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The
War Profiteers - War Crimes, Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
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The Story of “Curveball” - Rafid Ahmed
Alwan |
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“An alcoholic cousin of an aide to Ahmed Chalabi has
emerged as the key source in the US rationale for going to war in Iraq.
According to a US presidential commission looking into pre-war intelligence
failures, the basis for pivotal intelligence on Iraq's alleged biological
weapons programmes and fleet of mobile labs was a spy described as ‘crazy’ by
his intelligence handlers and a ‘congenital liar’ by his friends. The
defector, given the code-name Curveball by the CIA, has emerged as the
central figure in the corruption of US intelligence estimates on Iraq.
Despite considerable doubts over Curveball's credibility, his claims were
included in the administration's case for war without caveat. […]” - Excerpt
of a Guardian article
from April 3rd, 2005. |
Curveball/Rafid Ahmed Alwan (left) being
interviewed |
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June 28th, 2009 - Iraqi Whose Lies Made the Case
for War Looks on from Afar 1 news
article from the Guardian June 17th, 2008 - ‘Curveball’ Speaks, and a
Reputation as Disinformation Agent Remains Intact 1 news article by
the Los Angeles Times March 22nd, 2008 - How German Intelligence Helped
Justify the US Invasion of Iraq 3
feature articles by the Spiegel November 1st, 2007 - U.S. Program Unveils Man
Behind Iraq Weapons Story 1 news article by
Reuters October 16th, 2007 - The Man who Sold the War 1 feature article
by Salon Magazine November 20th, 2005 - How U.S. Fell Under the Spell
of ‘Curveball’ 1 news
article by the Los Angeles Times April 3rd, 2005 - US Relied on ‘Drunken Liar’ to
Justify War 1 news article by
the Guardian April 2nd, 2004 - Germans Accuse US Over Iraq
Weapons Claim 1 news
article by the Guardian |
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September 8th, 2006 - Report on the Postwar
Findings about Iraq’s WMD Programs Report by the U.S.
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence “[…] In the summer and fall of 2003, the Iraq Survey
Group (ISG) investigated whether Iraq had a mobile biological weapons program
as part of its overall investigation into Iraq’s WMD capabilities. The
primary focus was investigating sites and individuals identified by CURVE
BALL and later, CURVE BALL himself. The ISG located and debriefed over sixty
individuals who could have been involved in a mobile program, were linked to
suspect sites, or to CURVE BALL. “Many of the individuals corroborated some of the
reporting on personnel and some legitimate activities CURVE BALL claimed were
cover activities, but none provided evidence to substantiate the claim of a
mobile BW program. Inspections of the facilities CURVE BALL had described
also did not support his story. A CIA assessment dated May 26,2004 states
that ‘investigations since the war in Iraq and debriefings of the key source
indicate he lied about his access to a mobile BW production project.’ “The CIA and DIA jointly issued a congressional
notification in June 2004 noting that CURVE BALL was assessed to have
fabricated his claimed access to a mobile BW production project and that his
reporting had been recalled. “[…] During the ISG's investigation of CURVE BALL,
the group learned that CURVE BALL had a close relative who had worked for the
INC since 1992, for at least some period in a senior position. This
revelation, combined with the fact that CURVE BALL was determined to have
fabricated substantial portions of his reporting, led to suspicion that CURVE
BALL may have been coached on his story by the INC [Iraqi National Congress =
Iraqi opposition group led by Ahmed Chalabi]. […]” April 1st, 2005 - Statement of George J.
Tenet, Former Director of Intelligence Statement
by George J. Tenet “[…] I learned for the first time from the
Silberman-Robb Commission the account of a conversation that allegedly
occurred in late September or October of 2002 between a CIA Directorate of
Operations Division Chief and the representative of a foreign service
regarding a CIA request to secure direct access to Curveball. “The representative of the foreign service, it is
now reported, responded to CIA’s division chief responsible for relations
with the foreign service with words to the effect of ‘You do not want to see
him (Curveball) because he’s crazy.’ Speaking to him would be ‘a waste of
time.’ The representative reportedly went on to say that his service was not
sure whether Curveball was telling the truth; that he had serious doubts
about Curveball’s mental stability and reliability; and that Curveball had
had a nervous breakdown. Further the representative of the foreign service is
said to have worried that Curveball was ‘a fabricator’. The representative
reportedly cautioned the CIA division chief that the foreign service would
publicly and officially deny these views if pressed, because they did not
wish to be embarrassed. […]” April 1st, 2005 - Statement of John E.
McLaughlin Statement
by John E. McLaughlin “[…] I did not know prior to Secretary Powell's UN
speech that some of the information used in the biological weapons (BW)
section was the product of a likely fabricator, as suggested by some of the
testimony discussed in the Silberman-Robb Commission Report. I would never
have permitted the use of such material by the Secretary had I known this. In
fact, much of our time in the run-up to the speech was spent taking out
material, including much that had been added by the policy community after
the draft left the Agency, that we and the Secretary's staff judged to have
been unreliable. “With hindsight and the benefit of on-the-ground
investigation in Iraq, we now know that the specific material in question -
reporting from a source code-named Curveball, who alleged mobile production
of BW was underway - cannot be substantiated. It is difficult to reconstruct
every moment of deliberation during the tumultuous period leading up to the
Iraq war, but my predominant memory regarding this reporting is of receiving
assurances at the time that the information was credible. “I was told that the source had produced close to a
hundred reports - many highly technical in nature. The processes he described
had been assessed by an independent laboratory as workable engineering
designs. The UN had earlier come upon documentary evidence suggesting Iraq
was contemplating mobile production of BW. Although we did not have direct
access to the source, who was handled by a foreign intelligence service, that
service had joined US Intelligence Community officers and representatives of
two other foreign intelligence services in a quadrilateral conference in 2001
which had judged the reporting credible. Finally, the foreign service
handling the source had granted permission to cite the information publicly,
indicating, we thought, that it must have confidence in the reporting. These
are the main things I remember from discussions at the time. […]” March 31st, 2005 - Intelligence Capabilities
of the U.S. regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction Report
by the U.S. Silberman-Robb Commission “[…] The Intelligence Community assessed with ‘high
confidence’ in the fall of 2002 that Iraq ‘has’ biological weapons, and that
‘all key aspects’ of Iraq’s offensive BW program ‘are active and that most
elements are larger and more advanced than they were before the Gulf War.’
These conclusions were based largely on the Intelligence Community’s judgment
that Iraq had ‘transportable facilities for producing’ BW agents. That
assessment, in turn, was based largely on reporting from a single human
source. “Contrary to the Intelligence Community’s pre-war
assessments, the ISG’s post-war investigations concluded that Iraq had
unilaterally destroyed its biological weapons stocks and probably destroyed
its remaining holdings of bulk BW agent in 1991 and 1992. Moreover, the ISG
concluded that Iraq had conducted no research on BW agents since that time,
although Iraq had retained some dual-use equipment and intellectual capital.
The ISG found no evidence of a mobile BW program. “That Iraq was cooking up biological agents in
mobile facilities designed to elude the prying eyes of international
inspectors and Western intelligence services was, along with the aluminum
tubes, the most important and alarming assessment in the October 2002 NIE.
This judgment, as it turns out, was based almost exclusively on information
obtained from a single human source - codenamed ‘Curveball’ - whose
credibility came into question around the time of the publication of the NIE
and collapsed under scrutiny in the months following the war. This section
discusses how this ultimately unreliable reporting came to play such a
critical role in the Intelligence Community’s pre-war assessments about
Iraq’s BW program. […]” February 5th, 2003 - U.S.
Secretary of State adresses the U.N. Security Council Transcript
of Colin Powell’s speech before the United Nations “[…] One of the most worrisome things that emerges
from the thick intelligence file we have on Iraq's biological weapons is the
existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents. […]
The source was an eye witness, an Iraqi chemical engineer who supervised one
of these facilities. He actually was present during biological agent
production runs. He was also at the site when an accident occurred in 1998.
Twelve technicians died from exposure to biological agents. […] “A second source, an Iraqi civil engineer in a position
to know the details of the program, confirmed the existence of transportable
facilities moving on trailers. A third source, also in a position to know,
reported in summer 2002 that Iraq had manufactured mobile production systems
mounted on road trailer units and on rail cars. Finally, a fourth source, an
Iraqi major, who defected, confirmed that Iraq has mobile biological research
laboratories, in addition to the production facilities I mentioned earlier.
[…]” |
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The Extended World of Curveball |
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Colin Powell at the United Nations |
Non-existing WMD facilities |
August Hanning |
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Background 1)
Rafid Ahmed Alwan with reporter - probably 2007/2008 - The Spiegel magazine; The Extended World of Curveball 1)
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell during his presentation before the U.N.
Security Council with George Tenet and John negroponte in the background
listening - February 5th, 2003 - White House photo; 2)
Slide No. 20 of the presentation by then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell
before the U.N. Security Council. The caption of the official transcript
reads: “The trucks and train cars are easily moved and are designed to evade
detection by inspectors. In a matter of months, they can produce a quantity of
biological poison equal to the entire amount that Iraq claimed to have
produced in the years prior to the Gulf War.” - February 5th, 2003 - U.S.
Department of State; 3) August Hanning: former head of the German
intelligence service BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) - 2007 - Bundesministerium
des Innern/German Federal Ministry of Interior; |
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Department of Defense |
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