The War Profiteers - The Blackwater Killings

“[…] I, the above-named appellant, hereby appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit from the above-stated judgment.

“[…] United States of America, Appellant […]”

January 19^th, 2010 - Memorandum Opinion

“[…] This matter is before the court on the motions of defendants Nicholas Slatten and Donald Ball (‘the defendants’) to dismiss the indictment against them with prejudice. The government obtained an indictment against the defendants and three other individuals, charging them with multiple counts of voluntary manslaughter and firearms violations based on their alleged role in a shooting that occurred in Baghdad, Iraq on September 16, 2007. On December 31, 2009, the court dismissed the indictment in its entirety because the government had failed to prove that it had not used compelled, immunized information in the course of obtaining the indictment.

“Although the court concluded that much of the government’s evidence was tainted, it did not bar the government from seeking another indictment based solely on untainted evidence. In the motions now before the court, defendants Slatten and Ball contend that the indictment should be dismissed against them with prejudice - meaning that the government could not attempt to re-indict them - because there is insufficient untainted evidence to support another indictment and because the prosecutors committed gross misconduct in obtaining the original indictment. Because the court finds no legal justification warranting dismissal with prejudice, the court denies the defendants’ motions. […]”

December 31^st, 2009 - Order & Memorandum Opinion

“[…] For the reasons stated in the court’s Memorandum Opinion separately and contemporaneously issued this 31st day of December, 2009, it is hereby ordered that the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment based on the government’s violations of Kastigar and Garrity is granted; and it is further ordered that the indictment is dismissed against all defendants; and it is ordered that the government’s motion to dismiss the indictment against defendant Slatten without prejudice is denied as moot. […]

“[…] The defendants have been charged with voluntary manslaughter and firearms violations arising out of a shooting that occurred in Baghdad, Iraq on September 16, 2007. They contend that in the course of this prosecution, the government violated their constitutional rights by utilizing statements they made to Department of State investigators, which were compelled under a threat of job loss. The government has acknowledged that many of these statements qualify as compelled statements under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), which held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination bars the government from using statements compelled under a threat of job loss in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Fifth Amendment automatically confers use and derivative use immunity on statements compelled under Garrity; this means that in seeking an indictment from a grand jury or a conviction at trial, the government is prohibited from using such compelled statements or any evidence obtained as a result of those statements. […]

“[…] In short, the government has utterly failed to prove that it made no impermissible use of the defendants’ statements or that such use was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the court must dismiss the indictment against all of the defendants. […]”

December 30^th, 2009 - Motion to File Def.s’ Submission Re New Evidence of Kastigar Violation

“[…] Defendants respectfully move for leave to file the accompanying Defendants’ Supplemental Submission Regarding New Evidence of Kastigar Violation.

“Pursuant to this Court’s scheduling order dated November 5, 2009, briefing following the Kastigar hearing was completed on November 25, 2009. As explained in the accompanying Supplemental Submission, on December 23, 2009, the Government submitted to the defense, in support of its proposed jury instructions, a citation to a source that recounts information that is concededly compelled under Garrity. Defendants respectfully seek to bring this new evidence of the prosecution’s continuing violation of Garrity and Kastigar to the Court’s attention through the accompanying six-page supplement.

“Defense counsel have conferred with the government’s Garrity counsel regarding this submission. Without taking a position on its substantive contents, the government has indicated its consent to this motion for leave to file the Supplemental Submission. Pursuant to this Court’s November 5, 2009 scheduling order, the Supplemental Submission will be filed under seal. […]”

December 18^th, 2009 - Government’s Motion to Exclude Out-Of-Court Legal Opinions

“[…] The United States, by and through its attorney, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, respectfully submits this Motion in Limine, seeking to preclude the presentation of evidence of any out-of-court statements of legal opinion made by members of Congress or the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government concerning the applicability of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (‘MEJA’), 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq. to private security contractors in Iraq. […]”

December 17^th, 2009 - Government’s Motion to Exclude Threat Evidence that is Irrelevant

December 16^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate Trial and for a Bench Trial

“[…] In the interest of promoting efficiency and a clear and effective presentation of the essential issues of this case, the Defendants move this Court to bifurcate the trial of this matter into two consecutive stages: first, a trial of the discrete and segregable threshold issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3261, 3267 (2006) (‘MEJA’), and second, trial of the remaining issues charged in the indictment. The Defendants also move this Court for a bench trial on the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction and agree to waive their right to a jury trial on that issue. For the reasons set forth below, we respectfully submit that trial in this fashion will allow the jury to address the actual conduct at issue without dramatically prolonging the trial or confusing the jury with first-impression issues that go to the applicability of the law rather than the truth or falsity of the conduct charged in the indictment. The Government has indicated that it would object to both a bifurcation and a judge-trial on the issue of the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. […]”

December 16^th, 2009 - Defendants Liberty & Slough’s Motion in Limine

“[…] Defendants Evan Liberty and Paul Slough, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and 404(b), to exclude the evidence described in the Government’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence Under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) (‘Notice’). The evidence that the Government seeks to introduce is character evidence offered to prove conduct in conformity therewith and, as such, is inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Moreover, the Government’s evidence fails the required balancing test pursuant to Rule 403. Defendant accordingly asks the Court to exclude the evidence relating to Mr. Liberty and Mr. Slough described in the Government’s Notice of Intention to Introduce Evidence Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). […]”

December 2^nd, 2009 - Defendants’ Reply Memorandum in Support to Dismiss the Indictment

“[…] The arguments made in support of the motion to dismiss the Indictment for failing to state an actionable defense have not previously been submitted to this Court for decision. The Indictment must be dismissed because it simply tracks the bare language of the statute and does not contain a statement of the facts and circumstances sufficient to inform the Defendants of the specific offense being charged. The Indictment does not satisfy the Constitutional requirement of written notice of the facts constituting the elements of the offense charged and these failures jeopardize the protections afforded to the Defendants by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that the facts constituting every element of the offense be fixed at the outset of the case, in the charging document voted by the Grand Jury. The Defendants have been denied these Constitutional protections and the Indictment must be dismissed for filing to state an offense under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. […]”

November 25^th, 2009 - Request for Status Conference

“[…] On behalf of Defendant Nicholas Slatten, the undersigned attorneys respectfully request a status conference with the Court to discuss the procedures Mr. Slatten’s counsel should follow in responding to the ‘Motion for Leave of Court to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice’ that the government filed under seal just before the close of business on Friday, Nov. 20.

“While the government filed its Motion for Leave to Dismiss under seal, it has described the grounds for dismissal in ways that unambiguously repeat the government's now-discredited allegations about what happened on September 16, 2007. This is, unfortunately, part of a pattern of conduct on the government's part - a pattern in which the government exaggerates the meaning of alleged inculpatory evidence and pretends that there is hardly any exculpatory evidence at all. Yet the collapse of the government's case against Mr. Slatten should be as public as the baseless allegations against him; he should not be required to endure the government's repeated public mischaracterization of the evidence while non-public proceedings tell a very different a story. […]”

November 18^th, 2009 - Govt.’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense

“[…] As described more fully below, the Court has already received briefing, heard argument, and considered the issue presented by the defendants’ motion, as it was raised in their prior motion to dismiss the indictment on jurisdictional grounds. […]

“[…] In their instant motion, the defendants inexplicably ignore the Court’s prior ruling on jurisdiction and two of the three decisions that the Court considered ‘informative and useful in the Court’s analysis’ […], namely the Hamling and Stavroulakis opinions. For the reasons that follow, the Court correctly denied the defendants’ prior motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds and should do so again. […]”

November 18^th, 2009 - Government’s Opposition to Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

“[…] The United States, by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and the undersigned attorneys, submits this opposition to the defendants’ jointly-filed motion to dismiss the indictment because the prosecutors allegedly ‘put before the grand jury erroneous legal instructions and legal arguments concerning the applicability of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.’ […]

“[…] The defendants also ask the Court to order the United States to disclose the transcripts of the prosecutors’ instructions to the grand jury relating to Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (‘MEJA’), 18 U.S.C. § 3261, et seq. Def. Mem. at 24. Neither request has any legal merit, and the defendants’ motion should be denied. […]”

November 16^th, 2009 - Order & Memorandum Opinion

“[…] This matter is before the court on the defendants’ motion for an order requiring the government to provide security measures for the defense team’s pretrial investigation in Iraq. The defendants contend that such measures are necessary to permit their counsel to properly investigate this case, which arises out of a shooting incident that occurred in Baghdad, Iraq. The defendants, who have never asserted an inability to finance their own security measures, have offered to reimburse or defray the government for the cost of providing such security measures. The government opposes the motion, noting that it has already provided the defendants with a list of private security companies licensed to operate in Iraq and that are principal providers of security services for U.S. government personnel in Baghdad. Furthermore, the government argues that this court lacks the authority to order the U.S. military to divert personnel and other resources from its current mission in Iraq to provide security to the defense team.

“Because the defendants have not demonstrated that the private security companies identified by the government cannot ensure the safety of the defense team, the court denies their request for an order requiring the government to provide security measures. The court, however, grants the defendants’ request that the government provide updated contact information for victims and witnesses in this case because there is a compelling need for the disclosure of such information. […]”

October 16^th, 2009 - Def.s’ Motion to Dismiss Due to Misinformation of Grand Jury re MEJA

“[…] Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2), Defendants, through counsel, move to dismiss the indictment for irregularity in the grand jury proceeding, to wit, the prosecutors’ mis-instruction of the grand jury regarding the applicability of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. In connection with this motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(3)(E)(ii), Defendants respectfully request that the Court order disclosure of the grand jury transcripts relating to the prosecution’s instructions and argument regarding the applicability of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.

“In the alternative, Defendants respectfully urge the Court to review closely those portions of the grand jury transcripts (which the government has already produced to the Court in camera) to determine whether the prosecutors indeed put before the grand jury erroneous legal instructions and legal arguments concerning the applicability of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.

“After conference between the parties, the Government has declined to consent to the relief sought herein. Defendants respectfully request oral argument on the motion. A proposed Order is attached. […]”

October 16^th, 2009 - Def.s’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State an Offense under MEJA

“[…] The Court should dismiss the Indictment in its entirety because the Indictment fails to state an offense under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (‘MEJA’ or the ‘Act’), with the specificity required by the United States Constitution, Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and applicable precedent.

“Every count of the Indictment alleges a violation of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, which criminalizes certain conduct overseas if that conduct is committed ‘while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States.’ […]. The Defendants here were not employees of the U.S. military - they were subcontracted by the State Department to provide diplomatic security for U.S. Embassy protectees in Baghdad. The statutory language which determines whether MEJA covers the conduct alleged in the Indictment, and thus whether the Indictment states an offense under the Act, is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(A)(ii)(II), which defines ‘employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States’ to mean, in relevant part, a subcontractor of ‘any other Federal agency, … to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.’ […]

“The Indictment in this case tracks the language of the statute, and alleges Defendants worked in Iraq, but it does not allege a single fact showing that Defendants’ contract employment ‘relate[d] to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense.’ Because such support of the Department of Defense is an essential element of an offense under the MEJA - indeed, is the element which makes extraterritorial conduct a federal offense - the failure to allege facts showing such support constitutes a failure to state an essential element of the offense.

“Where, as here, the Indictment fails to state an essential element of the offense, the Indictment fails to place Defendants on notice of what must be defended at trial, and also fails to show what conduct the grand jury indicted as an offense. In these circumstances, the Indictment must be dismissed. […]”

September 14^th, 2009 - Minute Order

“[…] Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina: Status Conference as to Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball held on 9/14/2009. Defendants’ presence is waived. Motion to Compel Discovery Under Rule 16 filed by the defendants, granted in part and denied in part. Motion to Compel the Production of Brady Material filed by the defendants, granted in part and denied in part. Motion for Reconsideration, denied without prejudice. […]”

September 7^th, 2009 - Government’s Notice of Intention to Introduce Evidence

“[…] In this case, the United States will seek to introduce evidence that in the year leading up to the events of September 16, 2007, several of the defendants had harbored a deep hostility toward Iraqi civilians which they demonstrated in words and deeds. The defendants’ demonstrated hostility toward Iraqi civilians bears directly on the defendants’ respective states of mind when they fired rounds at innocent civilians at Nisur Square on September 16, 2007. In addition to verbal expressions of hatred towards Iraqi civilians, the defendants engaged in unprovoked and aggressive behavior toward unarmed Iraqi civilians in Baghdad. In so doing, the defendants routinely acted in disregard of the use of force policies that they were required to follow as a condition of their employment as Blackwater guards. […]

“[…] These prior bad acts are relevant to establish that the defendants specifically intended to kill or seriously injure the Iraqi civilians that they fired upon at Nisur Square. These prior bad acts are also relevant to establish, at a minimum, that the defendants acted in conscious disregard of an extreme risk of death or serious bodily injury when they fired their weapons. Furthermore, these prior bad acts are relevant to refute the defendants’ anticipated defense of self defense. This evidence tends to establish that the defendants fired at innocent Iraqis not because they actually believed that they were in imminent danger of serious bodily injury and actually believed that they had no alternative to the use of deadly force, but rather that they fired at innocent Iraqi civilians because of their hostility toward Iraqis and their grave indifference to the harm that their actions would cause. […]

“[…] 1. During the twelve months proceeding the events charged in the indictment, while assigned to a turret gun position on the Raven 23 convoy operating at various locations in the Red Zone in Baghdad, Iraq, defendants Paul Slough, Nicholas Slatten and Evan Liberty routinely threw water bottles and other items at unarmed civilians, vehicles, wagons, and bicycles without justification in an attempt to break automobile windows, injure and harass people, and for sport, and in a manner that was inconsistent with the use of force and escalation of force policies that governed Blackwater personnel in Iraq. Among the items thrown were frozen oranges and frozen water bottles.

“2. On or about May 23, 2007, in the vicinity of Amanat City Hall in Baghdad, Iraq, near an intersection of the city known to Blackwater personnel as ‘Grey 55,’ defendant Evan Liberty discharged an automatic weapon from the turret of a Blackwater armored vehicle without aiming the weapon, and without regard for who might be struck by the rounds, and in a manner that was inconsistent with the use of force and escalation of force policies that governed all Blackwater personnel in Iraq.

“[…] 4. During the twelve months proceeding the events charged in the indictment, while assigned to the Raven 23 convoy operating at various locations in the Red Zone in Baghdad, Iraq, defendant Nicholas Slatten made statements that he wanted to kill as many Iraqis as he could as ‘payback for 9/11,’ and he repeatedly boasted about the number of Iraqis he had shot.

“5. During the twelve months proceeding the events charged in the indictment, while assigned to the Raven 23 convoy operating at various locations in the Red Zone in Baghdad, Iraq, defendant Nicholas Slatten deliberately fired his weapon to draw out return fire and instigate gun battles in a manner that was inconsistent with the use of force and escalation of force policies that governed Blackwater personnel in Iraq. […]”

September 4^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Response to the Government’s Motion for Clarification

“[…] For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the government’s motion for clarification and/or reconsideration. The Court should instead (1) hold in abeyance its August 6 Order compelling the government to provide a bill of particulars, (2) order the government to produce immediately, but no later than September 15, 2009, the statements of all witnesses with knowledge of the incident at Nisur Square within the possession or control of the government, and (3) grant Defendants leave to seek to enforce the August 6 Order or obtain other appropriate relief no later than the current motions deadline of October 16, 2009. […]”

August 24^th, 2009 - Reply to Govt.’s Opposition to Def.s’ Motion to Compel Discovery

“[…] Given the serious nature of the allegations in this case and the complex facts and circumstances on which those allegations are based, the categories of information discussed above should be disclosed to the Defendants immediately. The Government’s earlier assertions to the Court about its ability to be ready for trial by Fall were either disingenuous, or the Government is delaying the disclosure of important evidence to disadvantage the defense. The potential prejudice to the Defendants caused by the Government’s delay on these matters is substantial. We are entering the final five months before trial is scheduled to begin. The discoverable material addressed in this motion, once disclosed, will require investigation and analysis by the defense and its experts. The Defendants therefore respectfully request that this Court compel the Government to respond promptly and fully to the Defendants’ discovery requests set forth above. […]”

August 21^st, 2009 - Def.s’ Reply Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Compel

“[…] The Government is clearly attempting to prosecute the five defendants as an undifferentiated group. But each defendant is a young man whose guilt or innocence must be determined based on what he himself did on September 16, 2007. Each of those young men has a constitutional right to know about every piece of evidence that has any tendency to contradict the charges against him.

“The time for scrutinizing the Government’s theory of group criminality will come, but for now the question is simply one of disclosure under Brady. For the foregoing reasons, the Court should order the Government to disclose all exculpatory information within its possession, custody, or control, including without limitation the four categories of information discussed above. […]”

August 15^th, 2009 - Government’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Compel Discovery

“[…] In their Brady motion, the defendants also move to compel the production of ‘evidence that tends to identify a particular shooter for any alleged victim.’ […] The defendants argue that such evidence constitutes Brady material because, they contend, it ‘tends to rule out four or even five of the defendants as possible shooters’ with respect to that victim. […] The defendants claim that evidence of a particular shooter’s identity must be disclosed, because otherwise the jury will be called upon to speculate ‘about who shot whom and about whether the shooter received any discernible assistance from any defendant.’ […] The defendants assert that, ‘ultimately, the jury must decide who shot whom, and with what (if any) assistance, and the jury cannot properly decide those questions if the prosecution suppresses evidence in its possession that would help establish the actual facts.’ […]

“The defendants’ Brady demand for the identity of who among them shot a particular victim is without merit. It is not a request for exculpatory information, but rather a device intended to obtain a preview of the government’s inculpatory trial evidence.

“The indictment charges that the defendants, along with a joint offender, killed or wounded each of the named victims in the indictment. The identity of the defendants’ joint offender was disclosed early in the case through the unsealing of the Factual Proffer in support of Jeremy P. Ridgeway’s guilty pleas. Moreover, in a variety of court filings […], the United States disclosed to the defendants that the government’s evidence at trial will show that the defendants and Mr. Ridgeway opened fire with a sniper rifle, machine guns, and grenade launchers on unarmed civilians located in and around Nisur Square, killing at least fourteen people, wounding at least twenty people, and assaulting but not injuring at least eighteen others.

“To be clear, the government’s proof at trial will show that the defendants and Mr. Ridgeway were the six shooters at Nisur Square who killed or wounded the victims named in the indictment. The government’s evidence will show that the defendants and Mr. Ridgeway fired well over a hundred rounds of ammunition and several grenades at the victims in this case, thereby causing their respective deaths or injuries. The government’s evidence will further show that each defendant participated in this continuous criminal episode by firing his weapon or weapons. The United States will prove at trial that the six shooters identified in the indictment - and only those six shooters - caused the deaths of the named decedents and caused the injuries of the named survivors. […]”

August 7^th, 2009 - Criminal Scheduling Order

“[…] And it is further ordered that this case be set for:

“A Motions Hearing on December 11, 2009 at 10:00 a.m.;

“A Hearing on the Government’s Objections to the Defendants’ Use of Classified Material [on] January 7, 2010 at 9:45 a.m.;

“Jury Selection on January 25, 2010 at 10:00 a.m.; […]”

July 28^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Production of Brady Material

“[…] Paul Slough, Nicholas Slatten, Evan Liberty, Dustin Heard, and Donald Ball, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of the Defendants’ Motion to Compel the Production of Brady Material. In this prosecution for manslaughter and attempted manslaughter in a combat zone, Government prosecutors have knowingly suppressed evidence that directly supports the defendants’ most central claims about what happened in Nisour Square: specifically, about who shot whom, and why.

“For example, the Government is withholding - and claims it is entitled to continue withholding - evidence that some of the alleged victims named in the Indictment were shot by someone other than these defendants. Furthermore, despite the Government’s inflammatory press statements (for example, accusing the defendants of crimes against humanity), it is increasingly clear that information within the Government’s own possession, custody, and control affirmatively supports the defendants’ longstanding contentions that they were defending themselves under hostile fire from enemy insurgents in Nisour Square. The defendants also have reason to believe the Government is suppressing evidence that casts grave doubts on the quality of the Government’s investigation, including evidence of very large discrepancies in the number of dead and wounded thought by the Government to have been in Nisour Square on September 16, 2007. […]”

July 28^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Motion to Compel Discovery under Rule 16

“[…] Given the serious nature of the allegations in this case and the complex facts and circumstances on which those allegations are based, the information set forth above, should be disclosed to the Defendants immediately. At the initial arraignment on January 6, 2009, the government prosecutors urged this Court to schedule an earlier trial date and assured the Court the Government could meet its discovery obligations and be ready for trial. We are now six months beyond that arraignment date, and information that is vital to the defense has not been disclosed by the Government. The Government’s earlier assertions to the Court about its ability to be ready for trial were either disingenuous or the Government is deliberately delaying the disclosure of important evidence to disadvantage the defense. The potential prejudice to the Defendants caused by the Government’s delay is substantial. The Defendants must have this discovery information with enough time in advance of trial to be able to adequately investigate the Government’s case and prepare their defense. This information we seek has been in the possession of the Government for a long period of time and should be produced to the defense immediately.

“For these reasons, the Defendants respectfully request that pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2), this Court compel the Government to respond promptly and fully to the Defendants’ discovery requests as set forth above. […]”

July 13^th, 2009 - Joint Status Report

“[…] The parties respectfully submit this Joint Status Report in response to the Court’s July 8, 2009, request. In this Joint Status Report, the parties relay those issues where they have reached an agreement on a proposed schedule and those issues where there remains a disagreement. The parties have attempted to resolve these disputes through meeting and conferring. […]

“[…] Defendants respectfully request a date-certain as a cutoff for document productions and discovery. The Government represented to the Court at the arraignment that it could be ready to try this case in early September 2009. The Court set February 2010 as a trial date and admonished both sides to avoid any delay. While some discovery has been produced, the Government has represented that there is still more to be produced. The Government has been investigating this case for over two years through a Grand Jury. It has access to all of its evidence and there is no reason why it cannot be fully disclosed now. Moreover, this trial presents unique issues for the defense. The factual events and witnesses are located in Iraq, a place that remains very dangerous to travel to. Defendants require sufficient time to evaluate the Government’s discovery and investigate it in Iraq. While under ordinary circumstances, a discovery cutoff six months before trial may be early, in this case it is justified and is reasonably

necessary in order to hold the trial as scheduled. […]

“[…] The Government is opposed to the entry of an order imposing a discovery deadline on the Government. Such an order is premature on this record, where the defendants have not yet even filed a motion to compel, and the Government has demonstrated its good faith in meeting its discovery obligations by producing over 9,300 pages of documents, 3,945 photographs and diagrams, and 16 digital videos to the defendants in response to their discovery requests. […]”

May 12^th, 2009 - Stipulated Protective Order

“[…] The undersigned parties hereby stipulate, subject to the approval of the Court, to the following Protective Order which shall govern the handling of discovery materials described below in this case:

“1. The defendants have asserted that this case involves statements by the defendants to government agents concerning the September 16, 2007, shooting at Nisur Square in Baghdad, Iraq, and that these statements raise issues under Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), and its progeny. For purposes of this Order, these statements, in whatever form, will be referred to as ‘Potential Garrity Material.’ As a subset of the overall discovery material in this case, Potential Garrity Material is governed by the preexisting Protective Orders entered by the Court on March 5 and April 13, 2009. […] To avoid any unwarranted disclosure of Potential Garrity Material, the undersigned counsel agree to the following additional handling procedures for discovery of this material.

“2. Regarding the defendants’ written statements and recorded oral statements concerning the Nisur Square shooting, the United States shall produce to each defendant only his individual statement(s). Documents labeled ‘Potential Garrity Material’ and the contents thereof shall not be provided to potential government or defense witnesses, other co-defendants, or potential jurors. Copies of material labeled ‘Potential Garrity Material’ may be provided to third parties employed or engaged for the purpose of this litigation, assisting in the preparation, trial and appeal of this matter, who shall be informed of the existence of this Order. The parties agree to serve a copy of this Order and the preexisting Protective Orders […] on any such third parties to whom Potential Garrity Material will be disseminated. The parties also agree to maintain a record of any disclosure to third parties, including the date such disclosure was made.

“3. Any party to this litigation may apply to the Court for an order specifically permitting other disclosure.

“4. Any violation of the terms of this Order may result in the imposition of contempt sanctions against the violator. […]”

April 13^th, 2009 - Protective Order

“[…] Based on a recent news article using leaked information from an unknown source, the government’s motion for a protective order, the defendants’ opposition and the government’s reply, it is this 13^th day of April, 2009, hereby ordered that government’s motion is granted in part and denied in part; and it is further ordered that

“1. The United States has and will provide to the defendants copies of material pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Brady v. Maryland, 373 […]. The purpose of providing these copies is for the use by the defendants and their attorneys to prepare their defense. The original material is not deemed publicly filed as a result of the copies provided to the defense. […]”

April 10^th, 2009 - Govt.’s Reply to Defendants’ Response to Motion for Protective Order

“[…] While the defendants are correct in pointing out that the ‘substantive dispute’ between the parties on the protective order is ‘narrow,’ […], the disagreement concerns the critical issue as to whether the protective order will place any enforceable limitations on who may receive copies of discovery material in this case. The defendants’ proposed order does not even address the very harm that led to the filing of the Government’s motion, and leaves the door wide open for third parties to do the same thing with Garrity-protected material once those statements are disclosed to the defendants pursuant to the discovery process.

“We respectfully request that the Court enter the Government’s proposed order so that discovery may immediately be resumed in this case. […]”

April 9^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Response to the Government’s Motion for a Protective Order

“[…] Defendants, through counsel, respectfully respond to the Government’s motion for a protective order. In its motion, the Government unfairly, and without support, accuses defense counsel of media leaks in which defense counsel had no role. To be clear and unequivocal: member of the Defense team had any role, direct or indirect, in the disclosure of the FBI reports that prompted the Government’s current motion. As Defense counsel have stated repeatedly to the Government and the Court, Defense counsel are aware of this Court’s view media disclosures and of their corresponding obligations, and have conducted themselves accordingly, without equivocation or evasion. The Defense has not been the source for the AP’s recent reporting, and does not know where or how the AP received its information. […]”

April 6^th, 2009 - Government’s Motion for a Protective Order

“[…] The United States, by and through its attorney, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for issuance of a protective order regarding the handling of discovery material that has been and will be disclosed by the United States to the defendants. In support of its motion, the United States relies on the following points and authorities and such other points and authorities as may be cited at any hearing on this motion. A proposed Order is attached. […]”

March 5^th, 2009 - Protective Order

“[…] This matter comes before the Court upon the Government’s Unopposed Motion for a Protective Order to prevent the unauthorized use, disclosure or dissemination of classified national security information and documents which will be reviewed by, or made available to, or are otherwise in the possession of, defense counsel in this case.

“Pursuant to the authority granted under Section 3 of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3 (1994) (‘CIPA’); the Security Procedures Established Pursuant to Pub. L. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, by the Chief Justice of the United States for the Protection of Classified Information (reprinted following CIPA Section 9; hereinafter referred to as the ‘Security Procedures’); Rules 16(d) and 57 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; the general supervisory authority of the Court; and in order to protect the national security:

“It is hereby ordered:

“1. The Court finds that this case will involve classified national security information, the storage, handling and control of which, by law or regulation, requires special security precautions, and access to which requires a security clearance and a ‘need-to-know.’

“2. The purpose of this Order is to establish the procedures that must be followed by all defense counsel of record, their designated employees, all other counsel involved in this case, translators for the defense, any Court personnel, and all other individuals who receive access to classified information or documents in connection with this case.

“3. The procedures set forth in this Protective Order and CIPA shall apply to all pre-trial, trial, post-trial, and appellate aspects of this case, and may be modified from time to time by further order of the Court acting under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(d); Sections 3 and 9 of CIPA; and the Court’s inherent supervisory authority to ensure a fair and expeditious trial. […]”

February 25^th, 2009 - Order

“[…] Based upon the representations made in the Joint Motion of the United States and the Defendants for a Second Exclusion of Time under the Speedy Trial Act filed on February 25, 2009, it is this 25^th day of February, 2009, hereby found that the parties have established by a preponderance of evidence that the abovecaptioned case is one that is unusual and complex due to the number of defendants, the number of counts charged in the indictment, and the nature of the prosecution involving events that occurred overseas, and that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for both pretrial proceedings and for the trial itself to be commenced within the seventy (70) day time limit of 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (c)(1), and therefore it is ordered that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(7)(B)(ii), the period of time from the date of the last court hearing on February 17, 2009, through the currently scheduled trial date of February 1, 2010, shall be excluded in computing the time within which the trial of these offenses must commence. So ordered. […]”

February 25^th, 2009 - Joint Motion for Second Exclusion of Time under the Speedy Trial Act

“[…] The United States of America, by and through the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and the defendants, Paul Slough, Nick Slatten, Evan Liberty, Dustin Heard, and Donald Ball, through their counsel, respectfully move this Court to exclude additional time from the period of time within which the trial of this matter must commence based on the unusual and complex nature of this case. […]”

February 17^th, 2009 - Minute Entry for Proceedings

“Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina: Motion Hearing as to Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball held on 2/17/2009 re Motion to Dismiss Case filed by Donald Wayne Ball, Paul Alvin Slough, Dustin Laurent Heard, Evan Shawn Liberty, Nicholas Abram Slatten, heard and denied. Joint Motion to Dismiss Case for Lack of Venue filed by Dustin Laurent Heard, heard and denied. Bond Status of Defendant: Defendants on PR Bond. […]”

February 12^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Reply to Government’s Response to Defendants’ Notice

“[…] The Defendants, through undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this brief Reply to the Government’s Response to our notice regarding the presentation of evidence at the February 17, 2009 motions hearing. The parties are in complete agreement as to the propriety of the Court considering extrinsic evidence. The Government’s sole objection to the Defendants’ stated intention to call Jeremy P. Ridgeway as a witness at the February 17, 2009, therefore, is based on its claim that the Defendants have no right to a ‘pretrial contested evidentiary hearing’ on their venue motion. […] The flaw in the Government’s reasoning is its misconception that the Defendants are seeking a pretrial contested evidentiary hearing. That is not what Defendants seek in calling Mr. Ridgeway as a witness at the motions hearing. The Defendants seek the admission of extrinsic evidence in the form of Mr. Ridgeway’s testimony that will permit the Court to resolve the venue issue and as we described earlier, there are powerful reasons why, in the interest of justice, the Court should resolve the issue now. Extrinsic evidence to establish venue is necessary here because the indictment alleges no facts from which this Court could conclude that venue is proper in this District. […]”

February 12^th, 2009 - Govt.’s Response to Def.s’ Notice of Intention to Present Evidence

“[…] The United States, by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and the undersigned attorneys, respectfully responds to the defendants’ jointly-filed Notice to Present Evidence at the Hearing on February 17, 2009. […] In their Notice, the defendants claim entitlement to call Jeremy P. Ridgeway as a defense witness at next Tuesday’s hearing on their venue motion […] The defendants’ Notice is meritless. […]

“[…] The defendants’ Notice is vague about what exactly they intend to elicit from Mr. Ridgeway and why. To the extent that the defendants say anything at all, they claim that they seek to introduce evidence through Mr. Ridgeway about ‘whether Mr. Ridgeway was ‘arrested’ and his status as a ‘joint offender.’’ […] These components of venue are not proper subjects for a pretrial contested evidentiary hearing for the reasons discussed above. […]”

February 11^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Notice of Intention to Present Evidence at Motion Hearing

“[…] In response to the Court’s Order of February 10, 2009, Defendants respectfully submit this Notice of Intent to present evidence at the February 17, 2009 hearing in support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Venue. Defendants seek to introduce limited evidence, through the testimony of Jeremy P. Ridgeway, which is directly material to the venue motion, namely: whether Mr. Ridgeway was ‘arrested’ and his status as a ‘joint offender.’ For reasons stated more fully below, pursuant to the plain text of Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and case law, it is appropriate for the Court to consider extrinsic evidence at this stage of the proceedings to promote judicial economy and to avoid the unnecessary risk of multiple trials. […]”

February 10^th, 2009 - Order

“[…] Order signed by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina on February 10, 2009, as to Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball directing that on or before 2/11/2009 at 5:00 pm, the defendants notify the the Court whether they intend to present evidence at the motions hearing scheduled for 2/17/2009, and if so, provide a legal basis for presenting evidence at this stage of the proceedings, […] Government’s response to the defendants’ notice is due on or before 2/12/2009 at 12:00 pm and defendants’ reply thereto is due on or before 5:00 pm that same day. […]”

February 9^th, 2009 - Order

“[…] The Center on Administration of Criminal Law (the ‘Center’) submitted a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae memorandum of law ‘to assist the Court in deciding the jurisdictional issue presented.’ […] After reviewing the motion, opposition and reply and comparing the Center's proposed memorandum of law with the government's submissions, the court declines to grant leave to file because the Center's proposed memorandum ‘essentially duplicates a party’s brief.’ […] Accordingly, it is this 9^th day of February 2009, hereby ordered that the Center’s motion for leave to file is denied. […]”

February 5^th, 2009 - Reply Memo. in Support of Motion for Participation as Amicus Curiae

“[…] The Center on the Administration of Criminal Law offers this brief Reply to the Defendants’ Opposition to the Center’s motion for leave to participate as amicus curiae on the issue of jurisdiction.

“1. The Defendants assert that the Center is not a friend of the Court but is ‘an advocate for the Government’ with ‘interest in this case ... informed by [its] prejudgment of the Defendants’ guilt." […] This assertion is untrue. The Center is an apolitical, nonpartisan organization devoted to promoting good government and prosecution practices in criminal justice matters. The Center’s positions in litigation matters, including this case, are determined by an objective and dispassionate evaluation of applicable law, not partisanship. In this case, the Center takes no position on the guilt or innocence of the defendants. Its interest in this case is solely in seeing that the jurisdictional regime enacted by Congress is vindicated, because that statutory scheme ensures that serious crimes do not go uncharged because of jurisdictional gaps. In the Center’s view, whether the defendants are guilty of the charges they face is a matter for a jury. The Center’s position is solely that the United States has jurisdiction under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (‘MEJA’) to prosecute this case.

“2. The Defendants assert that the Center has ‘parrot[ed]’ the Government’s brief. […] As an initial matter, we assure the Court that the two briefs were drafted entirely separately and that no drafts were shared between the Government and the Center at any time. Moreover, the briefs were filed on the same day to guarantee that the defendants would have as much time to reply to the Center’s brief as the Court had given them to reply to the Government’s brief. […]”

February 4^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Opposition to Motion of Center on the Admin. of Crim. Law

“[…]The motion of The Center on the Administration of Criminal Law (‘The Center’) for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the United States should be denied. It is rare - and perhaps unprecedented - for an amicus curiae, in a pretrial criminal proceeding, to seek leave to add its resources to the nearly unlimited resources of the United States government. Yet, The Center professes to possess helpful insights as ‘the first and only organization dedicated to defining good government practices in criminal prosecutions through academic research, litigation, and participation in the formulation of public policy.’ […] The United States, however, already has an organization dedicated to good government practice in criminal prosecutions: the United States Department of Justice. The DOJ, sometimes called the ‘world’s largest law firm,’ has divisions with hundreds of lawyers whose mission is to promote good practice in prosecution through research, litigation, and public policy. The DOJ of course is already well represented before this Court.

“The Center offers no unique insights on the legal issue before the Court. Indeed, The Center’s brief is simply a poor duplicate of the brief filed by the Government in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. As such, The Center will not aid the Court and its motion for leave to file an amicus brief should be denied. […]”

February 4^th, 2009 - Motion of the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law

“[…] The Center on the Administration of Criminal Law (‘the Center’) is the first and only organization dedicated to defining good government practices in criminal prosecutions through academic research, litigation, and participation in the formulation of public policy. The Center was founded because, although prosecutorial discretion is the central issue in criminal justice today at all levels of government, there is a dearth of research on how prosecutors exercise their discretion, how they should exercise their discretion and what mechanisms could be employed to improve prosecutorial decisionmaking. The Center aims to fill this gap by dedicating itself to identifying the best prosecutorial practices and suggesting avenues of reform. The Center’s litigation component aims to use its expertise and experience with criminal justice and prosecution to assist in important criminal justice cases at all levels. The Center’s litigation practice concentrates on cases in which the exercise of prosecutorial discretion raises significant substantive legal issues.

“This case presents an important issue of first impression regarding the scope of federal prosecutors’ extra-territorial power over private contractors who operate abroad in war zones. The Center submits that Congress intended private contractors who commit crimes while supporting the mission of the Department of Defense to be subject to U.S. criminal jurisdiction. The Center seeks to preserve the government's ability to exercise its prosecutorial power to the full extent contemplated and permitted by Congress in this context. […]”

February 3^rd, 2009 - Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

“[…] The fundamental issue before the Court, recognized by both sides, is whether Raven 23’s employment in Iraq related to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense. If it did, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (‘MEJA’) arguably provides jurisdiction. If it did not, jurisdiction is unarguably absent, and the Indictment must be dismissed. As the Defendants’ Memorandum in support of this motion noted […], a blue-ribbon panel of the State Department has already determined MEJA does not provide a basis for prosecution here.

“Now, that conclusion has received fresh support from none other than the Department of Defense. In two December 2007 letters that were produced only this past week (in response to Defendants’ request for exculpatory information relating to jurisdiction), the number two official in the Defense Department, responding to congressional inquiries regarding the Nisur Square incident, stated that ‘these private security contractors were not engaged in employment supporting the DoD mission overseas and, therefore, are not subject to Federal criminal prosecution under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.’ Yesterday, a Defense Department spokesman publicly confirmed that this view remains the view of the Defense Department today.

“Thus, both State and Defense have concluded Defendants’ conduct here did not relate to supporting Defense’s mission, and thus does not fall within the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act. That conclusion is also shared by former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice; the Government Accountability Office; the Congressional Budget Office; Representative David Price and fifteen co-sponsoring members of the House of Representatives; the House Judiciary Committee; Senator Leahy; and then-Senator, now President Barack Obama. […]”

February 3^rd, 2009 - Defendant’s Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Venue

“[…] The Defendants, jointly and through undersigned counsel, submit this Reply to the Government’s Opposition to our motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue. Under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court must dismiss an indictment (or separate counts within it) ‘where [there are] material facts [that] are undisputed and only an issue of law is presented.’ […] Here, the Government has proffered the material facts that it contends require resolution of the venue issue in its favor. At this time, the Defendants do not seek to challenge the accuracy of those facts (although they reserve the right to do so at trial if necessary). The Defendants do, however, dispute the legal consequences, for purpose of venue, of those proffered facts. In that posture, the venue issue can and should be adjudicated pretrial by the Court, a point the Government appears to concede. […]”

January 28^th, 2009 - Government’s Notice of Filing of Two Additional Exhibits

“[…] In support of its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction […], the United States respectfully submits two additional exhibits that illustrate how the activities of the Department of State support the military mission of the Department of Defense in the Republic of Iraq. The first exhibit is an excerpt of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, which mandated that the President of the United States submit a quarterly report to Congress on the Iraq war effort detailing ‘[t]he current military mission and the diplomatic, political, economic, and military measures that are being or have been undertaken to successfully complete or support that mission ... including ... (C) Strengthening the capacity of Iraq’s government ministries[, and] (D) Accelerating the delivery of basic services.’ […]

“The second exhibit is a Report to Congress prepared by the Department of State and submitted to Congress on April 6, 2006, in compliance with that same statute. See ‘Report to Congress Submitted pursuant to U.S. Policy in Iraq Act, Section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (PL 109-163),’ attached hereto as Government’s Exhibit 6. In particular, we note that, at pages 5 and 6, the State Department Report emphasizes that ‘[d]eveloping effective national and provincial governance in Iraq is a key component of Iraqi self-reliance and defeating the insurgency,’ and describes how various State Department-led reconstruction and assistance projects, for which Blackwater Worldwide provided security under Task Order 6, support that goal. […]”

January 27^th, 2009 - Jeremy Ridgeway’s Response to Government’s Notice to Court

“[…] Jeremy P. Ridgeway, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this brief in response to the Government’'s Notice to the Court Regarding Potential Conflict-of-Interest Issue (‘Conflict Notice’) […] and the Defendants’ Responses thereto: the ‘Coffield Response’ […] and the ‘Defendants’ JDA Response’ […], and in support thereof states as follows:

“[…] The Government’s notice advises the Court of potential conflicts of interest relating to (1) Mr. Coffield’s prior representation of Mr. Ridgeway in this matter, and (2) the oral joint defense agreement in which the Defendants and Mr. Ridgeway previously participated, and which we understand remains operative between the Defendants (hereinafter, ‘the IDA’).

“Before addressing the specifics of the three briefs filed to date, we note that undersigned counsel has prepared this submission under significant constraints. We have engaged in a detailed review of this Circuit’s law governing attorney client privilege, work product, the common-interest doctrine, and JDAs. While the law governing privilege and work product issues is robust, there is a paucity of authorities in this Circuit concerning common interest and joint defense issues and, as a result, we are concerned about the possibility of divulging potentially protected information in a public pleading. No opinion from any court of the D.C. Circuit has yet to clearly articulate whether the parties, terms, and related facts are, in fact, privileged infomation protected by the JDA or, alternatively, public information that is disclosable. […]”

January 27^th, 2009 - Govt.’s Opposition to Def.s’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

“[…] The United States, by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and the undersigned attorneys, submits this opposition to the defendants’ jointly-filed motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of jurisdiction under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (‘MEJA’), 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq. […]

“The defendants’ motion should be denied because it is predicated upon defense prognostications of what evidence will be presented at trial regarding jurisdiction, rather than the question that is germane to a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment - whether the four corners of the indictment properly allege the offenses charged. Whether the United States can satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of MEJA is, like any other element of the offense, a fact question to be resolved at trial. Moreover, the defendants’ claims that the United States cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of MEJA in this case are based upon a misreading of the statute that, in effect, adds additional elements that are neither found in nor implied by its plain terms.

“As we show below, the indictment properly alleges a violation of MEJA and the evidence that the United States intends to introduce at trial to support such allegations - whose broad contours we outline in this submission - fully satisfy the statutory requirements. Finally, nothing in the legislative history of MEJA, the rule of lenity or the presumption against extraterritoriality require the Court to ascribe a narrower construction of the jurisdictional component of the MEJA statute than its plain language provides. […]”

January 27^th, 2009 - Govt.’s Opposition to Def.s’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Venue

“[…] The United States, by the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia and the undersigned attorneys, submits this opposition to the defendants’ jointly-filed motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue. […] Relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3265(a)(2) and Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the defendants request an evidentiary hearing as to any contested facts related to venue. […] As explained more fully below, 18 U.S.C. § 3238 governs venue in this case because the offenses charged in the indictment occurred entirely outside of the United States. Pursuant to section 3238, venue properly lies in this District because a joint offender of the defendants, Jeremy P. Ridgeway, was arrested here. The defendants have no entitlement to an evidentiary hearing, and the Court need not conduct any such hearing, because venue in this District was properly pled in the indictment and the relevant court documents and proffered facts establish venue here. […]”

January 25^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Response to Government’s Notice to Court

“[…] The Defendants, jointly and through undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this response to the ‘Government’s Notice to the Court Regarding Potential Conflict-of-Interest Issue.’ The Government’s Notice purports to advise the Court of potential conflicts of interest that may arise in this case for two reasons: (1) The existence of a joint defense agreement that at one time included counsel for Jeremy P. Ridgeway, who has pled guilty in a separate case and agreed to cooperate as a Government witness against these Defendants, and (2) The claim that Mr. Ridgeway was represented for a very short period of time by William F. Coffield, who currently represents defendant Evan S. Liberty. Because these are two discrete and separate issues, defense counsel will file two separate responses addressing each of the Government’s claims. In this response, filed on behalf of all five defendants, we show that there is no conflict based upon the existence of a joint defense agreement that at one time included Mr. Ridgeway and his counsel. […]”

January 25^th, 2009 - Defendant Liberty’s Response to the Government’s Notice to the Court

“[…] Counsel for defendant Evan Shawn Liberty respectfully submits this response to the ‘Government’s Notice to the Court Regarding Potential Conflict-of-Interest Issue.’ The Government’s Notice purports to advise the Court of potential conflicts of interest that may arise in this case for two reasons: (1) The existence of a joint defense agreement that at one time included counsel for Jeremy P. Ridgeway, who has pled guilty in a separate case and agreed to cooperate as a Government witness against these Defendants, and (2) the claim that Mr. Ridgeway was represented for a very short period of time by undersigned counsel, William F. Coffield, who currently represents defendant Evan S. Liberty. Because these are two discrete and separate issues, undersigned counsel is filing this response to address the second issue. A separate response will be filed on behalf of all five defendants, with regard to the joint defense agreement that at one time included Mr. Ridgeway and his counsel. […]”

January 20^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Motion for a Bill of Particulars

“[…] Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully move this Court, pursuant to Rule 7(f) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to direct the Government to file a bill of particulars in the above-captioned case. The particulars sought are as follows:

“1. Specify the particulars for the allegation that ‘[t]he defendants ... employment related to supporting the mission of the United States Department of Defense in the Republic of Iraq.’ […]

“2. Specify what act or acts (or what omission or omissions) were allegedly performed (or not performed) by each Defendant and the alleged ‘joint offender known to the Grand Jury’ to ‘commit voluntary manslaughter, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1112, by killing’ Ahmed Haithem Ahmed Rubia’y. […]”

January 16^th, 2009 - Notice of Filing of Redacted Pleadings and Court Orders

January 13^th, 2009 - Order

“[…] ordered that the Joint Defense Motion to Unseal Proceedings Pertaining to Motion to Quash Grand Jury Subpoenas is granted; and it is further ordered that the Clerk of the Court unseal the papers, orders and transcripts of hearings pertaining to the motions to quash the grand jury subpoenas for lack of jurisdiction after the information is appropriately redacted by the govement to protect the names and confidentiality of any witnesses. […]”

January 13^th, 2009 - Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

“[…] Using unprecedented tactics, the United States Department of Justice has charged American civilians defending their lives in a foreign war zone with criminal offenses under U.S. law. Compounding the unprecedented nature of this prosecution, the Government has charged State Department security contractors with 30-year-mandatory-minimum firearm offenses for using firearms selected and issued by the U.S. Government, which the State Department required them to carry. Most fatally to its effort to break new ground in extraterritorial prosecution, the Government has based jurisdiction over conduct that occurred in wartime Iraq on a statute that by its plain terms does not apply to these Defendants.

“Donald Ball, Dustin Heard, Nicholas Slatten, Paul Slough, and Evan Liberty are young American men - distinguished, decorated veterans of the U.S. military - engaged by Blackwater USA to provide protection to U.S. State Department personnel deployed in Iraq. On September 16, 2007, a massive car bomb detonated near an Iraqi government building outside the Green Zone where an American civilian was visiting under the protection of a Blackwater security detail operating under the command of the U.S. Embassy’s Regional Security Officer, part of the Department of State. The Defendants are members of a second Blackwater detail (‘Raven 23’), also under State Department command, that responded to facilitate the safe return of the American civilian and her Blackwater protectors.

“Raven 23 proceeded to Nisur Square, also outside the Green Zone and near the scene of the explosion, to secure the traffic circle there and allow the safe passage of the first Blackwater detail. Shortly after Raven 23 entered Nisur Square, it was threatened by what its members perceived to be a vehicle borne improvised explosive device, i.e., a car bomb attack. Raven 23 became engaged in a two-way firefight in which it is alleged that several Iraqi non-combatants were killed or wounded. The disputed circumstances of that firefight are at the heart of this case. This Court need not resolve any dispute regarding the Nisur Square firefight, however, for a simple reason: the statute on which the Government relies for extraterritorial jurisdiction plainly does not reach the Defendants in this case. That statute, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261 et seq. (2006), extends the reach of American criminal laws, which ordinarily do not apply beyond U.S. borders, to cover contractors who work for the Department of Defense or whose work for another federal agency supports the mission of the Department of Defense overseas. […]

“The Defendants here do not fall within the plain and unambiguous terms of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, because their contractual work did not support the mission of the Department of Defense. Their contractual mission - performed pursuant to a contract with the State Department, under the supervision of State Department officers - is to provide armed protection to civilian State Department personnel. Although Department of State personnel must travel and work in dangerous, hostile areas of Iraq, and consequently need armed protection, the mission of the State Department - to ‘[c]reate a more secure, democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the American people and the international community’ - is very different from the Defense Department’s mission ‘to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country.’ The specific contract work at issue here – the provision of diplomatic security - is a diplomatic, not military, function. […]”

January 13^th, 2009 - Government Response to Joint Defense Motion to Unseal Proceedings

“[…] The United States is not opposed to unsealing the materials described in the defendants’ motion, provided the names of any witnesses are completely redacted therefrom, and any text that describes the witnesses is also removed. The United States is in the process of preparing a redacted version of the pleadings and court orders for submission to chambers, ex parte and under seal. The United States does not have a copy of any transcripts from the proceedings before the Chief Judge in this matter, but will order a copy of the same. […]”

January 12^th, 2009 - Joint Defense Motion to Unseal Proceedings

“[…] Pursuant to Local Criminal Rule 6.1, Defendants Paul Slough, Nicholas Slatten, Evan Liberty, Dustin Heard, and Donald Ball, though undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this motion to unseal any papers, orders, and transcripts of hearings pertaining to any motions to quash, for lack of jurisdiction, subpoenas issued in connection with the grand jury’s investigation of the September 16, 2007, incident at Nisour Square, Baghdad, Iraq. The Defendants requested that the Government make this information available.

“The jurisdictional challenge to the grand jury’s subpoenas is the same challenge the Defendants have raised to the Indictment. The Defendants expressed to the Government that they have no interest in learning the identities of the witnesses who moved to quash the subpoenas. The Defendants are interested only in the legal issues presented to the Court and the Court’s rationale for its order. Notwithstanding, the Government has stated it opposes our request. Continued secrecy of these ancillary proceedings, however, is not necessary to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury. The reasons supporting the Defendants’ motion are set forth below. […]”

January 7^th, 2009 - Notice of Filing of Proposed Order to Exclude Time

“[…] Pursuant to the representations made by the Government and counsel for the defense at yesterday’s arraignment in the above-captioned case, the Government submits the attached proposed order to exclude time under the Speedy Trial statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et al. […]”

January 6^th, 2009 - Minute Entry for Proceedings Held Before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina

“Arraignment as to Paul Alvin Slough Count 1-14,15-34,35; Nicholas Abram Slatten Count 1-14,15-34,35; Evan Shawn Liberty Count 1-14,15-34,35; Dustin Laurent Heard Count 1-14,15-34,35; Donald Wayne Ball Count 1-14,15-34,35 held on 1/6/2009. Plea not guilty entered by Paul Alvin Slough Count 1-14,15-34,35; Nicholas Abram Slatten Count 1-14,15-34,35; Evan Shawn Liberty Count 1-14,15-34,35; Dustin Laurent Heard Count 1-14,15-34,35; Donald Wayne Ball Count 1-14,15-34,35. 1/13/2009.

“Motion to Challenge jurisdiction/venue to be filed by 1/13/09. Responses to be filed by 1/27/2009. Replies to be filed by 2/3/2009. Jury Selection set for 1/29/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 30A before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. Jury Trial set for 2/1/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 30A before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. Status/Motion Hearing set for 2/17/2009 10:15 AM in Courtroom 30A before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. Pretrial Conference set for 1/14/2010 10:00 AM in Courtroom 30A before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. Joint Motion by parties to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act until the filing of motions on 1/13/09.

“The Court finds that it is in the interest of justice to exclude Speedy Trial time because of the complexity of this case. Motion by defendants to unseal the plea agreement and transcript in the Ridgeway Case, heard and granted over the objections by the government. The Court rules that in the interest of justice, said documents shall be unsealed within 90 days. Each defendant is releaseed on his own personal recogizance. […]”

January 5^th, 2009 - Joint Defense Motion

“[…] In the present motion, the defendants ask the Court to unseal all records pertaining to the plea proceeding of Jeremy Ridgeway. The material sought can be categorized into three general categories: (1) all plea papers and documents filed with the Court, (2) copies of any and all documents pertaining to the Government’s arrest of Mr. Ridgeway including arrest warrant(s) and affidavit(s), and (3) transcripts of Mr. Ridgeway’s plea proceedings.

“There is a compelling constitutional right for free and public access to all information and proceedings presented in our courts. Here, no countervailing interest would be adversely prejudiced by unsealing all information related to Mr. Ridgeway’s plea agreement proceedings given the fact that the Government itself has already moved to unseal the criminal information and factual proffer and, in a nationally televised press conference, publicized the fact of Mr. Ridgeway’s guilty plea. In contrast, the defendants will suffer prejudice if they are not able to obtain access to all documents related to Mr. Ridgeway’s proceeding before the Court, given that this information is critical to the defendants’ significant Constitutional legal challenges to the Government’s attempt to create venue in the District of Columbia. […]”

January 5^th, 2009 - Notice of Hearing

Notice of hearing as to Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball Arraignment set for 1/6/2009 at 2:00 PM in Courtroom 30, Annex Building, Sixth Floor before Judge Ricardo M. Urbina.

December 16^th, 2008 - Warrant for Arrest

December 8^th, 2008 - Amended Order Setting Conditions of Release

December 8^th, 2008 - Memorandum Decision & Order

“[…] In summary, this court concludes that it would be redundant to revisit the issue of probable cause. In addition, this court finds it has no authority to do so after the grand jury has acted. Moreover, to the extent this court determines that Defendants are entitled to a probable cause determination under the MEJA, this court makes that determination by relying upon and adopting the probable cause finding previously made by the grand jury. For all of these reasons, Defendants’ motion for a probable cause hearing is denied.

“[…] Based on the court’s conclusion with respect to Defendants’ entitlement to a probable cause hearing under the MEJA, the court will not reach Defendants’ underlying arguments with respect to jurisdiction and venue. Without commenting on or addressing the merits of those arguments, the court finds that they are not appropriate for an initial appearance and, instead, are best addressed by the District Court in the District of Columbia during the normal course of pretrial motion practice. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for a determination that no probable cause exists based on a lack of jurisdiction and improper venue is moot based on the court’s denial of Defendants’ motion for a probable cause hearing, and therefore, it is denied. […]”

December 8^th, 2008 - Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motions for Pre-Trial Release

“[…] The defendants in the above-captioned matter have each filed a Motion for Immediate Pre-Trial Release. As explained more fully below, the Court should deny these motions as moot.

“A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has already returned an indictment against the defendants on the charges on which the defendants elected to self surrender in this District. The defendants are presently scheduled to appear for arraignment on that indictment before United States District Judge Ricardo M. Urbina of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on January 6, 2009, at 2 p.m. The United States respectfully requests that the Court set conditions of release sufficient to assure the safety of the community and to assure the defendants’ appearance in Court. […]”

December 8^th, 2008 - Government’s Response to Defendants’ Motion for Probable Cause

“[…] The defendants in the above-captioned matter have moved jointly pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and 18 U.S.C. § 3265(b) for an immediate probable cause hearing in this District. As explained more fully below, the defendants are not entitled to a probable cause hearing, in this District or elsewhere. Moreover, Rule 5(c)(3)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires this Court to transfer this case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

“A federal grand jury in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has already returned an indictment against the defendants on the charges on which the defendants elected to self surrender in this District. The defendants are presently scheduled to appear for arraignment on that indictment before United States District Judge Ricardo M. Urbina of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on January 6, 2009, at 2 p.m. For these and other reasons that may appear to this Court, the defendants’ request for an immediate probable cause hearing should be denied, the defendants’ initial appearances in this District should be conducted pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, appropriate release conditions should be set, and this case should be transferred for all further proceedings to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. […]”

December 8^th, 2008 - Notice of Unsealing

“Notice of Unsealing Criminal Case as to Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball. Case unsealed in open court 12/8/08 […]”

December 8^th, 2008 - Minute Entry for Proceedings Held before Mag. Judge Paul M. Warner

“Initial Appearance in Rule 5/5.1 Proceedings as to Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball held on 12/8/2008. All dfts present with counsel in custody. Govt makes oral motion to unseal case. Court grants govt’s motion. This case is now unsealed. Waiver of Rule 5 hearings signed by all dfts and accepted in court. PTS reports received and reviewed by all parties.Govt does not seek detention. Court hears argument from all parties. Court orders all dfts released under standard and special condition. […].

“Court hears arguments on all pending motions. Motions […] for immediate release are moot. Motion (4) for overlength memorandum is granted. Motions […] denied and […] moot/denied without prejudice. Written order to follow. Dfts to self surrender on January 6, 2009 to the District of Columbia at 2:00 PM. Attorney for Plaintiff: John Huber and Michael Kennedy. Attorneys for Defendants: Brent Hatch, Paul Cassell, Michael Baratz, William Coffield, Thomas Connolly, Mark Hulkower, Steven McCool, Danny Onorato, David Schertler […]”

December 8^th, 2008 - Declaration of Brent O. Hatch in Support of Defendants’ Motion

December 8^th, 2008 - Defendants’ Motion & Memorandum for Finding of No Probable Cause

“[…] Defendants, jointly through counsel, and pursuant to Fed. R Crim. P. 5.1 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261 et seq., respectfully move this Court to order that there is no probable cause to believe that the Government has subject-matter jurisdiction to prosecute this matter and that there is a lack of venue in Washington, DC where the Indictment issued.

“In support of this motion, Defendants state as follows:

“1. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 5.1 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261 et seq., this Court has the power and obligation to determine whether there is probable cause to believe the Government has jurisdiction to prosecute these Defendants.

“2. Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261 et seq., the Government may only prosecute Defendants if they are Federal employees or contractors whose employment ‘relates to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas.’

“3. Defendants’ employment did not relate to supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas. Accordingly, there is no probable cause to believe that there is jurisdiction here.

“4. With respect to venue, Defendants have all been first arrested in Utah, not the District of Columbia. Therefore under 18 U.S.C. § 3238, venue does not lie in the District of Columbia. A sham arrest of an alleged joint offender does not change this conclusion and, even if venue somehow was created, it was at best mere ‘manufactured’ venue. Accordingly, there is no probable cause to believe that the venue element of the Indictment is supported.

“5. In support of this motion, Defendants submit their Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion For Finding Of No Probable Cause Due To Absence Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Lack Of Venue Pursuant To 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261 et seq. […]”

December 8^th, 2008 - Motion for Leave to File Memorandum in Excess of Page Limitation

“[…] Defendants move the Court for leave to file an overlength Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Finding of No Probable Cause Due to Absence of Subject Matter Jurisdiction And Lack of Venue Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3261, Et Seq.

“The Government’s vehicle for this prosecution is the recently amended and judicially untested Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3261 et seq. […]. The Act and its recent amendment extend the jurisdictional reach of American civilian criminal laws (including firearms laws) - which ordinarily do not apply beyond U.S. borders - to cover American civilians, including contractors, who work for the Department of Defense or whose work supports the mission of the Department of Defense overseas […].

“The Defendants here do not fall within the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, a decision the Act expressly confers on a Magistrate Judge to determine. They were not employed by the Department of Defense or under any Defense Department contract, nor were they employed in support of the Defense Department’s mission overseas. Rather, Defendants were employed pursuant to a Department of State contract to support the Department of State’s mission in Iraq.

“The Defendants respectfully submit that the legal issues raised in the motion and accompanying memorandum are complex and unique and cannot be properly briefed within the 25-page limit proscribed by DUCiv Rule 7-l(b)(4). […]”

December 8^th, 2008 - Defendants’ Motion & Memorandum for Probable Cause Hearing

“[…] Defendants, jointly through counsel, and pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 5(c)(3)(C), 5.1, and 18 U.S.C. § 3265(b), respectfully move this Court for an immediate probable cause hearing. In support of the request, Defendants respectfully submit the accompanying memorandum of law in support of this motion. […]”

U.S. vs. Slough, Slatten, Liberty, Heard & Ball

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia

Case-No.: CR-08-360

December 4^th, 2008 - Indictment

“[…] 1. On or about September 16, 2007, defendants Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, and Donald Wayne Ball, were employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1), that is:

“a. The defendants were employees and subcontractors of Blackwater Worldwide, a company contracting with the United States Department of State, who were employed to provide personal security services in the Republic of Iraq, which employment related to supporting the mission of the United States Depatment of Defense in the Republic of Iraq.

“b. The defendants were present and residing outside the United States in connection with their employment with Blackwater Worldwide.

“c. The defendants were not nationals of nor ordinarily residents in the Republic of Iraq.

“2. The conduct alleged in this Indictment occurred in and around the Nisur Square traffic circle in the city of Baghdad, in the Republic of Iraq.

“3. The conduct alleged in this Indictment constitutes offenses each of which would be punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

“4. The conduct alleged in this Indictment occurred outside of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district and within the venue of the United States District Coud for the District of Columbia, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 3238.

“5. On or about September 16, 2007, in tlie city of Baghdad, in the Republic of Iraq, defendants Paul Alvin Slough, Nicholas Abram Slatten, Evan Shawn Liberty, Dustin Laurent Heard, Donald Wayne Ball, and another joint offender known to the Grand Jury, unlawfully and intentionally, upon a sudden quarrel and heat of passion, did commit voluntary manslaughter, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1112, by killing the following individuals:

“Count One: Ahmed Haithem Ahmed Al Rubia'y

“Count Two: Mahassin Mohssen Kadhum Al-Khazali

“Count Three: Osama Fadhil Abbas

“Count Four: Ali Mohammed Hafedh Abdul Razzaq

“Count Five: Mohammed Abbbas Mahmoud

“Count Six: Qasim Mohamed Abbas Mahmoud

“Count Seven: Sa’adi Ali Abbas Alkarkh

“Count Eight: Mushtaq Karim Abd Al-Razzaq

“Count Nine: Ghaniyah Hassan Ali

“Count Ten: Ibrahim Abid Ayash

“Count Eleven: Hamoud Sa’eed Abttan

“Count Twelve: Uday lsmail Ibrahiem