Iraq. To the extent U.S. forces in Iraq are further reduced during 2006, it will be the result of our troops and Iraqi forces increasingly meeting their objectives. […]” March 16^th, 2006 - Testimony 2 from Commanders on Strategy & Op. Requirements for FY 2007 Prepared statement by General Bryan D. Brown, Commander, United States Special Operations Command March 2006 - Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center January 2006 - Counterinsurgency and the Four Tools of Political Competition Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center January 2006 - Learning Counterinsurgency: Oberservations from Soldiering in Iraq Article by the Military Review, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center January 2005 - The 203d MI Battalion (Technical Intelligence) in Operation Iraqi Freedom Article by “Military Intelligence professional Bulletin”, Volume 31, Number 1, U.S. Army Intelligence Center 2005 - Annex E/Consolidated Rules of Engagement Memorandum by the U.S. Department of Defense “[…] 3.A. (U) General Guidance: This establishes the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for all forces under the control of Multi-National Division - Baghdad. Coalition Forces (CF) may establish more restrictive ROE in accordance with their national caveats. Conflicting ROE will be addressed on a case-by-case basis. “3.A.(1) (S//REL) US National Policy. United States Government (USG) National Policy for the Southwest Asia region is ‘Charlie.’ Take the initiative within the limits allowed by these ROE. “3.A.(2) (U) Military Policy. Commanders have the inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and to take all appropriate action in selfdefense of their units and other US Forces and Coalition Forces. “3.A.(3) (U) At all times, the requirements of necessity and proportionality will form the basis of the judgment of the on-scene commander (OSC) or individual as to what constitutes an appropriate response in self-defense to a particular hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent. “3.A.(4) (U) All personnel must ensure that, prior to any engagement, non-combatants and civilian structures are distinguished from proper military targets. “3.A.(5) (U) Positive Identification (PID) of all targets is required prior to engagement. PID is a reasonable certainty that the individual or object of attack is a legitimate military target in accordance with these ROE. “3.A.(6) (U) Military operations will be conducted, in so far as possible, to ensure that incidental injury to civilians and collateral damage to civilian objects are minimized. Strikes on infrastructure, lines of communication and economic objects should, to the extent possible, disable and disrupt rather than destroy. “3.A.(7) (U) Civilian structures, especially cultural and historic buildings, nonmilitary structures, civilian population centers, mosques and other religious places, hospitals and facilities displaying the red crescent or red cross, are protected structures and will not be attacked except when they are being used for military purposes. Targeting structures will be conducted in accordance with these ROE and the CDEM. US Forces will not utilize these protected structures for military purposes. “3.A.(8) (U) The use of force to accomplish authorized missions will be necessary and proportional, that is, reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude. “3.A.(9) (U) A commander must consider the assigned mission, the current situation, higher commander’s intent and all other available guidance in determining the level of force required for mission accomplishment. “3.A.(10) (S//REL) ROE POLICY. The ROE in this message are effective for the duration of operations in Iraq, as determined by SECDEF or CDR, CENTCOM, or until rescinded or amended by competent authority. “3.A.(11) (S//REL) APPLICABILITY. ROE, policies, guidance, and taskings in this message are applicable to all US Forces assigned to, or under the operational or tactical command and control of, CDRUSCENTCOM, while conducting military operations. […]”
Photo Credits Background 1) A young Iraqi man is handcuffed and blindfolded by an U.S. soldier in Mosul. - May 10^th, 2005 - Associated Press; War Scenes from Iraq 1) A young girl is waiting with her uncle for a doctor in Yarmuk hospital in Baghdad. American soldiers had killed her father and wounded her mother, when they were driving in their car. - May 14^th, 2005 - Associated Press; 2) Tariq Muhsin, with his daughter Noran, is talking to a doctor from the Yarmuk hospital while his wife Raja Hassan receives treatment for her gun wounds. The family had come under attack by American forces while driving in their car. - May 14^th, 2005 - Associated Press; 3) The remnants of civilian houses after an U.S. air strike on the village of Karabila. - June 11^th, 2005 - Associated Press;
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