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The
War Profiteers - War Crimes, Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
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The
Killing of an Iraqi Adult Male & 2 Iraqi Children |
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Background - February 27th,
2006 March 7th, 2006 - Memorandum THRU Staff
Judge Advocate, MND-B, Camp Liberty, Iraq Report by the U.S.
Army, 2nd Brigade Combat Team & 502nd Infantry
Regiment, 101st Airborne Division “[…] 1. Summary of events: On 27 February 2006, 2/B/2-502
(‘Renegade 2’) was tasked to conduct route security on [redacted] (AO Strike
Force) in order to secure BN LOC’s and Patrol Base [redacted] (PBGS). The
Company Commander [redacted] issued the order to the 2/B platoon sergeant [redacted]
on 27 Feb. The security mission on this route is one that 2/B conducts every
three days for a 55-hour period. Prior to assuming RTE security, [redacted] received
a Battle Handover brief from the unit he was relieving and then briefed his
TL’s on his tactical plan. Although he did not specifically cover the Rules
of Engagement, the B/2-502 commander gave his entire company an updated ROE
class on 23 Feb 06. Moreover, [redacted] had issued in-depth patrol briefs
including ROE in the past for the same mission. Prior to every mission, he
alluded to these briefs. Furthermore, all gunners involved were qualified on
their assigned weapon system at the time of the incident. “At approximately 1430 hours on 27 February 2006,
2/B was in position to conduct its mission at the intersection of routes [redacted]
and [redacted] (MB 25610 63810). SSG Hobbs arrayed his M1114 vehicles in
positions where they could maximize observation with overlapping sectors of
fire. Renegade vehicle number 2-3A, lead by [redacted] was positioned on the
intersection of [redacted] and [redacted]. Renegade 2-3, commanded by [redacted]
was 500 meters West of the intersection on [redacted]. The remaining two
vehicles were positioned North of the intersection on [redacted]. The
intersection of [redacted] and [redacted] (approximately 50 - 100 meters South of and
perpendicular to [redacted]) has historically been an area of intense AIF
activity. On seven past occasions, 2-502 elements operating in the immediate
area have taken enemy fire. Additionally, B/2-502 had found caches in the
area containing AIF propaganda and insurgent TTPs about using civilians as
cover when attacking U.S. forces. “At approximately 1505 - 1508 hours, [redacted] vehicle
(Renegade [redacted]) received one round of RPG fire and a high volume of SAF
from approximately 200 meters Southwest of [redacted]. [redacted] was unable
to positively identify the shooter. However, he was able to see that the fire
was coming from behind and around a house 100-200 meters to his Southwest
(See Exhibit A). He reported the contact to [redacted] (Renegade 2 - 3) who
immediately maneuvered his M114 East on [redacted] to support [redacted][.] [redacted]
vehicle received 1 RPG before [redacted] arrived on scene, another as [redacted]
was en route, and a third once [redacted] arrived. The enemy small arms fire
was constant. [redacted] maneuvered his vehicle to the left of [redacted] in
a position where he could suppress the enemy fire. The exact moment that the
two vehicles returned fire is unclear. However, it is clear that both [redacted]
and [redacted] identified the direction and distance to the enemy and ordered
their gunners to engage on that area to suppress enemy fire. [redacted] dismounted
his vehicle and returned fire with his M4. Shortly after returning fire, [redacted]
gunner identified a dark colored van (See Exhibit B) parked where enemy fire
was coming from. The van was parked on the South side of a house on or near [redacted].
Based on the position of the vehicle, and his elevation as the gunner, [redacted]
was the only soldier who could see the vehicle at that time (See Exhibit C). [redacted]
believed that the enemy fire was either coming from the van or immediately
behind the van. Regardless, he concluded that the van was being used by the
AIF as either a firing platform or cover. [redacted] informed [redacted] that
he believed the van was the origin of the enemy SAF. [redacted] ordered [redacted]
to fire on the van and kill the enemy; [redacted] obeyed this order. At roughly the same time,
the van began driving East on [redacted] at a high speed. Once it began
moving, both gunners and both TC’s had visual contact with the van. [redacted]
[redacted] ([redacted] gunner) also opened fire on the van. According to
interviews and statements, either [redacted] or [redacted] ordered [redacted]
to fire. After firing on the van for approximately 2 - 10 seconds, the
vehicle in question stopped and both gunners ceased fire. A few seconds later;
however, the van continued to move, this time at a higher speed. The gunners,
again ordered by [redacted] reinitiated fire on the van for another 2 - 10
seconds and disabled it at [redacted] (see Exhibit D). In total, the gunners
fired roughly 50-100 rounds of 7.62 mm and 100-150 rounds of 5.56 mm (link)
ammunition. At this point, the patrol shifted its focus toward evaluating the
enemy situation and assessing battle damage. “[redacted] moved his vehicle I00 meters South to [redacted],
which separated his element from the van. He dismounted his soldiers but the
absence of a foot bridge prevented further movement toward the disabled van.
Though they could see the van through the canal vegetation, visibility was
not sufficient to conduct a battle damage assessment. Consequently, [redacted]
notified his higher headquarters and requested aviation support to assist in
the BDA. Attack Aviation arrived on scene at approximately 1520 hours and
reported that a crowd of local nationals was gathering around the vehicle. LONGBOW
attempted to disperse the crowd by firing an illumination flare. The D/2-502
commander [redacted] was located at PBGS and dispatched an element, including
the Battalion Commander and CSM, to move to the disabled vehicle and conduct
BDA. Upon arriving, the foot patrol confirmed that one local national adult
male and two chlldren occupied the vehicle. All three had been killed in the
exchange of fire. Moreover, there were no weapons or ammunition in the van.
However. D/2-502 did find a RPG round at [redacted] the same location of the
van when the patrol began taking fire. Following the BDA and procurement of
the RPG round, 2/B/2-502 remained in its original position to complete its
route security mission. […]” |
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