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The
War Profiteers - War Crimes, Kidnappings, Torture and Big Money |
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The Killing of Several Iraqi Civilians -
Location: not specified |
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Background - October 11th,
2005 October 13th, 2005 - Report of
Proceedings by Investigating Officer/Board of Officers Report by the U.S.
Department of the Army (6,1 MB) “[…] C/1-71 15-6 Investigation - Findings “On 11 October 2005, 4th PLT, C/1-71 was
conducting a three vehicle mounted patrol vicinity the [redacted] an area of
frequent enemy activity. At approximately 1900 hours, the patrol was
traveling south on Rte. [redacted] and made a left turn onto Rte. [redacted]
traveling east. The patrol leader’s (SSG) [redacted]) intent was to conduct
refit operations at the [redacted]. Upon making the left turn onto Rte.
[redacted] the patrol immediately recognized that friendly forces in the
[redacted] were engaging a civilian vehicle located in the westbound lane or
Rte. [redacted] approximately 100m from the patrol’s location. (Exhibits C1,
D1, E1, F1, H1, I1). Members of the patrol witnessed the [redacted] receiving
direct fire and saw what they believed to be muzzle flashes coming om the
suspected enemy vehicle. Subsequently, two of the patrol’s crew served
gunners engaged the vehicle, as it continued to move in the direction of the
U.S. patrol. The middle vehicle in the convoy initiated contact, followed
almost immediately by the trail vehicle in the convoy. When the patrol’s
leadership determined that the suspected enemy was no longer a threat, a
cease fire was called. Upon establishing security and conducting an initial
investigation, the patrol determined that all individuals in the vehicle were
unarmed and had been killed. A visual depiction of the engagement can be
found in Exhibit K. “After reviewing all sworn statements and
questioning the relevant parties, one can determine that the C/1-71 patrol
committed no wrongdoing. The patrol turned onto a road and immediately
encountered a fnendly force (IA and American forces in the [redacted]
engaging a vehicle with direct fire. It can be logically deduced that if
friendly forces have engaged a suspected enemy, positive identification has
been established. As a result, the C/1-71 patrol simply aided an adjacent
unit that was in contact with the enemy. Additionally, the patrol believed
there was an imminent threat from the suspected enemy (Exhibits C1, D1, E1,
F1, H1, I1), and acted well within established ROE critieria. “It is important to note that the incident occurred
during times of limited visibility, which would hinder the patrol’s ability
to determine whether individuals in the vehicle were armed. Furthermore, time
and distance analysis reveals that the patrol had very little time to assess
the situation. Upon making the turn onto Rte. [redacted] the patrol was
approximately 100m from the civilian vehicle, and shots were already being
fired from the [redacted] (Exhibits C1, D1, E1, F1, H1, I1). Consequently,
the incident is not an escalation of force issue, but rather an element
reading to contact. […]” |
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